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 This dissertation seeks to remedy the gap in the scholarship pertaining to the 
intersection of justice and aesthetics in 1790s British literature.  While many critics have 
considered the literature of this period within the historical context of the French 
Revolution and its tumultuous aftermath, few have questioned how contemporary writers 
use specific aesthetic categories to argue for egalitarian social change.  My inquiry, 
however, is not limited to a discussion of the overlap between aesthetics and justice in 
early British Romantic-era literature.  In addition to examining how Helen Maria 
Williams, Mary Wollstonecraft, William Godwin, and William Blake radically rewrite 
sensibility and the sublime to articulate the possibility of justice, I also argue that these 
writers radically rethink subjectivity and demonstrate a parallel between formal aesthetic 
features and phenomenological identity structures.  Thus, this dissertation is an overture 
into the possibility of justice vis-à-vis aesthetic expression of, as Wollstonecraft conflates 
the term, “sublime sensibility” about human suffering under inequitable laws and social 
customs.  This aesthetic expression condemns the economic, physical, and emotional 
dislocation individuals endure, but it also harbors significant implications for how we 
understand the individual.  Conflating the traditionally segregated categories of 
sensibility and the sublime, these writers also challenge the notion of a unitary self and 
articulate instead the existence of the subject as multiple, the “I” as “we,” the “I” as, in 
Emmanuel Levinas’s term, “being-for-the-other” or, in my phrasing, “communal 
subjectivity.”  Just as community in the form of egalitarian justice is essential to the 
aesthetic constructions of sensibility and the sublime of Williams, Wollstonecraft, 
Godwin, and Blake, so too is community at the heart of subjectivity as announced by 
these writers.  Williams, Wollstonecraft, Godwin, and Blake deconstruct the traditional 
paradigms and uses of sensibility and the sublime, liberating them from aesthetic 
categories and resituating them onto sites of human egalitarian struggle.  These writers 
articulate a possibility of justice beyond the written laws and social customs that aim to 
enforce compliance.  The possibility of justice, for these writers, must be found beyond 
the call or command of the law, beyond, as Derrida describes it, the “force of law”; the 
possibility of justice, for these writers, is aesthetic(s). 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION: AESTHETICS AND 
 
THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 
 
 
The most unfailing herald, companion, and follower of the awakening of a great 
people to work a beneficial change in opinion or institution, is Poetry.  . . . Poets 
are the unacknowledged legislators of the World. 
— Percy Bysshe Shelley, “A Defence of Poetry” 
 
 
The most sublime act is to set another before you. 
— William Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell 
 
 
Overture(s) 
 This dissertation is an overture into the possibility of justice beyond the law.1  It is 
a proposal made with the aim of opening negotiations into the possibility of justice vis-à-
vis aesthetic expression of “sublime sensibility” about human suffering under inequitable 
laws and social customs.2  This aesthetic expression condemns the economic, physical, 
and emotional dislocation individuals endure, but it also harbors significant implications 
                                                
1 I take this phrase, “the possibility of justice,” from the symposium (and the subsequent 
published volume) entitled Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice.  The 
symposium was held during the fall of 1989 at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. 
2 Italicized words in the Overture(s) section are quoted from The Oxford English 
Dictionary, 3d ed., Dec. 2004, online version March 2011, 
http://www.oed.com:80/Entry/135281, accessed 19 April 2011.  The term “sublime 
sensibility” is used by Mary Wollstonecraft in Maria. 
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for how we understand the individual.  “Sublime sensibility” is a radical revision of the 
“individual” subject itself wherein the “I” is “we,” wherein the “I” is, in Emmanuel 
Levinas’s term, “being-for-the-other,” or, in Jean-Luc Nancy’s phrasing, “being singular 
plural,” or, in my expression, “communal subjectivity.”  This dissertation is a declaration 
about the way four early Romantic-era writers, Helen Maria Williams, Mary 
Wollstonecraft, William Godwin, and William Blake, deconstruct the traditional 
paradigms and uses of sensibility and the sublime to liberate them from aestheticized 
categories and resituate them as aesthetic practices and onto sites of human egalitarian 
struggle and communal subjectivity. 
Throughout this dissertation, I will write of the aesthetics of justice and of the 
justice of aesthetics.  I will write of “justice” and of “aesthetics,” however, not as a 
finished given, but as a Derridean gift, as a ceaseless aporia and atemporal overture that 
is the opening up or revelation of a matter between individual subjects that calls into 
question the very existence of those “individual” subjects.  This aporia reveals a 
nonjuridical sense of the rights and obligations between non-subjects.  And so, finally, 
this is my overture, my point of beginning or commencement that seeks to fill the 
overture—the hole—left in the way most scholars have written of justice and of 
aesthetics: that the possibility of justice must be found beyond the call or command of the 
law that “is always an authorized force, a force that justifies itself or is justified in 
applying itself, even if this justification may be judged from elsewhere to be unjust or 
unjustifiable” (Derrida, “Force of Law” 5).  My overture is that the possibility of justice 
is aesthetic(s). 
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There are specific, “real world” implications for considering the intersections of 
legal rights and aesthetic categories.  For example, discussing the work of Helen Maria 
Williams, I assert that it is through sensibility and the sublime that Williams—and, she 
hopes, her readers—comes to denounce primogeniture.  In this and other “real-world” 
examples, the instrument of injustice (primogeniture) is historically fixed.  However, the 
state of egalitarianism between individuals for which the writers in my dissertation argue 
also contains an atemporal, phenomenological element that is always already in process: 
justice arises from the way an individual comes to understand her own individuality only 
vis-à-vis her relation to another, and only vis-à-vis welcoming the other without 
assimilation.  The art of opening a space for egalitarianism without duplication or 
equivalency is justice and  “the declaration of peace itself” (Derrida, Adieu 47); 
assimilation is war, as “[w]ith the same, one is never at peace” (Derrida, Adieu 85).  
“Justice,” then, in this dissertation, is both burdened and liberated by its indebtedness to 
history, phenomenology, and, ultimately, aesthetics. 
 
Rethinking aesthetics and social justice 
The argument as well as the methodology at the center of this dissertation posits 
that aesthetics is not a discrete, segregated entity from social justice but rather a porous, 
related intervention that both clarifies and challenges our understanding of social justice.  
Further, the implications that aesthetics has for understanding social justice pertain not 
just to an isolated, excised moment of a literary or historical past, but to our present-day 
attempts to locate the possibility of justice.  In a recent PMLA special topic issue, 
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“Literary Criticism for the Twenty-First Century,” Jean-Jacques Lecercle asserts that “the 
task for twenty-first-century literary criticism is a return to the political” (916).3  Lecercle 
qualifies this assertion, however, by noting that he is “proposing not a return to the old 
Marxist concept of literature as a reflection of the historical, political, and linguistic 
conjunctures but an active concept of literature as an intervention in them” (919, 
emphasis mine).4  Indeed, just as the writers I discuss in this dissertation were, I argue, 
intervening into what is frequently understood as the “public” sphere of social justice via 
the oft-conceived “private” realm of aesthetics, I regard my methodology as offering a 
way to write and speak about the possibility of justice not just as it existed during a 
literary time period, but as it exists today. 
The idea that aesthetics enacts—and demands—progressive intervention into the 
social is reminiscent of Derek Attridge’s statement that “[w]e experience literary works 
less as objects than as events” (2).  This dissertation approaches the selected early 
Romantic-era texts not as closed documents but as dynamic events that function as sites 
of the human struggle for social justice and identity formation.  Although this dissertation 
                                                
3 In “Critical Paradigms,” Jonathan Culler’s introduction to the PMLA special issue, he 
notes that the unifying motif throughout the collected abstracts for and published articles 
in the issue is that of return.  In one of the cornerstone texts of late twentieth-century 
criticism, Terry Eagleton’s The Ideology of the Aesthetic, Eagleton argues that the idea of 
the aesthetic returns with such persistence because it is implicated in questions such as 
freedom and legality and autonomy (3).   
4 While I find illuminating Lecercle’s notion of literature as intervention, I dispute in part 
his claim that “[g]one are the days of committed criticism, gone also the days of formalist 
criticism (structuralism is behind us)” (919). 
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examines aesthetics as “sites of struggle,” my methodology is not primarily Marxist, just 
as my approach is not solely one deriving from deconstruction even though the 
dissertation questions the limitations and even legitimacy of logocentric, institutionally 
voiced justice.  Certainly, Althusser’s theory of interpellation and subjectivity is an 
important element of my discussion of justice and narrative process in Godwin’s Caleb 
Williams, yet so too is Derrida’s notion of hospitality central to my reading of 
nonjuridical justice in the same novel.  Indeed, this dissertation is guided by a network of 
critical drives: Marxist notions of ideological and material production, deconstruction’s 
urge to reveal the inherent multiplicity of linguistic and other stated universalist 
structures, new criticism’s exacting attention to formal aesthetic features, new 
historicism’s contextualism, and Levinasian and Derridean articulations of subjectivity as 
responsibility for the other.  My critical approach is also deeply indebted to the work of 
Saree Makdisi, whose scholarly work on subjects ranging from Blake to Palestine take up 
the question of text- and individual-as-network.  Ultimately, my hope is that this 
dissertation’s critical mode reflects the content of its argument: that aesthetics, justice, 
and subjectivity are all structural but not inflexible, ideological as well as material, and 
representational as well as epistemological and ontological. 
This dissertation offers a new way to understand the intersection of aesthetics and 
justice as it considers how sensibility and the sublime in texts by Williams, 
Wollstonecraft, Godwin, and Blake intervene into the essential questions pertaining to the 
possibility of nonjuridical human(e) justice.  Further, this dissertation draws important 
parallels between the reconstituted categories of sensibility and the sublime and an 
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identity theory that privileges the multiple over the singular as it analyzes how each 
writer transforms these conventional aesthetic categories to articulate a more egalitarian, 
humanist, and emancipated vision of agency that is communal subjectivity.  In “Said, 
Palestine, and the Humanism of Liberation,” Makdisi emphasizes the critical discourse 
that acknowledges that social justice is inexorable from aesthetic concerns.  Describing 
Edward Said’s notion of the collective individual denoted by the term “being-in-
common,” Makdisi argues that for Said, “humanism involved developing a logic of 
being-in-common, in which the task of interpretation was never confined to books, 
music, and art but also applied to life and to humanity itself” (452).  Similarly, writing of 
Blake’s texts, Makdisi notes that “art for Blake is not an isolated, abstract, and idealized 
activity, but rather an ensemble of material practices, makings, beings, thoughts, images, 
and imaginations that constitute and define life itself.  . . . Art for Blake is, in other 
words, a creative and an ontological activity, rather than simply a representational or 
epistemological one” (262-63). 
 
Rewriting sensibility and the sublime 
This dissertation argues that Helen Maria Williams, Mary Wollstonecraft, 
William Godwin, and William Blake rewrite the aesthetic categories of sensibility and 
the sublime in a way that rethinks the possibility of justice.  As I detail below, the term 
sensibility has come to mean many things in literary and cultural studies, from a large-
scale inquiry pertaining to “the quality of literary experience and its relation to moral and 
social behavior that concerned eighteenth-century writers and readers” (Keith, “Poetry, 
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Sentiment, and Sensibility” 127) to a specific physiological reference to a person’s 
heightened sensory perception.  In my discussion of how some early British Romantic-
era authors rewrite sensibility, I use the term to mean the literary expression of an 
individual’s receptivity to and profound concern for the unjust suffering of others.  I 
mean to signify sensibility as an aesthetic category in that I am looking at texts that 
invoke the stylistic tropes and signposts of the literature of sensibility.  However, 
sensibility in this dissertation is also always tied to justice, as a character is described as 
possessing fine sensibility only when that character is moved to remedy the inhuman(e) 
suffering caused by the written laws or entrenched social customs that cause social 
inequality.   
Of course there are variations on how Williams, Wollstonecraft, Godwin, and 
Blake employ the aesthetic category of sensibility, with Godwin and Blake being the 
most radical in their rewriting of the aesthetic category.  For example, for Godwin, it is 
not only a character who lacks sensibility when he or she does not recognize juridical 
inequity, but, as I will demonstrate in my discussion of Caleb Williams, Godwin 
describes the law itself as being monstrously inhuman(e) because of its insensibility.  
While Godwin extends the rhetoric of sensibility onto the law, Blake enacts the most 
extreme rewriting of sensibility.  Blake adopts many of the traditional components of 
sensibility dealing with empathetic and compassionate receptivity (and personifies them 
as Mercy, Pity, Peace, and Love) while transforming sensibility into what he calls Vision.  
As I argue below, Blake’s notion of Vision is a further rewriting of the aesthetic category 
of sensibility.     
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The term the sublime is also burdened by various meanings in eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century British literature and its scholarship.  Most frequently, the term is used 
synonymously with the rationally based Burkean or Kantian articulations, both of which 
incorporate elements of Longinian psychological transport.  In my argument that 
Williams, Wollstonecraft, Godwin, and Blake reject these notions of the sublime, I use 
the sublime to mean a realization about the necessity for universal equality and 
egalitarian justice and the communal nature of the individual subject.  Just as Blake most 
radically transforms sensibility into Vision, he also most radically rewrites the sublime 
into what I call the exemptive sublime.  Within my discussion of Blake, exemptive means 
freedom from interpretive mandates and heterodox meaning; the exemptive sublime 
means the reader’s realization that she possesses this freedom and can construct her own 
system of understanding.  The exemptive sublime, however, is an experience only for the 
reader who sees with Blakean Vision.   
Among the writers in my study, the sublime (including the Blakean exemptive 
sublime) cannot be severed from sensibility (including Blakean Vision), as the sublime is 
an experience that can only be attained if one possesses sensibility to the unjust suffering 
of others.  The terms the sublime and sensibility, then, are also unseverable from justice, 
by which in this dissertation I mean a state of egalitarianism between individuals.  
Individuals, of course, is complicated by my argument that the term individual may 
accurately refer to a specific biological person, but that subjectivity (and, thus, an 
individual subject) is always already a communal, relational process. 
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This rewriting, and the subsequent rethinking in this dissertation, involves 
analyzing all three elements—sensibility, the sublime, and justice—not as discrete and 
segregated but as communal and relational; indeed, these elements may more properly be 
thought of as modes, networks, or processes.  The operational mode of justice is always 
relational and set within the context of human exchange5; justice is always a process 
defined by navigating the network of legal rights, moral duties, and ethical imperatives 
that exist between an individual and his or her community; so too, I posit, are sensibility 
and the sublime of Williams, Wollstonecraft, Godwin, and Blake.  Locating a discourse 
of human—and humane—egalitarian exchange in the articulations of sensibility and the 
sublime of these writers, I demonstrate how they emphasize exchange not only in the 
literary content and thematic strings that tie these writers together, but in the formal 
aspects of their literature: “sensibility” and “the sublime” become dependent on each 
other in rhetorical expression (markers of sensibility are extended into the discourse of 
the sublime and vice versa).  The aesthetics of sensibility and the sublime, as constructed 
by the writers whom I discuss in this dissertation, emphasize community, equality, and 
actualization via a realization about the access to justice.  Specifically, people who do not 
have access to sensibility are characterized by these writers as inhuman and inhumanely 
unable to engage in relational, communal, human exchange.  Those who possess 
                                                
5 Because I am writing of social justice between individual subjects, and how sensibility 
and the sublime counters the very idea of “individual” subjects, I will confine my 
discussion to exchange between humans.  The confines of my discussion for purposes of 
this dissertation, however, is not meant to suggest that there were not other discourses of 
the necessity for egalitarian exchange between, for example, humans and animals. 
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sensibility, on the other hand, have access to sublime moments about the necessity for 
juridical egalitarianism (articulated as some equality pursuant to the written law) and a 
model of subjectivity that recognizes the communal nature of individual subjects.   
A dissertation that aspires to understand justice in aesthetic terms, and, namely, in 
the terms “sensibility” and “the sublime,” counters one major strain of the critical 
scholarship surrounding late eighteenth-century and early Romantic-era writing.  Perhaps 
because of the resoundingly uniform citation to Janet Todd’s Sensibility: An Introduction 
(1986), much of the critical discourse surrounding the “literature of sensibility,” as it is 
frequently named, has not found great scholarly value in either the body of literature or 
the aesthetic category by which it is classified.  Todd describes “the mark of sentimental 
literature” as “[t]he arousal of pathos through conventional situations, stock familial 
characters and rhetorical devices,” and suggests that this uninspired literature 
“buttonholes the reader and demands an emotional, even physical response” (2).6  
Perhaps more damaging to sensibility’s scholarly reception is Todd’s blunt conclusion 
                                                
6 Stressing what she regards as the pedantic and pedagogical paradigms of “sentimental 
literature,” Todd describes sensibility’s prescriptive design as “exemplary of emotion, 
teaching its consumers to produce a response equivalent to the one presented in its 
episodes,” and as literature that “moralizes more than it analyzes” (4).  Suzanne Keen 
similarly views sentimental literature as “exploit[ing] its consumers’ appetites for feeling, 
taking on a pedagogical role and training its readers in emotional responses through 
exemplary responses of its characters” (46).    
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that sentimental texts “require no deconstructing . . . and they discourage multiple 
readings” (3).7   
My reading of sensibility understands this aesthetic category in less restrictive 
ways and builds upon the scholarship that has identified its public implications and even 
radical elements.  For example, although G. J. Barker-Benfield continues to promulgate a 
reading of sensibility that emphasizes the “receptivity of the senses,” in The Culture of 
Sensibility: Sex and Society in Eighteenth-Century Britain (1992) Barker-Benfield shifts 
sensibility from defining a specific literary genre detailing the escapades of emotionally 
overwrought, individual characters to a mode of experiencing the world that defined an 
entire culture.  Barker-Benfield explains sensibility as denoting 
 
the receptivity of the senses and referr[ing] to the psychoperpetual scheme 
explained and systematized by Newton and Locke.  It connoted the operation of 
the nervous system, the material basis for consciousness.  During the eighteenth 
century, this psychoperpetual scheme became a paradigm, meaning not only 
consciousness in general but a particular kind of consciousness, one that could be 
further sensitized in order to be more acutely responsive to signals from the 
outside environment and from inside the body.  (xviii) 
 
Despite this more holistic view of sensibility, Barker-Benfield’s discussion stays 
primarily grounded in analyzing the implications of sensibility in relation to then-
changing gender associations and the contemporary rise of a consumerist middle class.  
Some scholars have attempted to broaden an understanding of sensibility as a 
                                                
7 Todd does, however, assign some critical agency to the literature of sensibility in the 
way in which it marries aesthetics and ethics to reveal an “aesthetic quality of virtue” and 
an alliance of literature and moral philosophy (3). 
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progressive, humanistic, and communitarian aesthetics, which is a reading more in line 
with the critical position announced in Chris Jones’s Radical Sensibility: Literature and 
Ideas in the 1790s (1993).  In this and other texts,8 Jones argues that writers used 
sensibility to suggest a radical reimagining of the social bonds and the importance of 
egalitarian “fellow-feeling.”  More recently, critics have noted that “a nerve-based 
sensitivity and susceptibility is only one side of the story” (Bray 81), and that the 
literature of sensibility “shows reason and feeling in constant negotiation and interaction 
within consciousness, with neither triumphing over the other” (Bray 92).9  Scholars have 
also considered the more philosophical and phenomenological aspects of what was once 
thought of as a trifling aesthetic category and have placed sensibility in broader, 
multidisciplinary discourses.10  However, this dissertation seeks to fill a hole in the 
critical discourse surrounding this topic by arguing that sensibility has not only political 
                                                
8 See Chris Jones, “Helen Maria Williams and Radical Sensibility.”  See also Chris Jones, 
“Travelling Hopefully: Helen Maria Williams and the Feminine Discourse of 
Sensibility.” 
9 In The Poetics of Sensibility: A Revolution in Literary Style, Jerome McGann similarly 
states that sensibility “brought a revolution to poetic style exactly by arguing—by 
‘showing and telling’—that the traditional view of mind and reason would no longer 
serve a truly reasonable . . . mind” (5). 
10 Evan Gottlieb has discussed how discourses of sympathy were essential to modern 
British identity formation, and Vivasvan Soni has argued that sentimentalism “is an 
ethics of tragedy, in the precise sense that it is an ethics that emerges from a 
phenomenology of tragic theatergoing” (296). 
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implications, but phenomenological and juridical ones as well, by arguing that the 
rhetoric of sensibility is rooted in egalitarian justice and communal subjectivity. 
Certainly, there is a tradition of considering the close alignment of sensibility and 
moral theory that dates back to the initial articulations of “moral sentiments.”  In The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), Adam Smith, following a discourse set in motion by 
the third Earl of Shaftesbury and the Scottish Enlightenment theorists Francis Hutcheson 
and David Hume, directly linked the capacity to feel sympathy with another person with 
the quality of being a virtuous person.  At the deepest roots of humanity, Smith argues, is 
the act of engaging in benevolent human exchange. 
 
[T]he sweetness of [one’s] sympathy more than compensates the bitterness of that 
sorrow, which, in order to excite this sympathy, they had thus enlivened and 
renewed.  The cruelest insult, on the contrary, which can be offered to the 
unfortunate, is to appear to make light of their calamities.  To seem not to be 
affected with the joy of our companions is but want of politeness; but not to wear 
a serious countenance when they tell us their afflictions, is real and gross 
inhumanity.  (19) 
 
Smith’s theory is grounded in the idea that the duties and obligations of human conduct—
that just and moral actions—are situated in sympathetic human exchange not only or 
even primarily in legal mandates or juridical codes.  Smith writes that  
 
[w]ere it possible that a human creature could grow up to manhood in some 
solitary place, without any communication with his own species, he could no 
more think of his own character, of the propriety or demerit of his own sentiments 
and conduct, of the beauty or deformity of his own mind, than of the beauty or 
deformity of his own face.  All these are objects which he cannot easily see, 
which naturally he does not look at, and with regard to which he is provided with 
no mirror which can present them to his view.  Bring him into society, and he is 
immediately provided with the mirror which he wanted before.  (129) 
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Smith’s moral philosophy begins with a human subjective emergence that occupies the 
shared space of the aesthetic (beauty and deformity) and the social.  According to Smith, 
an individual is always a multiple, communal subject and can never make nonrelational 
moral judgments.  As Saba Bahar explains it, for Smith “there can be no ‘I’ without an 
other who shapes, modifies and consolidates personal identity” (97).  It is only through 
imagining how we are perceived by others (or, more specifically, how an individual is 
perceived by Smith’s “impartial spectator”) that we can understand the harmony of 
benevolent or the discord of unjust moral actions.  Noting the intersection of aesthetics 
and community underlying Smith’s I-other, spectator-object formula for identity 
formation, Bahar argues that Smith places subjectivity into the sphere of “social theater” 
that is “interactive and dialogic” (97).  Similarly, Andrew Ashfield and Peter de Bolla 
have recognized that for Smith, the aesthetic cannot be understood as a separate realm 
from interpersonal, human conduct (4).11  
Smith himself emphasizes the component of human “equitable justice” in 
aesthetic considerations.12  In a passage reminiscent of the aesthetic discourse Edmund 
                                                
11 Noting the corporeal quality of aesthetics, Terry Eagleton opens the first chapter of The 
Ideology of the Aesthetic with the seemingly counterintuitive sentence: “Aesthetics is 
born as a discourse of the body” (13).  Eagleton continues by explaining that “[i]n its 
original formulation by the German philosopher Alexander Baumgarten, the term refers 
not in the first place to art, but, as the Greek aisthesis would suggest, to the whole region 
of human perception and sensation, in contrast to the more rarefied domain of conceptual 
thought” (13).    
12 Dieter Paul Polloczek writes that sympathy functioned as a “nonlegal rhetorical 
institution[] of equitable justice” (vii). 
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Burke presented in A Philosophical Enquiry into the Sublime and Beautiful, published 
two years before the publication of Moral Sentiments, Smith discusses the difference 
between the road that leads to the acquisition of wealth, greatness, and moral corruption, 
and the road that leads to the attainment of wisdom, virtue, and moral fortitude.  These 
two different “pictures” appeal to two different kinds of people: those who are 
characterized by “proud ambition and ostentatious avidity,” and those who embody 
“humble modesty and equitable justice” (73).  Smith describes the pictures in this way: 
 
[T]he one more gaudy and glittering in its colouring; the other more correct and 
more exquisitely beautiful in its outline: the one forcing itself upon the notice of 
every wandering eye; the other, attracting the attention of scarce any body but the 
most studious and careful observer.  They are the wise and the virtuous chiefly, a 
select, though, I am afraid, but a small party, who are the real and steady admirers 
of wisdom and virtue.  The mob of mankind are the admirers and the worshippers, 
and, what may seem more extraordinary, most frequently the disinterested 
admirers and worshippers, of wealth and greatness. (73) 
 
For Smith, the picture that attracts those who are motivated to serve their own individual 
interests of pride and greed is intense, imposing, and associated with the vastness of a 
mob; the picture that stirs those who are motivated by an emphasis on communal well-
being is subdued, harmonious, and associated with a limited but virtuous group.  The 
former picture harkens back to Burke’s description of a sublime object, which in part is 
rugged, negligent, and enormous; the latter picture is reminiscent of Burke’s beautiful 
object, which is small, smooth, and polished.   
Although Smith explicates his moral theory with language that recalls Burke’s 
descriptions of the beautiful and the sublime in Enquiry into the Sublime and Beautiful, 
Smith is no Burkean.  The prevailing distinction between their theories is the benevolent, 
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interpersonal communitarianism that permeates Smith’s text and the self-interested, 
isolated segregation that defines Burke’s.  Burke’s aesthetic theory of the sublime is 
founded on rigid laws of demarcation about what specifically qualifies as “the sublime” 
versus “the beautiful.”  Ashfield and De Bolla characterize Burke’s methodology as one 
that “seeks to fragment and fracture our experiences of the sublime in order to create as 
full a taxonomy as possible” (5).13  In sharp contrast to Smith’s theory of how sensibility 
can move individual actors to remedy communal inequity, Burke’s theory of the sublime 
privileges self-preservation above all else.  Burke explains that “[t]he passions which 
concern self-preservation, turn mostly on pain and danger,” and that these “are the most 
powerful of all the passions” (36; emphasis in original).  Furthering the divide between 
Smith and Burke is Burke’s emphasis on distance and isolation from the events that 
evoke a sublime experience:  “When danger or pain press too nearly, they are incapable 
of giving any delight, and are simply terrible; but at certain distances, and with certain 
modifications, they may be, and they are delightful” (36-7).  Reminiscent of the later 
Kantian ideal of “disinterested” aesthetic judgment, Burke’s sublime requires a 
detachment from the human exchange that is essential for Smith.  Frances Ferguson 
comments that both Burke and Kant “link the beautiful with society and the sublime with 
individuals isolated either by the simple fact of their solitude or by an heroic distinction 
that sets them apart even as they participate in social enterprises” (3). 
                                                
13 The inadequacy of establishing a “taxonomy” of the sublime mirrors Susan Manning’s 
statement that attempts to define sensibility by specific, delineated characteristics is a 
“fiction of taxonomy” (82). 
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Given Burke’s monolithic presence in eighteenth-century British discourse of 
theories of the sublime, it is not surprising that twentieth-century scholars have applied a 
fundamentally Burkean paradigm to their readings of late-eighteenth century and early-
Romantic articulations of the sublime.14  Yet this paradigm wrongly “assume[s] the 
existence of a generic British ‘romantic’ discourse on the sublime that is both 
uncomplicatedly idealising and largely apolitical” (Duffy 2).  In other words, this 
paradigm strips any communal, human component out of the sublime.  As this 
dissertation argues, such a paradigm ignores the aesthetics of the sublime (and 
sensibility) articulated by contemporary writers who were breaking down the 
constitutive, formal laws of this aesthetic category to argue for egalitarian social justice.  
These writers did not just use an aesthetic category to describe acts of justice; rather, they 
deconstructed form and rebuilt it in a way that privileged the multiple community over 
the separate individual and nonjuridical equity over legally-sanctioned laws. 
 
Chapters overview 
Chapters are organized by author, and the order is roughly chronological based on 
the publication date of the main text discussed in the chapter.  However, all of the main 
                                                
14 Indeed, the two most frequently cited texts on the Romantic-era sublime do not account 
for the radical and decidedly anti-Burkean articulations and uses of the sublime by 
contemporary writers.  In The Romantic Sublime and in Solitude and the Sublime, 
Thomas Weiskel and Frances Ferguson both enact primarily Kantian-Burkean readings of 
the sublime.  For a discussion of the limitations of this and similar approaches, see 
Duffy’s introduction to Shelley and the Revolutionary Sublime. 
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texts I address were published in the 1790s, the tumultuous decade following the fall of 
the Bastille and the beginning of the French Revolution.  While the egalitarian ethos 
flowing across the English Channel from France was initially received with widespread 
approval, by 1790 the so-called “revolution controversy” was already underway.  Within 
months of Edmund Burke’s chastising the Revolution in Reflections on the Revolution in 
France (1790), Mary Wollstonecraft published a rebuke in A Vindication of the Rights of 
Men (1790), while Thomas Paine continued the castigation of Burke in Rights of Man 
(1791).  The debate about parliamentary reform, inheritance rights, and the role of a 
monarchy was certainly not limited to printed books and pamphlets.  Societies (such as 
the prominent London Corresponding Society) called for a reconsideration of who should 
be afforded legal rights as well as for a renunciation of entrenched social customs that 
enforced separation among class and gender lines.  Indeed, these calls became so 
threatening to the ruling class that in 1795 Parliament enacted the Treason Act and the 
Seditious Meetings Act.  These laws provided the government with a legal means of 
silencing prominent “Jacobins,” such as the radical leaders John Thelwall, John Horne 
Tooke, and Thomas Hardy, all of whom were arrested and tried under the laws although 
eventually acquitted.  The government clampdown was so caustic that booksellers 
refused to publish the preface to Godwin’s Caleb Williams (1794) in its first editions for 
fear of being prosecuted. 
As the main texts I discuss were all published within the 1790s, the chapters are 
primarily arranged according to how the authors rewrite and radicalize sensibility and the 
sublime to argue for egalitarian justice and articulate notions of communal subjectivity; 
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namely, the chapters are organized based on how radically sensibility and the sublime are 
resituated from aesthetic categories to aesthetic expressions of the possibility of justice 
where that justice is a humanism not based on social class, written laws, or hereditary 
customs, but on “inclusivity and community” (Makdisi, “Said, Palestine, and the 
Humanism of Liberation” 443).15  For example, I begin my discussion with Williams’s 
Letters Written in France because it is the text that adheres most closely to the 
traditionally conceived rhetoric and linguistic markers of sensibility and the sublime.  In 
other words, it is easier to recognize in Williams when the author is working with the 
formal conventions of sensibility and the sublime than when Blake is doing so.  Indeed, 
Blake so radically rewrites these aesthetic categories, and the formal conventions are so 
difficult to detect, that the terms of these categories must be similarly rewritten.  Thus, in 
my discussion of Blake’s rewriting of sensibility and the sublime I will speak of Blakean 
Vision and the Blakean exemptive sublime. 
In chapter 2, I argue that in Helen Maria Williams’s epistolary Letters Written in 
France, in the Summer 1790, not only does Williams infuse sensibility with an 
unwavering egalitarian ethos, but she also redefines the traditional separation between the 
aesthetic categories of sensibility and the sublime so that her aesthetics themselves 
rupture categorical division.  This rupturing, in which aesthetics is not a taxonomic 
bounding but rather a mode of expressive and equitable restructuring, characterizes her 
                                                
15 Writing about Edward Said’s discussion of the idea of Palestine, as opposed to the 
geographical place of Palestine, Makdisi characterizes Said’s argument as one about “a 
sense of justice and a concept of humanism not predicated on claims of ethnic, racial, or 
religious exclusivity but, rather, on inclusivity and community” (443). 
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radical humanism as much as it characterizes her radical aesthetics, for Williams’s texts 
announce a subjectivity founded on the notion of the subject as a communal structure.  In 
this structure, Williams defines the individual subject as a communal space possessing 
what I term “communal subjectivity.”  This phenomenological structure understands the 
individual to be a transpersonal, open, intersubjective community who is individuated 
through her relationship to and responsibility for others.   
Williams is an important starting place for my overall argument about the 
implications aesthetics have for the possibility of justice.  Because Letters Written in 
France are nonfictional, first-person accounts of historical events, Williams can offer her 
readers specific examples of how the aesthetic categories of sensibility and the sublime 
can spur human egalitarian justice.  Written in France one year after the fall of the 
Bastille, Williams uses the rhetoric of sensibility and the sublime to laud the French 
citizens who support the Revolution and work to enfranchise a wider segment of the 
population.  Explicitly aligning sensibility with the ability to experience a sublime 
realization that universal human rights must be recognized for all people, Williams 
suggests that a person’s insensibility causes that person to perpetuate social injustice.  
However, Williams also pointedly depicts these “real-world” implications in her poem 
“An American Tale” (1786).  In my reading of this poem, I demonstrate how communal 
subjectivity—the notion that subject and identity formation is always relational and 
rooted in human exchange—is closely aligned with Adam Smith’s theory of moral 
judgment and its reliance on the presence of the other; further, I show how Williams’s 
communal subjectivity and Smith’s theory of moral judgment resonate with Emmanuel 
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Levinas’s theory of subjectivity as ethical relation.  In this chapter, I will add a new strain 
of criticism to the scholarly discourse surrounding aesthetics to argue that through her 
reconfiguring of sensibility and the sublime, Williams articulates an egalitarian identity 
theory that presages post-structuralist and modernist thinking about the fluidity of 
personal identity and the narrative that there exists a unitary “self.”  Contrasting sharply 
with Burke’s notion of the sublime, which privileges power, segregation, distance, and 
limitation, Williams’s sublime is characterized by democratizing difference.  Just as 
Williams’s use of sensibility embodies a proto-Levinasian notion of individuation via 
sociability, her use of the sublime in her long poem “An American Tale” bears 
remarkable parallels to Derrida’s notion of individuation via hospitality and a 
rectification of the sin of separation, an aesthetics that parallels communal subjectivity.  
My reading of Mary Wollstonecraft’s work in chapter 3 picks up this thread of 
communal subjectivity.  I argue that although Wollstonecraft’s articulation of this process 
is not based on justice as ethical hospitality (as is the case, I posit, with Williams), her 
epistolary novel Maria; or, The Wrongs of Woman (published posthumously in 1798) 
also announces an understanding of egalitarian justice that is derived from the “sublime 
sensibility” of communal identification.  Indeed, despite the chorus of scholars who 
characterize Wollstonecraft as condemning sensibility and advocating reason alone as the 
most effective writing style, I demonstrate that Maria initiates an argument furthered by 
Godwin: that sensibility is an essential component of an individual’s ability to access a 
sublime realization about when one should disavow the written law and engage in a kind 
of civil disobedience.  Similar to the way in which Williams roots sensibility and the 
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sublime in communal, egalitarian ideals of liberty, Mary Wollstonecraft liberates 
sensibility and the sublime from aesthetic categories that privilege isolation and places 
them within the public discourse of social change.  In chapter 3, I focus primarily on 
Wollstonecraft’s oft-neglected novel.  I argue that in this novel, sensibility and the 
sublime are not discrete aesthetic categories but rather modes of human exchange that 
provide access to one’s liberating “own sense of justice.”  This justice, which one comes 
to know through “sublime sensibility,” as Wollstonecraft conflates the terms in the novel, 
is governed by communal natural rights mandates and not strict adherence to positive, 
written law.   
Just as Williams’s texts advocate a “real world” application of the message of 
egalitarian justice they espouse, Maria not only alters sensibility and the sublime into 
sites of political and personal transformation, but it also provides a practical model of 
how people, especially women, can accomplish this transformation.  In the most radical 
textual enactment of the interplay between aesthetics, justice, and personal agency in 
Maria, the protagonist argues in the court-room scene at the end of the novel that the all-
male jury should be moved by their hearts and heads to form a community of resistance 
to protest unjust, gender-biased laws by engaging in jury nullification.  Maria asserts that 
if her male counterparts fail to uphold the natural law, she will recover her own remedy 
not in a court of law but by engaging in a kind of proto civil disobedience and renouncing 
what Wollstonecraft describes in the Preface as “the partial laws and customs of society” 
(59). 
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William Godwin’s epistolary novel Things as They Are; or, The Adventures of 
Caleb Williams (1794) more radically suggests that no law is just because the very nature 
of judicially enforced codes is inherently suspect.  In chapter 4, I establish how Godwin 
uses the rhetoric of sensibility to describe the monstrous—or insensible—nature of the 
law and of those who have been corrupted by it.  Significantly, it is in sublime moments 
of recognition about the monstrosity of the law that characters are depicted as being the 
most human and the most humane.  Whereas Williams and Wollstonecraft demonstrate 
an egalitarian ethos underlying sensibility and the sublime and raise implications that 
ethos has for communal notions of both justice and identity formation, Godwin more 
directly and radically conflates the rhetoric of sensibility and the sublime with that 
frequently associated with articulations of justice.  In the process, Godwin suggests that 
justice is ultimately a narrative—and not a political—act that is grounded in “the sublime 
of true virtue and the pathos of true sympathy.” Godwin’s novel concludes that textual 
construction, justice, and identity formation are ideologies and material practices that are 
inextricable from each other.  I will examine this conclusion vis-à-vis Althusser’s theory 
of identity formation, which posits that the very act of identifying as an “I” is inseparable 
from ideological narrative prescription, conscription, and inscription.  In Caleb Williams, 
the narrator is unambiguous that justice and injustice are achieved through narrative acts, 
and that these narrative acts are the means by which individuals write themselves into—
and out of—existence.  
Emphasizing the humanistic foundation of his aesthetic and juridical theories, in 
Caleb Williams Godwin demonstrates that the “sublime of true virtue” and the “pathos of 
 
 
24 
true sympathy” are rooted in the human—and specifically humane—exchange at the 
heart of the then-nascent theory of ethical hospitality.  No one in Caleb Williams is more 
human(e) than Mr Raymond, the person who lives outside of the law with a “gang” who 
embody communitarian ideals of equality and liberation.  Harkening back to Williams’s 
notion of hospitality as justice, Godwin more rigorously investigates ethical hospitality.  
Surprisingly, Mr Raymond has received almost no scholarly attention; however, in my 
reading Mr Raymond is essential to the novel’s articulation of justice because he 
personifies a communal space of equality that is achieved through “the sublime of true 
virtue and the pathos of true sympathy.”  I also explain how Godwin’s text is reminiscent 
of Mary Wollstonecraft’s early articulations of jury nullification, as Godwin both 
explicitly reveals the inequity in the application of written laws and more implicitly uses 
the rhetoric of sensibility to argue that making rational decisions about justice starts with 
one’s heart and an acknowledgement about the fellow-feeling of communal ties that 
construct an individual. 
More than any other writer I discuss in this dissertation, William Blake formally 
enacts how aesthetic structures parallel subjective ones and offer an opening to approach 
the possibility of justice.  In chapter 5, I show how Blake transforms the aesthetic 
categories of sensibility and the sublime even more radically than the three writers who 
precede him in this dissertation so that sensibility becomes Vision and the sublime 
becomes what I call the exemptive sublime.  In this chapter, I focus primarily on Blake’s 
The [First] Book of Urizen (1794).  Although this long visual and verbal design has not 
generated as much scholarship as many of Blake’s other texts, it is essential to this 
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dissertation’s inquiry because it considers how an “individual” becomes physically 
constructed and psychologically constrained by multiple external and internal factors, 
such as written laws, familial and social customs, and most significantly, I argue, 
contemporary Enlightenment epistemological paradigms.  Indeed, in Urizen Blake 
rewrites more than the aesthetic categories of sensibility and the sublime; he rewrites the 
creation story of Genesis and, in doing so, redefines who should be held accountable 
under moral law for the Fall (at different moments in the poem we might answer Urizen, 
Los, or the Eternals), what the dictates of that law are, and who has authority to inscribe 
and prescribe what is normative.   
By reimagining logocentric origins, Urizen emphasizes (re)creation in its thematic 
content and formal structure as well as in how a reader can (re)create meaning in the 
world outside of the verbal and visual design.  In chapter 5, I examine how Blake’s text 
rebukes Enlightenment theories—and attendant metaphors and linguistic associations—
about knowledge and life, two elements that are at the center of the biblical and Urizenic 
creation stories; namely, Blake rewrites sensibility into Vision and recreates what it 
means to see (i.e., to have “light,” to be “enlightened,” to be out of the “dark”) and what 
it means to be ontologically viable (i.e., be out of the creative and generative “void”).  
For Blake, Vision is multiple and is contrasted against Enlightenment “single,” bounded, 
empirical vision; the Enlightenment eye is “vegetative,” biological, and mortal.  Blake 
co-opts some of the signposts of the literature of sensibility—such as enthusiasm, pity, 
and mercy—into his articulation of Vision, and he is explicit in his belief that those who 
look at the world with a vegetative eye have no Vision and thus no empathy.   
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Commonly referred to as “composite art” because of Blake’s use of both verbal 
and visual designs, Blake’s texts emphasize the resonances between aesthetic structures 
and experiences of the sublime.16  Rather than producing a sense of frustration on the part 
of the reader that feels limiting, arresting, or dysfunctional, the texts offer a new way of 
reading just as they offer a new way of seeing, and this way of reading and seeing is what 
I designate as the exemptive sublime.  In this space, meaning is neither tyrannically 
mandated nor teleologically structured; meaning originates with the reader and not with 
the Logos.  The exemptive sublime is a productive space of liberty that is outside of 
orthodox interpretation or even assumption and, thus, outside of juridical commands.  As 
the originator of meaning, as an agent of Vision, the reader must create “a new way of 
making the world” that is born from “a new way of sharing, of loving, of living, of being 
in common” (Makdisi, Impossible History 263).  Just as the sublime articulated by 
Williams, Wollstonecraft, and Godwin can only be reached via sensibility, the Blakean 
exemptive sublime is open only to a reader with empathetic Vision.  Similarly, the 
“sublime sensibility” of the first three writers always implicates issues of social justice, 
and, as a state of (re)creative multiplicity, the Blakean exemptive sublime is tied to 
justice because it is a space of emancipation from the injustice of orthodoxy and 
hegemony.  
 In the conclusion, I accept Blake’s challenge (as I hope I will have been doing 
throughout the dissertation) to write about a new way of making meaning about the 
                                                
16 The term used by W. J. T. Mitchell in Blake’s Composite Art: A Study of the 
Illuminated Poetry. 
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intersection of aesthetics and justice, a new way of seeing an “old” (and, specifically, 
critically mined) text, by offering a reading of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein.  In the 
conclusion, I more rigorously investigate how Levinas’s theory of justice as being-for-
the-other and Derrida’s theory of hospitality deeply implicate the aesthetic categories of 
sensibility and the sublime and the notion of communal subjectivity, but also how these 
twentieth-century articulations of nonjuridical responsibility have direct implications not 
just for Romantic-era literature, but for how we might proceed as we write about 
aesthetics and the very real possibility of justice.
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CHAPTER II 
 
“A LINE OF CONNECTION ACROSS THE DIVIDED WORLD”:  
 
JUSTICE, AESTHETICS, AND COMMUNITY IN  
 
HELEN MARIA WILLIAMS’S LETTERS AND POEMS 
 
 
[I]t may possibly be within the compass of human ability to form a system of 
politics, which, like a modern ship of discovery . . . sailing sublimely over the 
untracked ocean, unites those together whom nature seemed for ever to have 
separated, and throws a line of connection across the divided world.  
— Helen Maria Williams, Letters Written in France  
 
 
The one is responsible for the sin of the other.  I am in principle responsible, prior 
to the justice that makes distributions, before the measurements of justice.  . . . 
The other engages you in a situation where you are obligated without culpability, 
but your obligation is not less for all that.  It is at the same time a charge.  It is 
heavy and, if you will, goodness is just that. 
— Emmanuel Levinas, “Proximity”  
 
 
A line of connection 
The literature of sensibility offers a complex space of inquiry about the 
intersection of egalitarian ethics, literary aesthetics, and juridical concerns.  Because 
sensibility is rooted in acting with benevolence toward others and cultivating “fellow-
feeling,” there are inextricable communal and subjective elements underlying the 
aesthetic category of sensibility.  Despite the relevance of sensibility to questions about 
what literature can say and do about the possibility of justice between humans, the 
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literature of sensibility has undergone a complicated critical reception.1  As Susan 
Manning has remarked, sensibility has not yet triumphed over its “embarrassing 
association” (80) with an aesthetics of uncontrolled and uncontrollable emotional 
response and stock characters such as the “man of feeling” and the female figure 
embodying virtue in distress.  In Radical Sensibility, Chris Jones explains that the 
trouncing of sensibility even at its literary inception was propelled in part by anti-Jacobin 
sentiment, which considered untethered emotion as a precursor to radicalized forms of 
social fracture and disavowal of the status quo.  Jones remarks that “[t]he common anti-
Jacobin narrative paradigm aligns sensibility with selfishness, sees the cultivation of an 
enthusiastic aesthetic taste as self-indulgent, and deep sympathetic emotions as 
dangerous” (16).  Jones explains that anti-Jacobin satirists did such a good job of 
derailing the aesthetics of sensibility by “ridiculing and suppressing the threat of radical 
sensibility” that, to this day, readers and critics alike “have difficulty in responding 
seriously to the language of sensibility” (17). 
Adding to the scholarly conversation that finds critical significance in the 
aesthetic category of sensibility, scholars have criticized as “a fiction of taxonomy” the 
restrictive lens through which literary history has attempted to define and categorize 
sensibility, noting that rather than expressing a specific period of time (mid- to late-
eighteenth century), a philosophical approach (anti-rationalist), or a mere celebration of 
                                                
1 For a summary of the critical treatment the literature of sensibility has received, see 
Carey, especially 5-9.  For scholarship that provides an overview and identifies common 
traits of the aesthetic category “sensibility,” see Pinch, “Sensibility”; see also Manning. 
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somatic empiricism, sensibility is “a system of relations and ruptures” (Manning 82).  
Manning herself, though, places this “system of relations and ruptures” within the larger 
purview of “a fluctuating but continuous repertoire in emotional representation” (82).  
The emphasis on emotional representation is clearly supported in the literature of 
sensibility; however, as I will demonstrate in this and other chapters of this dissertation, I 
extend the critical lens of sensibility to argue that sensibility is also an aesthetics of 
juridical and phenomenological representation.  Similarly, there is a critical narrative that 
considers the affective, melodramatic elements as part of a larger, didactic rhetorical 
writing strategy and situates the aesthetics of sensibility within various contexts and 
inquiries.  For example, G. J. Barker-Benfield analyzes the gender implications of 
sensibility in relation to the rise of the female middle-class readership, and how this 
readership provided a public space for previously private, domestic matters.2  Barker-
Benfield even locates nascent stages of feminism in the “culture of sensibility,” 
explaining that the public reading forum allowed female writers to publicize issues of 
gender inequality and spurred group awareness on the part of women regarding their 
“victimization” by men (xviii).  However, discussing the transformation of gender roles 
and expectations that occurred at the site of sensibility, Barker-Benfield reads Helen 
Maria Williams as contributing negative stereotypes of the hyper-emotive female who 
idolizes the goddess of sensibility, a practice of emulation that “welcomes dependence 
and self-effacement” (265).  In Helen Maria Williams and the Age of Revolution, 
                                                
2 For further treatment of the gender and domestic/private versus political/public aspect 
of sensibility, see Armstrong, Desire and Domestic Fiction.  
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Deborah Kennedy supports the contention that Williams sometimes writes in a “self-
deprecatory” manner, but argues that “[a] self-deprecatory stance was a common strategy 
for women writers, and would probably have seemed especially necessary for one who 
published on a political topic, since there was a longstanding tradition of excluding 
women from political discussion” (63).  As I discuss later in this chapter, I read 
Williams’s writing as announcing not conservative gender stereotypes, but rather radical, 
humanistic subjective constructions. 
Other scholars have placed sensibility within a framework that links aesthetics 
and ethics, namely, within the Scottish Enlightenment school of moral philosophy3 that 
treats what is beautiful as what is good, virtuous, and true.  Significantly, this linking of 
aesthetics and ethics had a decidedly social dimension, as sensibility “came to denote the 
faculty of feeling, the capacity for extremely refined emotion and a quickness to display 
compassion for suffering” (Todd 7).  In “Natural Jurisprudence and the Theory of 
Justice,” Knud Haakonssen identifies a practical, behavioral aspect of the Scottish 
Enlightenment’s moral theory.  Haakonssen explains that one’s perceptive power 
“stimulated the response of the sentiments and thus directed action” (208).  Similarly, 
Andrew Ashfield and Peter de Bolla have explained that one cannot understand 
eighteenth-century British aesthetics as a category separate from conduct (4).   
                                                
3 The eighteenth-century Scottish Enlightenment is embodied primarily by Shaftesbury, 
Hutcheson, Hume, and Smith.  For a helpful summary of the main ideas and 
contributions of each of these philosophers to the practice of aestheticizing morality, see 
Todd 25-28. 
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The view that sensibility allowed a person access not just to his or her empathy 
for the troubled position of others, but to a desire to remedy such injustice, is the activist 
strain of sensibility of what Chris Jones has termed “radical sensibility.”4  Radical 
sensibility is contrasted to the sensibility of the trifling “man of feeling” depicted in such 
texts as Sterne’s A Sentimental Journey.  Writers of radical sensibility, such as Helen 
Maria Williams, deconstruct the traditional bonds of communal affiliation—such as 
bonds based on family and social rank— in favor of a “universal benevolence seeking the 
widest communal good” (Jones, “Helen Maria Williams and Radical Sensibility” 4).  
While the critical conversation about the activist branch of sensibility has done 
much to lift the aesthetic category out of its “embarrassing” place in literary history, the 
scholarship has not gone far enough.  This chapter addresses the gap in the scholarship 
and examines the connections in Williams’s texts between egalitarianism, aesthetics, and 
subjectivity.  My analysis of the “aesthetics” arm of this connection is not limited to 
Williams’s use of sensibility alone.  Building upon what critics have argued about 
Williams’s “radical sensibility,” this dissertation investigates how egalitarianism also 
operates vis-à-vis the aesthetic category of the sublime.  I significantly extend the critical 
narrative about Williams’s aesthetics by arguing that her rewriting of sensibility and the 
sublime evinces an equally revolutionary notion of the way in which aesthetic categories 
and form itself can articulate a notion of identity formation that is rooted in egalitarianism 
                                                
4 For a thorough discussion of “radical sensibility” see Jones, “Helen Maria Williams and 
Radical Sensibility,” “Travelling Hopefully: Helen Maria Williams and the Feminine 
Discourse of Sensibility,” and Radical Sensibility: Literature and Ideas in the 1790s. 
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and community.  This chapter asserts the novel argument that Williams characterizes the 
subject as a communal space individuated through a relationship to and responsibility for 
others in a way that presages post-structuralist and modernist thinking about the fluidity 
of personal identity and the narrative that there exists a unitary “self.”  
In this chapter, I demonstrate how in Letters Written in France, in the Summer 
1790 and in select poems, not only does Williams infuse sensibility with an unwavering 
egalitarian ethos, but she also redefines the traditional separation between the aesthetic 
categories of sensibility and the sublime so that her aesthetics themselves perform a 
rupturing of categorical division.  This rupturing, in which aesthetics is not a taxonomic 
bounding but rather a mode of expressive and equitable restructuring, characterizes her 
radical humanism as much as it characterizes her radical aesthetics, for Williams’s texts 
announce a subjectivity founded on the notion of the subject as a communal structure.  I 
argue that the radical nature of Williams’s use of aesthetic categories stems not just from 
its egalitarian urges, but from the ways sensibility and the sublime become gateways for 
expressing the communal ontological and phenomenological structures of the individual, 
of the “I” as “we.” 
I have analyzed primarily Letters because of the way it most acutely articulates 
how Williams revolutionizes the aesthetic categories of sensibility and the sublime, as 
well as how it announces a radical way of conceiving of identity formation.5  The 
                                                
5 The scholarship on Helen Maria Williams is far from prodigious, and while she 
published a number of nonfiction texts (primarily letters and essays) as well as 
collections of poetry between the years 1782 and 1827, the only critical edition of her 
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epistolarity of Letters is an interesting analogue to the egalitarian thematics of the text: 
just as Williams revises sensibility and the sublime to argue for a communal ethos and 
even subject formation, the text merges the traditionally separate realms of “private” 
letters and “public” novels.  Further, the way Williams uses aesthetic categories in Letters 
also complicates this traditional dichotomy, as she asserts that people of fine sensibility 
have access to the “private” matters of their heart which enables them to enact “public” 
egalitarian change.  However, the egalitarian practice of democratizing difference by 
emphasizing the communal nature of identity formation is not only a central element in 
Letters.  In the poem “An American Tale” (1786), Williams demonstrates an even earlier 
articulation of what she will advocate for in Letters: that identity formation is based in 
what I term communal subjectivity—the understanding of an individual as a 
transpersonal, open, intersubjective community.  Emphasizing the importance of an 
individual’s moral responsibility to act justly toward others even in the face of significant 
difference,  communal subjectivity can be more fully understood by reading it alongside 
Emmanuel Levinas’s articulation of subjectivity as responsibility for the other and 
Derrida’s notion of individuation via hospitality and a rectification of the sin of 
separation.  In the case of “An American Tale,” enacting justice takes the form of 
transcending the difference between American and Royalist soldiers. 
 
                                                
work is Letters Written in France (edited by Neil Fraistat and Susan S. Lanser).  Perhaps 
not surprisingly, Letters is one of the texts that is addressed more frequently in the limited 
Williams scholarship; other texts discussed are her poems “To Sensibility” (1786) and 
Peru, a Poem (1784), and her nonfiction A Farewell, for Two Years, to England (1791). 
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Democratizing difference 
“An American Tale” relates the story of an English father, his daughter Amelia, 
and her American lover Edward.  Underscoring the potential danger of difference to 
propagate war and division even among family members, Williams’s poem valorizes 
Edward for acknowledging the communal nature of individuals and enacting peace in the 
face of difference.  In “‘Storms of Sorrow’: The Poetry of Helen Maria Williams,” 
Deborah Kennedy characterizes Williams as a “pacifist poet” who lent her voice to the 
anti-war poetry that was sparked by the American Revolution and, more specifically, by 
the haunting quality of this war which pitted British soldiers against their own relatives 
who had emigrated (80).  Kennedy notes that Williams’s anti-war poetry “fails to recreate 
the historical scenes, but her aim was to depict and speak to a reality of the human heart 
that would transcend historical conditions” (79-80).  Indeed, poems like “An American 
Tale” emphasize “that all share a common humanity.  If one can be merciful to the 
enemy, even love and marry the enemy, then maybe peace can be restored” (82).  While 
the poem certainly demonstrates a “common humanity,” the human exchange and the 
expressions of sensibility and the sublime at the center of the text go further than 
recognizing commonality in the face of difference: the poem demonstrates how Williams 
revolutionizes aesthetic categories to express a mode of identity formation based on the 
subject as community.  In other words, her text demonstrates an early articulation of what 
would come to be associated with Levinasian and Derridean ethical subjectivity, or what 
I call Williams’s “communal subjectivity.” 
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In “An American Tale,” Williams blends the voices of an unrelated, third-party 
speaker with that of the first-person voices of Amelia, her unnamed, Royalist father, and 
her American lover, Edward.  The poem begins with the daughter placing herself in 
mortal danger to comfort her dying father, who was wounded in battle fighting for the 
British against the American forces, including Edward.  As her father’s wounds are too 
severe for him to live much longer, Amelia wishes to find peace in death alongside him: 
 
In vain thy wretched child is come, 
She comes too late to save! 
And only now can share thy doom, 
And share thy peaceful grave!  (6.1-4; 56) 
 
As Amelia consoles her father, he explains that a “Stranger,” an American soldier, had 
come to his aid despite their conflicting allegiances.  Praising the “ennobled mind” of the 
young soldier, Amelia’s father states: 
 
Born in the western world, his hand 
Maintains its hostile cause, 
And fierce against Britannia’s band 
His erring sword he draws; 
 
Yet feels the captive Briton’s woe; 
For his ennobled mind, 
Forgets the name of Britain’s foe, 
In love of human kind.  (9.1-10.4; 56)  
 
Although they were fighting for different countries, because of the young soldier’s 
enlightened awareness of and respect for his fellow-creatures, that is, his sensibility, he 
did not kill Amelia’s wounded father but rather helped to ease his pain and suffering.   
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The soldier’s activist compassion causes Amelia to draw comparisons between 
the “enemy” soldier and her lover, Edward, whom she believes died in battle.  Using 
rhetoric often associated with sensibility, Amelia notes that the soldier and Edward are 
similarly “ennobled” through their mercy and “kind pity.”  Amelia praises the way in 
which the soldier risked his own life “[t]o comfort, and to bless” the enemy (her father) 
who is now under his benevolent care.  She praises her lover’s “virtues that were thine.”  
Revealing himself to be her lover, Edward exclaims that his own father has relented in his 
insistence that he not unite with Amelia in the face of Edward’s “constant pain” during 
their separation.  He pledges that despite her father’s bellicose stance, Edward and 
Amelia will console her father’s grief until he passes away: 
 
And soon thy honor’d sire shall cease 
The captive’s lot to bear, 
And we, my love, will soothe to peace 
His griefs, with filial care.  (30.1-4; 60) 
 
Edward exclaims that despite their profoundly conflicting ideologies, allegiances, 
backgrounds, and personal histories, the two families will unite as one in compassion and 
benevolence.  Collective identity will be built upon the smoldering embers of violent 
separation.  Those once held “captive” will be liberated under “filial care.” 
While the traditional rhetoric of sensibility is at the fore of the poem, so too is the 
radical implication of Williams’s ethics.  Diction involving the physical manifestations of 
sensibility (“tears,” “pangs,” “pain,” “panting”), the psycho-emotional manifestations of 
sensibility (“ennobled mind,” “grief,” “sorrows”), and the communal dimensions of 
sensibility (“kind pity,” “Friendship,” “wounds to heal,” “love of human kind,” “mercy”) 
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predominate.  Yet the events of the poem enact the ultimate, materialized hope of 
Williams’s sensibility: that warring factions will come together via an acknowledgment 
of their shared humanity.  Kennedy finds this hope to be “Williams posit[ing], rather 
tenuously, an idealistic humanitarianism which will triumph over any worldly strife” 
(“Storms of Sorrow” 82); however, I find Kennedy’s reading too restrictive because it is 
grounded in an understanding of the individual as a unitary—and ultimately self-
interested—entity, which is the very theory of subjectivity that, I argue, Williams 
counters in her poem.  Williams’s hope is grounded in a radical understanding of 
communal subjectivity.  More than articulating a message about the importance of mercy 
for all people regardless of geographical or class situation—an articulation that was 
revolutionary in its own right—Williams’s sensibility posits that identity formation itself 
is grounded in an acceptance of the responsibility for the well-being of the other.  In 
addition to reimagining the relationship between the aesthetics of sensibility and the 
ethics of justice and equality, Williams’s texts reimagine the phenomenological and 
ontological structure of an individual as community.   
Emmanuel Levinas posits that subjectivity is built upon the edict that an 
individual has not merely a passive responsibility to do no violence to the other, but an 
active responsibility to welcome the other.  Derrida speaks of this Levinasian ethical 
responsibility as a kind of hospitality marked by an “ethico-metaphysical moment” (92) 
of welcoming the other, a moment that is “the declaration of peace itself” (Adieu 47).  
The phenomenologically based ethical philosophies of Levinas and Derrida emphasize 
non-violent, albeit radical, alterity based on collective identity, just as Williams’s radical 
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sensibility is premised upon notions of fundamental, human equality.  Alterity is deeply 
connected to equality because alterity finds the difference of the other to be sacred, not 
violent, and requires that one welcome the other while preserving this sacred difference.  
Indeed, what makes Edward’s acts in “An American Tale” so deeply illustrative of a 
notion of identity formation that is rooted in community is that he welcomes that which is 
not just different, but he also places his own existence at risk to take responsibility for 
keeping alive and honoring that which is deeply different.  In contrast, those who lack 
sensibility (such as the Baron du Fossé) are engaged in the violence of stratification and 
separation. 
The interrelation between sensibility and Levinasian and, later, Derridean 
subjectivity may be underscored by considering the violence inherent in Hegelian 
consciousness.  This consciousness calls for a process of “nullifying the object as distinct 
[from it], appropriating it as its own, and proclaiming itself as this certainty of being all 
reality, of being both itself and its object” (144).  The intrinsic violence in Hegel’s 
articulation of the self-other relationship is adamantly rejected by Levinas, who argues 
that otherness is not to be overcome and strong-armed into submission, but rather 
welcomed without being assimilated, without being extinguished.  Hegel’s being-for-
itself is contrasted against Levinas’ being-for-the-other, which seeks individuation 
through sociability rather than totalization.  In “The Proximity of the Other,” Levinas 
describes sociability as the “alterity of the face, of the for-the-other which calls me to 
account; it is the voice that rises in me before any verbal expression, within the mortality 
of the I, from the depths of my weakness.  This voice is an order to respond for the life of 
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the other man.  I do not have the right to leave him alone at his death” (215).  This 
principle of grave responsibility is literally enacted by Edward (and is found in the 
benevolent sympathy expressed by Mons. du Fossé). 
One of the charges that could be leveled against Williams’s sensibility is that it 
seeks to homogenize individual differences; however, this charge falters once we 
understand the common ties whereby sensibility privileges instead of assimilates 
difference.  In “An American Tale,” Edward, the American revolutionary, and Amelia’s 
father, the British Royalist, embody vastly different subject positions; however, their 
regard for the peace of what is common—though not the same—trumps the violence of 
fracture and segregation.  Indeed, it is in the space of radical alterity itself that communal 
bonds are formed, for “an encounter between the same is merely kinship, whereas 
hospitality arises out of an encounter between strangers” (Levinas 211).  In “An 
American Tale,” Edward is referred to as a “stranger” twice by Amelia.  This designation 
of difference underscores how Williams’s texts celebrate the efforts by those occupying 
vastly dissimilar subject positions to forge a “filial” bond under the guidance of 
sensibility and in an “ethico-metaphysical moment” of communal subjectivity.  “An 
American Tale” examines how communal subjectivity suggests the possibility of justice 
as justice is enacted within the confines of a poem.  However, four years after the poem’s 
publication Williams imports the notion of communal subjectivity into her nonfiction 
Letters Written in France.  In this text, Williams transforms aesthetic categories into 
mandates for social action when she employs the rhetoric of sensibility and the sublime to 
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laud the “real-world” egalitarian practices of French revolutionaries, practices which she 
describes as being rooted in sensibility and the sublime. 
 
Fine sensibility enacts justice 
Helen Maria Williams begins Letters Written in France with an anecdote that 
epitomizes how sensibility can offer a “real-world” possibility of justice.  She recounts a 
story in which she was interrupted in her writing by a visitor who conveys a “little 
incident” that so disturbs the author’s composure that she must immediately further the 
narrative and give it to her readers unadulterated and “warm from my heart.”  Williams 
explains how in the midst of deliberations about a more equitable system of hereditary 
property distribution among brothers, the National Assembly was itself interrupted by the 
eldest son of a man who was near death and who wished to be able to grant to his father 
the satisfaction of knowing that all of his male children would be provided for.  Although 
it would mean a great financial loss to himself, the son had come to implore the 
Assembly to pass the equitable decree for just property distribution under consideration. 
Williams writes of the son’s act: “If you are not affected by this circumstance, you have 
read it with very different feelings from those which I have written it: but if, on the 
contrary, you have fallen in love with this young Frenchman, do not imagine that your 
passion is singular, for I am violently in love with him myself” (89). 
The “feelings” with which the author has written about the incident are the 
disturbances felt by the heart of sensibility, a “psychoperceptual scheme” in which one’s 
consciousness is “sensitized in order to be more acutely responsive to signals from the 
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outside environment and from inside the body” (Barker-Benfield xvii).  In the incident 
described above, Williams rejoices at the selfless act by a brother who forgoes individual, 
personal interest for the sake of pluralistic, communal equality and happiness.  Although 
in this example it is the author herself who is deeply moved, throughout Letters Williams 
writes about people like the son who, because of their fine sensibility, are prompted to 
enact justice in the name of the communal good, even if their actions cause personal 
financial, physical, or emotional loss.  Egalitarianism is central to Williams’s “radical 
sensibility,” according to Chris Jones, who argues that it is a mistake to conflate the 
radical sensibility of writers like Helen Maria Williams with the conservative sensibility 
of figures like Edmund Burke.  Jones notes that Burke’s writing focuses on delineating 
and upholding the “traditional social responsibilities” of a community (Radical 
Sensibility 16).  For Burke, this community is identified vis-à-vis hierarchy, family, and 
local bonds (“Helen Maria Williams” 4).  However, Jones explains, Williams’s texts 
argue for a radical egalitarian notion of loyalty to the idea of the “widest communal 
good” (“Helen Maria Williams” 4). 
For Williams, the desire to produce the “widest communal good” was 
demonstrated in the post-Revolutionary practice of renouncing one’s title.  While the 
chasm between classes in ancient France was spurred by the system of nobility, in Letters 
Williams praises the National Assembly for abolishing the nobility and the French 
citizens who gave up their titles.  Williams frequently writes of the injustice of self-
interest that encourages hereditary rank, of “the absurdity of converting the rewards of 
personal merit into the inheritance of those who had perhaps so little claim to honours, 
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that they were a sort of oblique reproach on their character and conduct” (78).  Rather, 
she lauds the integrity of those of supreme “generous affections” who “have gloried in 
sacrificing titles, fortune, and even the personal ornaments . . . for the common cause” 
(79) of equality.  While titles bolster a communal identity based on the segregation and 
fracture of class position and social status, a rejection of such a mechanized system 
emboldens the “liberality of sentiment” that is concerned with “general sympathy” and 
equality.  In Williams’s rewriting of sensibility, possessing a “liberality of sentiment” is 
more than a revered character trait; it is the essential element that allows a person to be 
cognizant of and actively respond to social injustice.  If one does not have a liberality of 
sentiment, or fine sensibility, one cannot enact justice.  In Letters, this critical connection 
is embodied in Mons. du Fossé, who embodies fine sensibility and justice, and his father, 
the Baron du Fossé, who is emotionless and cruel.6   
The Baron is a material representation of the severe dangers of insensibility and a 
self-enclosed heart.7  Although it is Mons. du Fossé who is subjected to a cave-like prison 
after the Baron has his son jailed for marrying a woman below the family’s social class, 
the isolated, dark, cold dungeon may be viewed as a metaphor for the Baron, and, more 
specifically, for the way the Baron is emotionally cut off from his fellow-creatures.  
Completely lacking sensibility, the Baron represents the isolating captivity and 
                                                
6 Deborah Kennedy has described William’s story of the du Fossés as “a paradigmatic 
revolutionary narrative” (69). 
7 As I discuss in chapter 3, there is a striking similarity in the way tyrannical insensibility 
leads to cruel injustice as embodied by Williams’s Baron du Fossé and Godwin’s Squire 
Tyrrel. 
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segregation of the “aristocrate” mentality that prevailed throughout the ancien régime.  
Using language pertaining to sensibility, social stratification, and the ideology of pre-
Revolutionary France, Williams explains that the Baron is enclosed by self-interest and 
motivated by the preservation of his familial title, wealth, and consolidation of power: 
 
The endearing name of father conveyed no transport to his heart, which, being 
wrapt up in stern insensibility, was cold even to the common feelings of nature. 
The Baron’s austerity was not indeed confined to his son, but extended to 
all of his dependants.  Formed by nature for the support of the antient government 
of France, he maintained his aristocratic rights with unrelenting severity, ruled his 
feudal tenures with a rod of iron, and considered the lower order of people as a set 
of beings whose existence was tolerated merely for the use of the nobility.  The 
poor, he believed, were only born for suffering; and he determined, as far as in 
him lay, not to deprive them of their natural inheritance.  (115) 
 
The Baron may be seen as a unitary, isolated entity who individuates himself through the 
violence of separation and autocratic reign.  He is “the emblem of the institutions 
[Williams] opposed,” a self-enclosed figure who “emphatically rejects any sentimental 
role of ‘father’” (Kennedy, Helen Maria Williams 70).  The Baron clings to the rule of 
law of the ancien régime and the ethos of segregation underpinning that law.   
Sharply contrasting to the Baron is the younger du Fossé, who wholly embodies 
the new, democratic France and is a material representation of the liberty of passion and 
the zeal for an equalizing force.  Indeed, even when the Baron offers his son physical 
freedom if Mons. renounces his marriage, his son refuses, preferring to remain a man 
characterized by fine sensibility rather than enjoy pleasant physical surroundings.  
Reinventing the relationship between members of a community so as to replace singular 
difference with communal feeling and collective identity, Mons. du Fossé considers his 
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land tenants to be family and is lauded as doing nothing but good by the peasants who 
live in his district.  Returning once again to paternal language, albeit this time to praise 
the good will of Mons. du Fossé against the tyranny of the Baron, Williams notes that 
“Mons. du F— endeavors to banish misery from his possessions.  His tenants consider 
him as a father, and, ‘when the eye sees him it blesses him’” (139).  Deborah Kennedy 
has characterized Mons. du Fossé as exemplifying the “responsibility and affection” of an 
“ideal father” (Helen Maria Williams 70).  However, I read Mons. du Fossé as a more 
radical pronouncement of Williams’s use of sensibility.  A paradigmatic figure in Letters, 
he personifies the way in which a heightened regard for others can materially affect the 
rights and liberties of the community at large.   
Mons. du Fossé embodies the egalitarian ethos at the heart of Williams’s 
sensibility, and she is unapologetic in her effusive valorization of him.  She openly 
exclaims that her “love of the French revolution is, the natural result of this sympathy, 
and therefore my political creed is entirely an affair of the heart” (91).  Williams praises 
the leaders of the French revolution as being people who, like Mons. du Fossé,  
intimately understand the human heart and do not trust only the “force of reason” (90). 
Williams’s insistence that radical social change comes not through reason alone has 
prompted some scholars to establish a dichotomy between Williams’s construction of 
aesthetic categories and those constructed by many of her contemporaries.  For example, 
Steven Blakemore has argued that Williams and Mary Wollstonecraft display antithetical 
aesthetics in that Wollstonecraft privileges reason and judgment and Williams relies on 
 
 
46 
emotion and the heart (163).8  However, other scholars, such as Chris Jones, have argued 
that reason is a natural extension of—rather than an antagonistic reaction to—sensibility 
(Radical Sensibility 16).  Adela Pinch has explained the relationship between 
understanding and passion during the eighteenth century by commenting that 
“empiricism allow[ed] emotion to be a new way of knowing” (Strange Fits of Passion 
19).  The mandate for the recognition of natural rights that lies at the heart of Williams’s 
aesthetics complicates such a stark opposition between reason and emotion. 
R. S. White argues in Natural Rights and the Birth of Romanticism in the 1790s 
that emotion and reason are both folded into natural rights discourse: “When the issue of 
natural rights is placed at the centre of analysis, ‘sentimentality’ and rationality emerge as 
not always or necessarily antithetical, but as compatible.  What is rational is also 
emotionally satisfying” (4).  In her use of sensibility, Williams openly describes the 
aesthetic category as a driving force behind the seismic change in the politics of 
communal and egalitarian rights.  Again turning her comments to her “friend,” Mons. du 
Fossé, Williams continues: 
 
With respect to myself, I must acknowledge, that, in my admiration for the 
revolution in France, I blend the feelings of private friendship with my sympathy 
in public blessings; since the old constitution is connected in my mind with the 
image of a friend confined in the gloomy recesses of a dungeon, and pining in 
hopeless captivity; while, with the new constitution, I unite the soothing idea of 
his return to prosperity, honours, and happiness.  (93) 
 
                                                
8 The characterization of Wollstonecraft as being hostile to sensibility, and of sensibility 
being an aesthetic mode in opposition to a reason-based rhetorical approach, is a 
characterization that I dispute in the next chapter of this dissertation. 
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Lamenting her friend’s physical captivity under the hand of ancient tyranny as 
punishment for crossing class boundaries and uniting with a woman of “exquisite 
sensibility,” yet “obscure birth,” Williams again connects political freedom with 
passionate and cooperative sympathy (Letters 116-117).   
Just as the representations of the Baron and Mons. du Fossé underscore how 
Williams links emotional accessibility and freedom, Williams’s use of metaphors and 
personification to describe the figure of Liberty from the French and English perspectives 
further elucidates this connection.  Williams states: “Upon the whole, liberty appears in 
France adorned with the freshness of youth, and is loved with the ardour of passion.  In 
England she is seen in her matron state, and, like other ladies at that period, is beheld 
with sober veneration” (93).  For Williams, liberty springs most profoundly from “the 
ardour of passion” and must be safeguarded and encouraged not just in the privacy of 
intimate familial relationships but in the public space of wider communal exchange.  
Indeed, while physical demonstrations of emotion (such as weeping) had long been 
considered a private affair, Williams’s use of personification linking Lady Liberty with 
“the ardour of passion” resituates sensibility into the public domain.  In “Poetry, 
Sentiment, and Sensibility,” Jennifer Keith explains: “To make ideas into persons, to 
enlist the reader’s capacity to see them in the mind’s eye, puts flesh and blood on what 
could otherwise seem empty abstractions.  Thus, personification links images of persons 
with important concepts circulating in the culture” (132).  
Williams describes sympathy as if it were a material structure that moves among 
individuals and binds them in collective identity rather than as an abstract, intangible 
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emotion.  Deborah Kennedy has noted the communal components of Williams’s 
sensibility, explaining that Williams “considers sensibility as compassionate 
responsiveness, which provides a foundation for human relationship” and that Williams 
stresses the “communal nature of sensibility” (“Storms of Sorrow” 87).  Explaining the 
virus-like quality of eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century sensibility, Adela Pinch 
notes that feelings were characterized as “transpersonal” and “as autonomous entities that 
do not always belong to individuals but rather wander extravagantly from one person to 
another” (Strange Fits of Passion 3).  For Williams, sympathy is “caught from heart to 
heart with irresistible energy, fills every eye with tears, and throbs in every bosom” 
(Letters 90).  The ability to be moved to act and understand others as an integral 
component of one’s own self is essential in Williams’s egalitarian ethics and aesthetics.  
In Letters, Williams characterizes the French citizens as active and collaborative 
participants in the “new constitution,” and contrasts these citizens against the inhabitants 
of “a certain great metropolis,” presumably London, “who consider apathy and 
negligence as the test of good breeding” (78).   
Williams’s valorization of sympathetic fervor is highlighted in her poem “To 
Sensibility” (1786), in which she praises the communal benevolence that sensibility 
engenders even as it produces deep suffering for the person of sensibility: 
 
Tho’ she the mourner’s grief to calm,  
Still shares each pang they feel, 
And, like the tree distilling balm, 
Bleeds, others wounds to heal.  (11.1-4; 65) 
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Williams’s articulation of sensibility rejects the notion of a self-enclosed, unitary self and 
privileges the idea of the communal.  Despite the burden of sympathy that sensibility 
entails, the speaker unambiguously states: “No cold exemption from [sensibility’s] pain / 
I ever wish’d to know” (2.1-2; 63).  Indeed, the speaker is puzzled that anyone would 
elect to feel less as a way to preserve individual happiness at the expense of “friendship, 
sympathy, and love” (21.3; 67)9: 
 
Yet who would hard INDIFFERENCE choose, 
Whose breast no tears can steep? 
Who, for her apathy, would lose 
The sacred power to weep?  (16.1-4; 66) 
 
For Williams, the ability to weep demonstrates one’s acknowledgement of relational 
consciousness; those who are unmoved in the face of inequality or suffering (such as the 
Baron du Fossé) are individuals in the negative sense of being closed to and isolated from 
the “amiable community” (Letters 90) of citizens.   
Williams’s “amiable community” complicates the individual-versus-community 
dichotomy.  For example, Williams opens Letters by explaining that she arrived in Paris 
on the day before the Fête de la Fédération, a celebration of the first anniversary of the 
fall of the Bastille.  Williams emphasizes how in preparing the scene for the Fête, the 
French citizens come together with a new-found enthusiasm for a common and 
egalitarian identity: 
                                                
9 “To Sensibility” is in fact a rebuttal to the 1750s poem “A Prayer for Indifference” by 
Frances Greville; in the poem, the speaker pleads to be unburdened of sensibility because 
of the extreme states of suffering that accompany it (Todd 61-62). 
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Twenty days labour, animated by the enthusiasm of the people, accomplished 
what seemed to require the toil of years.  Already in the Champ de Mars the 
distinctions of rank were forgotten; and inspired by the same spirit, the highest 
and lowest orders of citizens gloried in taking up the spade, and assisting the 
persons employed in a work on which the common welfare of the state depended.  
Ladies took the instruments of labour in their hands, and removed a little of the 
earth, that they might be able to boast that they also had assisted in the 
preparations at the Champ de Mars; and a number of old soldiers were seen 
voluntarily bestowing on their country the last remains of their strength.  A young 
Abbé of my acquaintance told me, that the people beat a drum at the door of the 
convent where he lived, and obliged the Superior to let all the Monks come out 
and work in the Champ de Mars.  (65) 
 
These citizens reject the artificial fracturing and traditional demarcations of social 
standing, gender, or religious practice.  They are united in their common purpose—the 
celebration of egalitarian liberty—and are moved to act, sacrificing even “the last 
remains of their strength,” because of their passion and benevolence.   
Williams further extends the collective nature of identity when, still discussing the 
scene of cooperative expression and celebration, she expressly rejects the notion of a 
personal individuation erected under the banner of national affiliation.  She explains that 
despite her English citizenship, she is far from an “indifferent witness” to the celebration 
of revolutionary equality.  For Williams, the common humanity that is shared by all 
individuals rises above the legal delineations of geographic citizenship.  Individuals are 
not “French” or “English” in their valorization of the fall of the ancien régime, as this 
valorization “was the triumph of human kind; it was man asserting the noblest privileges 
of his nature; and it required the common feelings of humanity to become in that moment 
a citizen of the world” (69).  Williams explains how, “but a sojourner in their land,” she 
joyfully participated in the French people’s happiness and merged her own cries of “Vive 
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la nation!” with “the universal voice” of communal existence (73).  Neil Fraistat and 
Susan Lanser have noted that Williams considered anti-Revolutionary hostility such as 
Burke’s to be based in “anti-French bigotry” and “a proprietary attitude to liberty and a 
nationalist intolerance of difference” (36).  In opposition to Burke’s notion that a select 
few “gentlemen” are endowed with the authority to set jurisprudential and social 
parameters for the sake of all, Williams promotes sensibility as a way to extend 
cooperative and participatory action to a collectively governing community (Fraistat and 
Lanser 32).  Williams not only tolerates difference but underscores what is the same—
namely, common humanity and naturally-endowed universal rights—in different 
members of a community in her aesthetics and ethics of sensibility.   
Highlighting the monolithic quality of English liberty compared to the 
representative, self-governing spirit of post-Revolutionary French liberty, Williams 
exclaims that the “ungenerous” English “wish to make a monopoly of liberty” (92).  
Williams’s use of the phrase “monopoly of liberty” suggests the importance that some 
English citizens, such as Burke, continued to place on ownership and restricting the 
communal voice.  In contrast, a defining element of Williams’s sensibility is its 
underlying egalitarian ethos.  Chris Jones has commented on the shifting definition of 
community by radical writers of sensibility such as Williams, who privileged inclusivity 
over the exclusivity favored by other prominent contemporary writers like Burke.  Jones 
notes that radical writers of sensibility emphasized “action and intervention,” and that 
while they gave priority to the passions, “[i]n championing individual sensibility they 
affirmed the authority of personal experience over precept, custom and tradition” (“Helen 
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Maria Williams and Radical Sensibility” 4).  He explains that such writers challenged the 
“hierarchical distinctions of Burke’s grand community of the living and the dead,” a 
community in which “feudal loyalties” masked the extreme injustice of class inequality 
(4).  For Williams, sensibility is not just an aestheticized account of individual feeling, 
but rather a practical model for participating in communal equality and recognizing 
collective identity.  Williams rejects the sin of separation and characterizes individual 
identity formation as rooted in community, as communal subjectivity; this rejection is not 
limited to her use of sensibility.  Williams’s construction of the sublime also announces 
her egalitarian, communal project.  Flatly rejecting Burke’s theory of the sublime—which 
privileges segregation, distance, and limitation—the aesthetic structure of Williams’s 
sublime mirrors the phenomenological and ontological structure of communal 
subjectivity in its egalitarian merging of what has been tyrannically and artificially torn 
apart. 
 
The sublime as communal subjectivity 
Subjectivity possesses a necessary place in aesthetics, as one may not divorce 
human reception from aesthetics; a scene, object, or event becomes aesthetic only via 
human cognition.10  Helen Maria Williams highlights the cognitive component of 
aesthetics by transferring aesthetic possibility onto the human body: in her texts, humans 
                                                
10 This is not to say, of course, that aesthetics need always be connected to ethics.  My 
statement refers only to the discourse of events that are necessarily aestheticized via their 
reception by humans. 
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themselves become capable of inspiring aesthetic and ethical reactions.  Further, it is 
human benevolence, and, specifically, human attempts to remedy injustice, that express 
the most supreme—and indeed the most sublime—event.  As I will demonstrate, in 
Letters it is one’s fine sensibility that provides access to a heightened awareness of and 
egalitarian response to injustice, a response that Williams characterizes as sublime.  That 
Williams uses both sensibility and the sublime to argue for the same radical effect 
demonstrates how she blurs the line between these two aesthetic categories, or, as Ellison 
notes, the way in which Williams’s sublime “is made contiguous to and sometimes 
indistinguishable from sentiment” (199).  The necessary component of egalitarian ethics 
that Williams infuses into her construction of the sublime is a sharp break from the 
tradition of the sublime from which Williams was operating, most notably the Burkean 
tradition. 
In Letters, Williams’s articulation of the sublime event stresses radical human 
interaction and egalitarian exchange; in contrast, a rigid power structure underlies 
Burke’s articulation of the sublime.  In A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our 
Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, Burke states that he “know[s] of nothing sublime 
which is not some modification of power” (59).  Burke qualifies this statement by 
explaining that vast power alone will not induce a sublime response, as the power must 
be of the kind that is associated with destruction and suffering.  To highlight the 
difference between power that is sublime and that which is “by no means grand,” Burke 
compares an ox with a bull.  He characterizes the ox as an animal of “vast strength,” but 
also of innocence and serviceability who is “not at all dangerous,” and, thus, 
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“contemptible” and not capable of inducing the sublime (60).  A bull, on the other hand, 
possesses strength “of another kind”: a bull is “often very destructive,” yet is “seldom . . . 
of any use in our business”; thus, “the idea of a bull is therefore great, and it has 
frequently a place in sublime descriptions, and elevating comparisons” (60).  He notes 
that the same terror that must accompany sublime power is what makes those who are in 
positions of authority, such as commanders and kings, so awe inspiring, and lauds the 
appropriateness of the title “dread majesty” (62). 
Burke’s theory is based on terror, self-preservation, and an ethos of limitation and 
separation between the sublime event and its human observer.  He explicitly links the 
sublime to what is painful and terrible:  
 
Whatever is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain, and danger, that is to say, 
whatever is in any sort terrible, or is conversant about terrible objects, or operates 
in a manner analogous to terror, is a source of the sublime; that is, it is productive 
of the strongest emotion which the mind is capable of feeling.  I say the strongest 
emotion, because I am satisfied the ideas of pain are much more powerful than 
those which enter on the part of pleasure.  (36) 
 
Burke argues that just as “pain is stronger in its operation than pleasure, so death is in 
general a much more affecting idea than pain; because there are very few pains, however 
exquisite, which are not preferred to death; nay, what generally makes pain itself . . . 
more painful, is, that it is considered as an emissary of this king of terrors” (36).  As 
death is the annihilation of self—and thus of subjectivity—it follows that for Burke, the 
sublime and death, or, more specifically, the avoidance of this “king of terrors,” are 
intrinsically linked.  As Burke bluntly exclaims, “the sublime is an idea belonging to self-
preservation” (79).  Burke’s statement conflating self-preservation and the sublime 
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underscores the contrast between his theory and Williams’s theory of the sublime, in 
which she maintains that the sublime is invoked not by conserving and perpetuating the 
unitary self, but by selfless acts that benefit the “common good” and unify disparate 
groups. 
Burke’s contention that self-preservation is at the center of the sublime also 
pertains to the elements of limitation and distance inherent in his aesthetic theory, 
elements that run counter to Williams’s aesthetics.  Burke explains: “When danger or 
pain press too nearly, they are incapable of giving any delight, and are simply terrible; 
but at certain distances, and with certain modifications, they may be, and they are 
delightful” (36-7).  Qualifying his argument that pain and danger are the supreme sources 
of the sublime, Burke describes how separation between the observer and the sublime 
object or a limitation on the vastness of the sublime object reassures the observer of his or 
her own survival in the face of potential totalization. 
Not only is Burke’s aesthetic theory grounded in separation, but so too is the way 
in which he presents this theory.  Rigidly pulling apart notions of the sublime and the 
beautiful, Burke catalogs what qualifies as “beautiful” as opposed to what constitutes 
“sublime”: 
 
For sublime objects are vast in their dimensions, beautiful ones comparatively 
small; beauty should be smooth, and polished; the great, rugged and negligent; 
beauty should shun the right line, yet deviate from it insensibly; the great in many 
cases loves the right line, and when it deviates, it often makes a strong deviation; 
beauty should not be obscure; the great ought to be dark and gloomy; beauty 
should be light and delicate; the great ought to be solid, and even massive.  They 
are indeed ideas of a very different nature, one being founded on pain, the other 
on pleasure; and however they may vary afterwards from the direct nature of their 
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causes, yet these causes keep up an eternal distinction between them, a distinction 
never to be forgotten by any whose business it is to affect the passions.  (113-14) 
 
Burke’s qualifications for the categories of the beautiful and the sublime are exacting and 
his language commands that these categories should not be forgotten.  This directive is 
not followed by Williams, who readily blurs the lines between beauty and the sublime.  
Fraistat and Lanser have noted that “Williams interprets the Revolution through a set of 
fluid aesthetic categories that privilege the beauty and harmony of the Revolution as a 
new kind of sublimity, shifting the terrible aspects of the sublime—terror and horror—to 
an inhumane ancien régime” (46).  Burke’s sublime is experienced by isolated 
individuals and infused with an antisocial ethos (Ferguson 3, 8); further, Burke restricts 
“the passion of love” solely to the category of the beautiful (Burke 102).   
Burke’s prescriptive rhetoric foregrounding segregation, isolation, and dominance 
underscores the extreme difference between his articulation of sublime power and that 
offered by Williams.  For Williams, it is not the preservation of unequal power structures 
and the capacity for dominance that is sublime; what is most sublime is the evisceration 
of distinctions of rank for the protection of the “common welfare” (65) of the people.  
Burke’s insistence that pain and terror are at the root of the sublime and are the strongest 
emotions the mind can feel is flatly rejected by Williams, whose articulation of sublimity 
is based on the fervor felt in the face of human collective benevolence and equality.  
Williams situates the source of the sublime in benevolent, cooperative sympathy.  She is 
deeply thankful that she is able to “witness an event so sublime as the French 
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Revolution,” which has inspired “universal love,” “liberality of sentiment,” and “amiable 
communit[ies]” (90-91).   
In sharp contrast to Burke, Williams locates the source of the sublime not in an 
exterior presence but rather in the sympathetic bond between individuals, in the “amiable 
community” bound by “universal love” (90); thus, the elements of separation and limit 
are anathema to Williams’s sublime.  Commenting on Williams’s communal aesthetics as 
it pertains to the sublime, Fraistat and Lanser have explained that for Williams, 
“[s]ublimity is possible only through revolutionary principles in which a shared 
emotional state reflects a shared politics” (46).  This shared politics is one based upon 
equality and common justice and not on singular, unitary preservation and progression.  
Similarly, Chris Jones has distinguished Burke’s aesthetics of the sublime from 
Williams’s: Burke’s sublime “stimulated fear and protective preservation of the . . . ego 
within established power relations which it further consolidated” (“Travelling Hopefully” 
93), while Williams’s “sublime of radical sensibility” was founded upon “an extension of 
human faculties, especially of the ‘social passions’ that would realise new forms of 
society” (93-94). While these critics have recognized the connection between the sublime 
and communal politics (Fraistat and Lanser) and communal social bonds (Jones) in 
Williams’s construction of the sublime, the communal element of Williams’s sublime is 
even more expansive: it not only encourages the breaking down of oppressive 
segregations of power and wealth in the community, but also of notions of unitary, 
enclosed selfhood. 
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Just as Williams shifts the focus of the sublime away from Burke’s rigid 
separation and categorization onto a sublimity based on human benevolence, she also 
reimagines how material objects signifying equality and community come to represent 
the sublime.  The recasting of sublime objects also parallels the communal structure of 
her aesthetics, for objects representing the democratic and participatory shift in the 
political system are akin to the emphasis on human exchange and community in 
Williams’s sublime.  For example, Fraistat and Lanser have explained how while the 
Bastille was the ultimate symbol of ancient terror, for Williams it is the ruins of this 
prison that become sublime; the ruins as a symbol represent the new participatory 
government, and as a material object can be enjoyed by all communal participants 
regardless of social standing (46).11  The ruins thus function in Letters as a material 
allusion to the notion of collectivity. 
Williams’s Letter V suggests the same connection between sublime ruins and 
communal subjectivity.  In this letter, Williams relates how the prince Mons. de Chartres, 
who had renounced his title, came across a wooden cage made by order of Louis XIV to 
imprison a French citizen who had ridiculed the conquests of the King and which still 
housed prisoners.  In striking contrast to the leaders of the ancien regimé, Mons. de 
Chartres “beheld with horror this instrument of tyranny” (80) and smashed the cage to 
                                                
11 In England’s Ruins: Poetic Purpose and the National Landscape, Anne Janowitz reads 
a democratic ethos foregrounding the “ruin poems” of writers such as Volney and 
Wordsworth.  Janowitz explains that for Volney, physical remnants of traditional markers 
of power, such as palaces, serve as a warning to the ruling class and “the signal of the 
defeat of power, as well as the possibility of an international social transformation” (118).   
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pieces with a hatchet.  Williams describes this sublime action as reflecting “the highest 
honor on his humanity” (79) and lauds him as a “democratic Prince” (78).  Indeed, Mons. 
du Chartres, like Mons. du Fossé, embody the way in which sensibility in an individual 
can lead to sublime acts of communal identity formation. 
Williams opens and closes Letters Written in France with an explicit reference to 
her unique brand of communal ethics and aesthetics.  In the first paragraph of Letter I, 
Williams describes the Fête de la Fédération as “the most sublime spectacle which, 
perhaps, was ever represented on the theatre of this earth” (63).  In the next paragraph, 
Williams notes that it is the emotive, rather than the rational, component of the sublime 
that is most potent for her and declares that it is “much easier to feel what is sublime than 
to paint it” (63).  As Julie Ellison has remarked, Williams’s sublime announces an 
aesthetics founded upon sympathy and “ethical assent” (200).  She characterizes what 
Williams finds to be sublime as “not a specific aesthetic or emotional structure, but rather 
the simultaneous experience of sublime associations, sentimental (including erotic) 
sensations, and ethical fervor” (199).  Indeed, Williams characterizes the sublime as the 
quality of the national ethos of equality and justice permeating revolutionary France one 
year after the fall of the Bastille.  In Letter II, Williams clarifies that what made the 
spectacle of the Fête sublime was the feeling of “common welfare” unifying the 
divergent economic, gender, and religious classes of people; that it was sight of the 
humans and their benevolent feelings for one another and not of the celebratory 
pageantry that was sublime:  “I Promised to send you a description of the federation: but 
it is not to be described!  One must have been present, to form any judgment of a scene, 
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the sublimity of which depended much less on its external magnificence than on the 
effect it produced on the minds of the spectators”  (64).  Williams continues that the Fête 
“connected the enthusiasm of moral sentiment with the solemn pomp of religious 
ceremonies; which addressed itself at once to the imagination, the understanding, and the 
heart!” (65).   
Similarly, Williams ends Letters with an example of how the passion of 
sensibility leads to an act of sublimity.  Williams relates how one French aristocrat, who 
had taken refuge in England, “has lost his fortune, his rank, all his high expectations, and 
yet who has the generosity to applaud the revolution, and the magnamity to reconcile 
himself to personal calamities, from the consideration of general good” (149).  This kind 
of “liberality of sentiment” is what Williams lauds in Letters, and is what leads her to 
proclaim the French Revolution to be a “sublime event” (91).  Transforming an historical 
event into a sublime one lifts the event out of a chronologically fixed moment and 
emphasizes the propelling forces behind the event.  In this instance, these forces are 
equality and common justice, which are the same forces upon which Williams’s 
communal subjectivity is based.  Fraistat and Lanser have explained that Williams 
depicts the Revolution as “a new kind of sublimity” (46).  Rendering aesthetic categories 
open and fluid, Williams “synthesizes the sublime with the beautiful by liberating the 
sublime from pain and terror and allowing its grandeur to be informed with pleasurable 
participatory sympathy” (Fraistat and Lanser 46).  Fraistat and Lanser also note how “[a]s 
the Revolution dissolves hierarchies of sex, condition, and structures of governance, so it 
collapses the old aesthetic dichotomy” (46).  The guiding principles of the French 
 
 
61 
Revolution (at least circa 1790 and the publication of Letters) mirror the prominent 
communal elements of Williams’s construction of sensibility and the sublime. 
The last letter also demonstrates how Williams revises not just aesthetic 
categories but revolutionizes notions of what constitutes an individual.  Locating the 
potential for egalitarian political progression in the structures of the sublime and 
communal subjectivity, Williams writes: 
 
Perhaps the improvements which mankind may be capable of making in the art of 
politics, may have some resemblance to those they have made in the art of 
navigation.  Perhaps our political plans may hitherto have been somewhat like 
those ill-constructed misshapen vessels, which, unfit to combat with the winds 
and waves, were only used by the antients to convey the warriors of one country 
to despoil and ravage another neighboring state; which only served to produce an 
intercourse of hostility, a communication of injury, an exchange of rapine and 
devastation.  (149) 
 
The discourse of the destruction wreaked by the ancients against their neighbors harkens 
back to the way in which Williams characterizes the devastating effects of hostility 
between the Royalists and Revolutionaries in “An American Tale,” in which the 
speakers, through their fine sensibilities, are moved to construct a collective subjectivity 
based on hospitality.  Similarly, the discourse of a separation that can be bridged via 
aesthetic guidance strikingly resembles the way in which the warring families of the 
“stranger” Edward and his lover Amelia forge a “filial bond.”  Indeed, Williams’s ethical 
aesthetics is located at the center of the most private, domestic relationships as well as at 
the heart of the most public, global exchange, as both structures rely on human—and for 
Williams collective and just—intercourse and communication.   
 
 
62 
Rather than the ancients’ “intercourse of hostility” and “communication of 
injury,” Williams’s aesthetics is one of hospitality and benevolence, or, as Williams 
describes it, is one of becoming “a citizen of the world” (Letters 69).  To be “a citizen of 
the world” is to recognize the communal bonds we share because of—not in spite of—our 
differences.  Suggesting that people consider “the art of navigation” to spur a revised 
understanding about “the art of politics,” Williams urges her readers to look toward a 
new approach to justice: 
   
[I]t may possibly be within the compass of human ability to form a system of 
politics, which, like a modern ship of discovery, built upon principles that defy 
the opposition of the tempestuous elements (“and passions are the elements of 
life”—) instead of yielding to their fury makes them subservient to their purpose, 
and sailing sublimely over the untracked ocean, unites those together whom 
nature seemed for ever to have separated, and throws a line of connection across 
the divided world.  (149) 
 
Williams’s new approach to justice—to the “line of connection across the divided 
world”—is not found in institutionalized government alone.  Rather, justice is located in 
the human exchange of sensibility, and in the sublime communal subjectivity sensibility 
cultivates.  The sublime, then, is not a historically fixed, chronological marker that 
designates a singular event.  The sublime is a multiple opening, a multiple possibility of 
connection, a multiple possibility of justice.
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CHAPTER III 
 
“MY OWN SENSE OF JUSTICE”: MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT’S  
 
MARIA, NATURAL RIGHTS, AND “SUBLIME SENSIBILITY” 
 
 
So great a favourite is the female sex of the laws of England.  
— William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England  
 
 
My main object [in writing Maria is] the desire of exhibiting the misery and 
oppression, peculiar to women, that arise out of the partial laws and customs of 
society. 
— Mary Wollstonecraft, Preface to Maria 
 
 
Aesthetics, agency, justice 
 Upon first inquiry, it may seem that Mary Wollstonecraft’s engagement with 
sensibility stands in direct opposition to that of Helen Maria Williams.  Whereas 
Williams unequivocally advocates for the place of passion in any juridical paradigm, the 
mainstream critical narrative continues to characterize Wollstonecraft as privileging 
reason over emotion and harshly critiquing the rhetoric of sensibility.  For example, 
discussing A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792), Adela Pinch notes that 
Wollstonecraft regards sensibility as “a key factor in the degradation of women” 
(“Sensibility” 56); Gary Kelly posits that Wollstonecraft uses her second Vindication to 
refute the Western philosophical tradition that subjugates women to the physically 
oriented arena of the passions and to call on women to exercise reason and suppress 
passion (26).  Similarly, Jacqueline LeBlanc argues that in A Vindication of the Rights of 
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Men (1790), Wollstonecraft “condemns the culture of sensibility for replacing the rational 
mind with the emotional heart as the primary seat of moral guidance” (29), and that 
Wollstonecraft saw sensibility, or “the affective front,” as “the pernicious agent” that 
furthered a powerful monarchy (28).1   
In this chapter, I refute the prevailing characterization that holds up 
Wollstonecraft as the anti-sensibility (and, by extension, anti-Williams) writer and 
demonstrate how in the posthumously published Maria; or, The Wrongs of Woman 
(1798), “sublime sensibility” (70) plays a critical role in linking individual feeling and 
thought with communal social change.  Sublime sensibility, as Wollstonecraft conflates 
the terms in the novel, is not a self-contained aesthetic category; it is a mode of human 
exchange that prompts individuals to act according to mandates about communal natural 
rights and not according to dictates of positive, written law.  Sublime sensibility is a 
gateway to social justice.  Addressing the gap in scholarship pertaining to Maria, I 
establish how the novel not only reconsiders the relationship between emotion and 
reason, but dramatically recasts the faculty of feeling as a way to recognize injustice and 
spur revolutionary social change.  As Claudia Johnson has acknowledged, 
                                                
1 I counter that Wollstonecraft’s treatment of sensibility in her first Vindication is more 
nuanced, particularly in the way in which feeling becomes folded into communal 
benevolence.  While I touch upon the role of the passions vis-à-vis juridical concerns in A 
Vindication of the Rights of Men below, it is to argue that some of the radical assertions 
about jury nullification and civil disobedience that Wollstonecraft makes in Maria, the 
focus of this chapter, can be seen in nascent forms in the first Vindication. 
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Wollstonecraft’s novels have received “scant attention” in Romantic-era critical 
discourse (189), but, I posit, Maria deserves more than “scant attention.” 
Maria deepens our understanding of how closely related aesthetics, juridical, and 
interpersonal human concerns really are.  The novel centers around Maria, whose 
inhumane, insensible yet law-abiding husband has Maria imprisoned in an insane asylum 
in an attempt to gain control of her inherited fortune.  A scathing critique of the 
contemporary laws of coverture, Wollstonecraft’s narrative uses some of the traditional 
rhetoric of sensibility and the sublime to make a radical argument.  The novel contends 
that sensibility allows a person to access a sublime moment of understanding about the 
communal nature of identity and the ethical imperative to remedy unjust social laws even 
if that remedy involves breaking the law and acting according to one’s “own sense of 
justice” (144).  Maria is a crucial text not just for Wollstonecraft scholars, but for those 
inquiring into early articulations of egalitarian social movements (namely, those 
pertaining to gender rights, human rights, and legally sanctioned, culturally reinforced 
subjugation); further, the novel offers significant insight into how late eighteenth-century 
texts began to suggest the existence of an overlap between “public” social movements 
and “private” (that is, removed from juridical concerns) aesthetic categories.  It is 
Wollstonecraft’s novel, rather than her nonfiction treatises, that most acutely exemplifies 
complex notions of the aesthetic categories of sensibility and the sublime to argue for 
social change.  Rather than exiling from her fiction the sociopolitical topics and “public” 
discourse of her treatises, Wollstonecraft explicitly argues for social change within the 
supposedly private form of the novel and via certain aesthetic experiences. 
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Wollstonecraft did not always place sublime sensibility at the center of radical 
juridical discourse.  However, in the relatively short period of ten years, she seems to 
have profoundly reconfigured her ideas about the most effective way to articulate social 
wrongs and spur public change.  In her first novel, Mary, A Fiction (1788), 
Wollstonecraft largely excoriates the aesthetics of sensibility, casting the protagonist as 
possessing a “strong and clear” understanding of the world only when she is “not clouded 
by her feelings” and serving as “the slave of compassion” (9).  Although Mary does 
present glimpses of a socially activist element attendant in the sublime, the sublime 
experiences described in the novel primarily lead to moments that are personally and 
emotionally fortifying but that are not communally engaged, to moments in which the 
protagonist “learn[s] the luxury of doing good” (11).  Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication of 
the Rights of Men strengthens the positive connection between aesthetic categories and 
juridical concerns and hints at the argument she will more radically develop in Maria, 
namely, that there is an essential link between sublime sensibility and natural rights.   
In Maria, Wollstonecraft fully articulates how sensibility and the sublime can lead 
one to recognize and resist social injustice and consider how private relationships can 
influence public changes.  Just as Helen Maria Williams roots sensibility and the sublime 
in communal, egalitarian ideals, Wollstonecraft emancipates sensibility and the sublime 
from aesthetic categories that privilege isolation and places them within the public 
discourse of social change.  Maria draws compelling associations between justice, 
sensibility, and the sublime, and transforms what was traditionally an aesthetics of 
personal and even isolated feeling into an ethical mandate for public action.  Not only 
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does the novel alter sensibility and the sublime into sites of political and personal 
transformation, but it also provides a practical model of how persons, especially women, 
can accomplish this transformation.  Namely, in the most radical textual enactment of the 
interplay between aesthetics, justice, and personal agency in Maria, the protagonist 
argues for the importance of jury nullification and civil disobedience to renounce “the 
partial laws and customs of society” (59).  Both jury nullification and civil disobedience 
are modes of resistance propelled by emotion and reason.  In the Preface to Maria, 
Wollstonecraft states that the critical danger in a woman’s being forced to steel herself 
against the humanizing affections of sensibility is not that it weakens her heart but that it 
degrades her mind.  Thus, she makes a direct link between insensibility and irrationality, 
a link that runs counter to the critical narrative that she is a staunch advocate for a reason-
only based moral and political philosophy. 
 
“The luxury of doing good” versus “sublime sensibility” 
Despite the activist expressions of sensibility embodied in Maria, the idea that 
one is moved to aid another through benevolent sympathy has a darker side, one in which 
sensibility is represented as diminishing rather than expanding one’s sense of agency and 
communal commitment.  Published ten years before Maria, Mary demonstrates that 
emotional excess can become a form of isolationism and solipsism.  After fleeing 
England to delay a pre-arranged marriage to a man whom she does not love, Mary, a 
young woman of extreme sensibility, falls in love with Henry, who is in declining health.  
After Henry dies, an overwrought Mary returns to England and devotes her life to 
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charitable works.  Rather than being emboldened by the sublime sensibility Maria comes 
to know, Mary becomes dysfunctional and ineffective when sensibility overcomes her.  
She seems deeply plagued by any show of interpersonal conflict, moral transgression, or 
social inequity: 
 
Other causes also contributed to disturb her repose: her mother’s lukewarm 
manner of performing her religious duties, filled her with anguish; and when she 
observed her father’s vices, the unbidden tears would flow.  She was miserable 
when beggars were driven from the gate without being relieved; if she could do it 
unperceived, she would give them her own breakfast, and feel gratified, when, in 
consequence of it, she was pinched by hunger. (9) 
 
Not only do these strong emotional responses stifle her progressive social action, for 
Mary “was too much the creature of impulse, and the slave of compassion” (9), but they  
glamorize and “aestheticize” the realities of the crippling social problems of the day 
(such as oppressive gender relations, restrictive religious orthodoxy, and severe class 
inequalities).   
 Not only can the aesthetics of sensibility serve to desensitize people to the 
authentic suffering of others, but it can also act as a mode of injustice by objectifying the 
sufferer for the benefit of the spectator.2  Using the rhetoric of traditional sensibility, 
                                                
2 Robert Markley has argued that in addition to the injustice that derives from this 
“theatrics” of sensibility, the “ideology of sentiment” also enacts injustice because it 
“relegate[s] women to the status of perpetual victims, biologically constrained by their 
hypersensitivity and emotionalism” while it “valorizes masculine sensitivity as a virtue” 
(212).  Markley also comments that in its initial articulation by Shaftesbury, sensibility 
was characterized as an upper-class virtue, but that writers in the eighteenth century 
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Wollstonecraft characterizes Mary’s mother, Eliza, as bestowing care and pity on her two 
helpless dogs, whom she considers to be a “resource” for inspiring charitable emotion.  
Eliza’s benevolence does not arise from genuine compassion; rather, “it proceeded from 
vanity, it gave her an opportunity of lisping out the prettiest French expressions of 
ecstatic fondness, in accents that had never been attuned by tenderness” (6).  Although 
Mary’s benevolence is deeper and extends further than her mother’s, the reader still 
understands this benevolence to be primarily a medium of self-fortification.  Mary’s 
“sensibility prompt[s] her to search for an object to love ...” (8), and she wanders from 
her family’s estate to “the huts of the poor fishermen, who supported their numerous 
children by their precarious labour” (11).  There, Mary denies herself “every childish 
gratification” so as to “relieve the necessities of the inhabitants,” which would cause her 
heart to “dance with joy when she had relieved their wants, or afforded them pleasure” 
(11).  Similarly, Mary becomes more emotionally invigorated and physically beautiful 
when she helps others: “the sweet tears of benevolence frequently moistened her eyes, 
and gave them a sparkle which, exclusive of that, they had not . . .” (11).  In her 
“rhapsody on sensibility,” Mary declares that sensibility “‘is indeed the foundation of all 
our happiness,’” and ponders “‘[i]s any sensual gratification to be compared to that of 
feeling the eyes moistened after having comforted the unfortunate?’” (43).  In Mary, 
sensibility lacks rigorous human exchange and activist elements, offering instead the 
opportunity for Mary to learn “the luxury of doing good” (11). 
                                                
“expand the ranks of the innately virtuous and good-natured” to include members of the 
emerging middle class. 
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 The idea that doing good is a personal luxury that enervates one’s sense of agency 
rather than developing an empowering, communal ethical imperative goes to the heart of 
Wollstonecraft’s critique of sensibility in Mary.  The conclusion that Wollstonecraft is 
denigrating sensibility rather than advocating for it stems largely from the way the text 
conforms to the novelistic conventions of the literature of sensibility; namely, the text 
depicts an overwrought, politically disengaged heroine who is enslaved and ultimately 
ruined by sensibility.  The narrator notes that “sentimental novels” allow a reader the 
pleasure of dwelling on love scenes without having to think, a process that, the narrator 
sarcastically states, would merely “contaminate[]” the reader’s mind.  Indeed, as Syndy 
Conger has argued, although Mary may have a kind heart, “[t]he idea of social activism 
never occurs to Mary; rather than reform the tainted world, she works to present a 
morally inviolate self to the next one.  In consonance with this goal, the virtues Mary 
cultivates are self-sacrificial and intensely self-directed” (161).  And yet there are 
moments when Wollstonecraft departs from her critical stance regarding the indolence 
sensibility breeds. 
  In the Advertisement that opens Mary, Wollstonecraft proclaims that she wishes 
to present a heroine “different from those generally portrayed,” and to write “an artless 
tale, without episodes, [in which] the mind of a woman, who has thinking powers is 
displayed” (3).  While sensibility in Mary is far from the progressive mode of 
engagement it becomes in Maria, Mary does openly acknowledge that benevolence 
without activism is ineffective and even solipsistic.  While visiting a convent, Mary 
reflects on the false compassion of the nuns.  She concludes that the nuns who believe 
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themselves to be religious without “exercising benevolence in its most extensive sense, 
must certainly allow, that their religious duties are practised from selfish principles; how 
then can they be called good?  The pattern of all goodness went about doing good.  
Wrapped up in themselves, the nuns only thought of inferior gratifications” (25; emphasis 
in the original).  Although Mary herself never considers sensibility to be a gateway for 
social reform, she, like Wollstonecraft, at least exposes the limitations and dangers of 
self-serving benevolence.  
 Similar to her treatment of sensibility in Mary, Wollstonecraft also treats the 
sublime as primarily an aesthetics of isolation and emotional extravagance, but she 
intimates that there may be a more progressive articulation to be found.  In a mocking 
tone, the narrator explains how “[s]ublime ideas filled [Mary’s] young mind—always 
connected with devotional sentiments; extemporary effusions of gratitude, and rhapsodies 
of praise would burst often from her, when she listened to the birds, or pursued the deer” 
(8).  Mixed with the traditional depictions of the sublime, however, there are also 
moments in which Wollstonecraft signals a more radical construction of the sublime.  For 
example, in a scene where Mary witnesses the rescue of a small vessel at sea, 
Wollstonecraft suggests that there is a communal element of human interaction and 
benevolence in the experience of the sublime.  Wollstonecraft describes a conventional 
scene of the sublime in which humans are overpowered by nature and dangle on the 
precipice of death.  Helping to comfort the crew who had just been “on the brink of 
destruction,” Mary caught “the poor trembling wretches” as they came onto her ship, and 
“soothed” a female crew member who had fainted upon coming on board (37).  The 
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experience “had gratified [Mary’s] benevolence, and stole her out of herself” (37).  The 
humanitarian element is neglected, however; rather than considering how her sublime 
interaction could be extended to a sociopolitical context, the experience eventually causes 
Mary to turn her thoughts to “the great day of judgment,” in which “the Lord Omnipotent 
will reign, and He will wipe the tearful eye, and support the trembling heart” (37).  
Mary’s sensibility and experience of the sublime trigger only a desire to wait for the 
“Lord Omnipotent” to ameliorate actual, human suffering, and lack the activist 
component that will come to define these aesthetic categories in Maria.  Ultimately, the 
heroine in Mary only comes to know the palliative “luxury of doing good” and not the 
transformative “sublime sensibility” the heroine in Maria understands. 
Introducing the argument that she will more fully develop in Maria, in A 
Vindication of the Rights of Men Wollstonecraft maintains that there is an inextricable 
connection between sublime sensibility and promoting natural rights for all people.  R. S. 
White has noted that during the 1790s, the emergence of a discourse emphasizing the 
import of natural rights created an ethics grounded in acknowledging the dignity of one’s 
own, and, critically, another’s, basic human rights.  Wollstonecraft’s first Vindication 
embodies this discourse, suggesting that the behavior that leads to sublime sensibility is 
triggered not alone by measured reason regarding the natural rights of every person, but 
also by the energizing emotion of fellow-feeling:     
 
In life, an honest man with a confined understanding is frequently the slave of his 
habits and the dupe of his feelings, whilst the man with a clearer head and colder 
heart makes the passions of others bend to his interest; but truly sublime is the 
character that acts from principle, and governs the inferior springs of activity 
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without slackening their vigour; whose feelings give vital heat to his resolves, but 
never hurry him into feverish eccentricities.  (6) 
 
It is from the right combination of a reasonable mind and a passionate heart that a person 
conducts himself or herself with truth in morals; truth in morals, in turn, is “the essence 
of the sublime” (5).  And the essential connection between the head (reason), the heart 
(passion), and acting with truth in morals (the sublime) is being able to recognize the 
natural rights of all people and acting to preserve these rights by engaging in the human 
exchange of communal subjectivity. 
Wollstonecraft’s emphasis on the unifying, natural rights of all people resembles 
how Helen Maria Williams, in Letters Written in France, characterizes the act of 
voluntarily divesting oneself of title and rank as the most sublime event.  Similarly, just 
as Williams describes acts of communal egalitarianism through the discourse of aesthetic 
categories, so too does Wollstonecraft maintain that the commitment to protect the 
natural rights of oneself and others is grounded in sensibility and the sublime.  Refuting 
Burke’s arguments in Reflections of the Revolution in France, Wollstonecraft charges 
that his “respect for rank has swallowed up the common feelings of humanity” (16) and 
exclaims that “all feelings are false and spurious, that do not rest on justice as their 
foundation, and are not concentred by universal love” (34).  Wollstonecraft states that the 
“respect paid to rank and fortune damps every generous purpose of the soul, and stifles 
the natural affections on which human contentment ought to be built” (24).    
Just as Wollstonecraft argues in A Vindication of the Rights of Men that “respect 
paid to rank and fortune” can debase the human bonds and social exchange that are 
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necessary for justice, she similarly asserts that a strict reliance on legal mandates rather 
than adherence to natural law considerations leads to injustice.  The doctrine of natural 
law holds that some rights (such as, for example, the right to liberty) are so fundamental 
that they are automatically conferred upon an individual at birth.  These rights are 
considered inalienable and transcend positive, or human-made, laws.  As such, natural 
law doctrine is based upon egalitarian principles that extend to protect the natural rights 
of all people.  I argue that this doctrine resides at the center of Wollstonecraft’s juridical 
philosophy in Vindication.   
Speaking of the rights that flow from the natural order as imposed by God, in 
Vindication Wollstonecraft exclaims that “there are rights which men inherit at their 
birth, as rational creatures, who were raised above the brute creation by their improvable 
faculties; and that, in receiving these, not from their forefathers but, from God, 
prescription can never undermine natural rights” (12-13).  For example, Wollstonecraft 
cites slavery as an abomination of a person’s fundamental liberty, and laments the 
practice of politicians to segregate applications of policy from principles of natural justice 
“with shameful dexterity” (53).  Wollstonecraft maintains that one should not follow a 
law solely because it is recognized as legally operative.  She states that “a blind respect 
for the law is not part of my creed” (19 n.10).3  Rather, one should consider—using 
reason and feeling—questions concerning whether the law enacts an injustice of one’s 
own or another’s natural rights.  Drawing an explicit distinction between law and justice, 
                                                
3 In their study of Wollstonecraft’s life and work, Ferguson and Todd write about the 
author’s “rigorous sense of justice” (104). 
 
 
75 
Wollstonecraft argues that certain legislation, such as some of the laws pertaining to 
heredity rights, should be disavowed because “the demon of property has ever been at 
hand to encroach on the sacred rights of men, and to fence round with awful pomp laws 
that war with justice” (7).4   
 Although Vindication is a nonfiction “epistle,” as Wollstonecraft calls it, the text 
does not discard all aesthetic considerations in its narrative construction.  Wollstonecraft 
castigates Burke’s rhetoric, accusing him of employing “awful pomp” to mask the 
injustice of his argument, and contrasts her narrative style against Burke’s.  Using the 
second person to address Burke directly, Wollstonecraft claims that in Reflections on the 
Revolution in France, Burke uses “the flowers of rhetoric” (7) to fashion “the gorgeous 
drapery in which you have enwrapped your tyrannic principles” (38).  In contrast, 
Wollstonecraft argues that she has no need for “courtly insincerity” (5) because her 
argument speaks to what is universal and communal, not monarchal and “fence[d] round” 
(7).  Indeed, although Wollstonecraft is ostensibly writing directly to Burke, she opens 
her letter by stating that her argument is not with an individual person but with systematic 
injustice: “But I war not with an individual when I contend for the rights of men ...” (5; 
emphasis in the original).5  By commenting on how Burke deceives his readers by using 
                                                
4 In Maria, the “awful pomp” of custom perpetuates injustice.  Mallinick notes that for 
some characters in the novel, “their dread is inherited” and that custom “negatively 
affects at least three generations of Jemima’s family” (5).   
5 The “rights of men,” according to Wollstonecraft, is “such a degree of liberty, civil and 
religious, as is compatible with the liberty of every other individual with whom he is 
united in a social compact, and the continued existence of that compact” (7). 
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beautiful rhetoric to distort a cultural legacy based on brutal tyranny, Wollstonecraft 
makes a connection between principles of representation and “natural principles of 
justice” (52). 
 Wollstonecraft also draws a connection between representation and communal, 
natural law in A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792).   Wollstonecraft exclaims 
that her arguments are set forth with “the firm tone of humanity,” and that she was 
spurred to write her second Vindication based on her “affection for the whole human 
race” (67; emphasis mine).  Advocating for more equal education rights for females, she 
asserts that “this important object” requires her to write prose that is “unaffected” and 
free of “flowery diction” so she may “persuade by the force of my arguments, [rather] 
than dazzle by the elegance of my language” (77). Wollstonecraft characterizes “pretty 
feminine phrases” as tools of oppression that men employ “to soften our slavish 
dependence,” and unambiguously condemns the culture of sensibility that she believes 
contributes to female servitude (76).  She writes: “despising that weak elegancy of mind, 
exquisite sensibility, and sweet docility of manners, supposed to be the sexual 
characteristics of the weaker vessel, I wish to show that elegance is inferior to virtue, 
[and] that the first object of laudable ambition is to obtain a character as a human being, 
regardless of the distinction of sex” (77).   
At first glance it could seem that Wollstonecraft’s condemnation of “flowery 
diction,” “feminine phrases,” and “exquisite sensibility” supports the critical narrative 
that she distinctly favors a reason-based (over an emotion-based) approach to juridical 
concerns.  However, in her second Vindication, Wollstonecraft excoriates the gendered 
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culture of sensibility that renders women “vain and helpless” and “in a state of perpetual 
childhood” (76); she does not reject the notion that one’s heart must act in unison with 
one’s head, that emotion unlocks reason.  Indeed, Wollstonecraft maintains that virtue 
results when “the passions . . . unfold our reason” (81).  Wollstonecraft exclaims that 
virtue must be supported by genuine sentiment, and she defines virtue as “that sublime 
morality which makes the habitual breach of one duty a breach of the whole moral law” 
(229).  This early articulation of the relationship between emotion, reason, and acting to 
protect the natural rights of all people will become fully cultivated in Maria as sublime 
sensibility. 
In the Preface to Maria, Wollstonecraft explicitly states that the “partial laws and 
customs of society” she seeks to address in the novel are those pertaining to women who 
have entered into marriage.  Perhaps the most explicit textual embodiment of such partial 
laws and customs is in Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765), the seminal 
eighteenth-century legal treatise that explicates the immense body of contemporary law 
as derived from ancient England and that formed the basis for English (and emergent 
American) jurisprudence.  In Commentaries, William Blackstone articulates the rights of 
husband and wife: 
 
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being 
or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is 
incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband: under whose wing, 
protection, and cover, she performs every thing; and is therefore called in our law-
french a feme-covert; and is said to be covert-baron, or under the protection and 
influence of her husband, her baron, or lord; and her condition during her 
marriage is called her coverture.  Upon this principle, of an union of person in 
husband and wife, depend almost all of the legal rights, duties, and disabilities, 
that either of them acquire by the marriage.  (430) 
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Upon marriage the husband acquires not only legal rights over his wife’s material body 
but ownership of her subjective existence; the laws of coverture erase not just the 
individual legal status but also the “very being” of the woman.  Despite the explicit way 
the laws of coverture subjugate—and indeed enact an erasure of the legal rights and 
personal identity of—women, Blackstone reasons that the laws are in place as a way to 
safeguard women because “so great a favourite is the female sex of the laws of England” 
(433).  He notes that “even the disabilities, which the wife lies under, are for the most 
part intended for her protection and benefit” (433).   
Wollstonecraft squarely rejects Blackstone’s model of protection and equates the 
marriage laws and customs of her time with violence and oppression.  She explains that 
“[t]he Wrongs of Woman, like the wrongs of the oppressed part of mankind, may be 
deemed necessary by their oppressors: but surely there are a few, who will dare to 
advance before the improvement of the age” (59).  Rather than bringing about progress, 
the marriage laws limit not just the rights of women but their sense of agency as well.  
Nancy Johnson notes that Wollstonecraft’s novel presents the “paternalistic assumption” 
made by Blackstone as an insidious form of false benevolence that is “fatal to women” 
(“Women, Agency, and the Law” 282).  Wollstonecraft, according to Johnson, exposes 
the protection of coverture as “a guise that covers the acquisition of property through 
marriage, the double standard of fidelity, the annihilation of legal identity, and the all-
purpose diagnosis of madness to silence and sequester defiant women such as the 
protagonist” in Maria (282).  Indeed, Wollstonecraft makes no disguise of her novel’s 
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intended purpose.  Wollstonecraft states that the main object in writing the novel was to 
“exhibit[] the misery and oppression, peculiar to women, that arise out of the partial laws 
and customs of society” (59).   
In Maria, it is through, as Johnson describes it, “the all-purpose diagnosis of 
madness” that Maria’s husband, Venables, imprisons her in an asylum in an attempt to 
gain control of her finances.  Maria’s uncle had willed her child a fortune and had 
designated Maria guardian of this inheritance.  Having knowledge of both Venables’s 
true character as a spendthrift, libertine, and violent man as well as the unjust laws of 
coverture, Maria’s uncle had taken every measure “to enable [Maria] to be mistriss of his 
fortune, without putting any part of it in Mr Venables’ power” (132).  By falsely, though 
legally, confining Maria to an insane asylum, Venables is able to gain access to this 
fortune.  Speaking of the asylum in which Maria is brutally confined with legal impunity, 
Johnson notes that “the eery, decrepit prison of the madhouse could, in one of its many 
symbolic functions, refer to the institution of British law that ‘protects’ women through 
confinement and denial of rights” (The English Jacobin Novel 151).  The madhouse also 
invokes Gothic imagery, although Wollstonecraft deviates from Gothic traditions by 
locating the source of danger and persecution in corporeal bodies as well as in the legal 
code.  Ghislaine McDayter reads Maria’s body as “a metaphor for all oppression against 
women, her imprisonment enlarged to represent patriarchal society as a whole” (58).6  
                                                
6 McDayter gives a fascinating interpretation of the use of space in eighteenth-century 
Gothic texts.  She reads Gothic representations of imprisonment as largely pleasure-
inducing for contemporary readers because they provided room for “fantasy and the 
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McDayter argues that “Wollstonecraft, no doubt wary of the addictive imagery 
surrounding the Gothic genre, chose a writing strategy designed specifically to eliminate 
the possibility of her book ‘feeding’ the same unhealthy addiction she sought to 
eradicate” (58).  This “addiction,” according to McDayter, was the practice of female 
readers “savoring the broken bodies of their favorite heroines” (58).  McDayter’s 
conclusion seems particularly apt given what Wollstonecraft says about the Gothic in A 
Vindication of the Rights of Men: “These are gothic notions of beauty—the ivy is 
beautiful, but, when it insidiously destroys the trunk from which it receives support, who 
would not grub it up?” (8).   
While Maria certainly reveals the biased marriage laws that literally regarded 
wives as chattel,7 the novel also implicates the ways social customs and traditions 
                                                
fluctuation of personal boundaries that might also occur in these spaces” (55).  Notably, 
she describes how Wollstonecraft’s texts deviate from the pleasurable consumption 
model because Maria herself is turned into a symbol of inescapable female oppression.  
While grounded in different reasons, McDayter’s reading of space as negative in 
Maria—if not in the majority of contemporary Gothic texts—is a productive analogue to 
my interpretation of the space of separation in Wollstonecraft’s novel.  Further, speaking 
of the material practices of Gothic reading audiences, McDayter notes how readers would 
form a community of exchange via circulating libraries, an observation that has parallels 
to my reading of the connection between the ability to bridge schisms and form a 
communal subjectivity. 
7 Under the laws of coverture, a woman was considered a material object of property; 
thus, a husband could enter a legal claim for property damage if his wife was abducted or 
beaten (Johnson, “Women, Agency, and the Law” 283).  Maria laments the way in which 
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engender violence against women, for without human enforcement written laws, of 
course, have no material validity.  The human intercourse at the heart of social customs 
and traditions is also at the heart of Wollstonecraft’s vision of sensibility and the sublime 
in Maria.  In the novel, it is through these modes that people come to acknowledge—and 
sometimes resist—violations of fundamental human dignity even when the person 
enacting the violation is in legal compliance with written laws.8  Noting the emergence of 
natural rights discourse during the 1790s, R. S. White explains that “literature was one 
powerful forge where the idea [of natural rights] was tested through the creative 
imagination and transferred to popular consciousness.  Among the results were new and 
more egalitarian ways of thinking about society, far-reaching political reforms, and the 
birth of new forms of literature . . . .” (1).  I argue that Maria demonstrates this “new 
form” of literature in which aesthetic categories serve as gateways to socio-political 
arguments about natural rights. 
                                                
the law makes dehumanized objects of women, noting that a wife is “as much a man’s 
property as his horse, or his ass” (118).    
8 This articulation of a kind of proto civil disobedience on the part of Maria resonates 
with the argument that Blackstone (certainly no friend of radical politics) gives in 
Commentaries on the Laws of England when he exclaims that ethics is synonymous with 
natural law, and that “no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of 
them as are valid derive all their force, and all their authority, mediately or immediately, 
from this original [natural law]” (41).  While Blackstone regards natural law as being 
“dictated by God himself” (41), I argue that Wollstonecraft locates the source of natural 
law in the heart-mind connection; namely, in the way in which fine feelings of sensibility 
allow for a sublime experience of a shared or common humanity. 
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In contrast to the critical narrative that Wollstonecraft held reason as the highest 
faculty with which to enact change, the rhetoric of sensibility and the sublime in Maria 
merges emotion and reason and asserts that resisting injustice is a matter for both the 
head and the heart.  Syndy Conger describes Wollstonecraft’s revised and radical use of 
sensibility in Maria by stating, “[a]s symbolic action, Maria is an especially significant 
step forward; for in it Wollstonecraft concretizes and conquers the prison-house of 
sensibility that earlier often holds her and her heroines in captivity,” and that 
Wollstonecraft’s rhetoric of sensibility in the novel inspires “a resistance movement 
among several women under the banner of liberty and justice” (178).  Speaking of 
Wollstonecraft’s use of the sublime in Maria, Daniella Mallinick argues that 
Wollstonecraft explicitly rejects Burke’s version of the sublime as privileging the 
dehumanizing and incapacitating effects of fear; rather, Wollstonecraft focuses on the 
way the sublime has the potential “to reveal a complex vision of human capability—
packaged in this novel as a new kind of heroism—that cannot be realized without the 
experience of a sublime that requires both feeling and rationality” (2).  Mallinick 
articulates how Wollstonecraft revises an aesthetic category and presents the sublime “as 
an experience that can generate an awareness of important innate qualities” and the 
fundamental dignity of human beings (7). 
Indeed, speaking about the deep injustices she suffered under the partial marriage 
laws of her country and the legally sanctioned tyranny of her husband, Maria draws a 
direct parallel between her husband’s lack of affective compassion towards others and his 
disregard of fundamental human rights.  Maria states that Venables “pretended to be an 
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advocate for liberty, with as little affection for the human race as for individuals, he 
thought of nothing but his own gratification” and thought nothing of violating the “laws . 
. . of humanity” (119).  Similarly, the protagonist describes how when she first finds 
herself locked and isolated in the asylum, she attempts to connect with her only human 
contact, her attendant Jemima.  Even though Maria recounts to Jemima the legally 
sanctioned injustices she suffered by the hand of her husband, it is not until Maria tells of 
the emotionally raw experience of losing her daughter that Jemima is moved to consider 
her own position as caretaker of Maria.  Initially, Jemima is not affected by reason alone 
because her own heart has been sealed by profoundly inhumane treatment.  However, 
while Maria “failed immediately to rouse a lively sense of injustice in the mind of her 
guard, because it had been sophisticated into misanthropy, she touched her heart” (64). 
In Maria, Wollstonecraft rewrites sensibility so that access to one’s feelings and 
passions does not lead to overburdened, emotional dysfunction but to radical social 
engagement.  Describing the relationship forged between Maria and Jemima in 
Wollstonecraft’s text, Claudia Johnson claims that it is “new in the history of the novel” 
(204).  Johnson describes the relationship as announcing a turn towards an “affective 
community” built upon “female solidarity” that “suggests an alternative to the 
disastrousness of heterosexual relations” (204).  Syndy Conger notes that Maria 
represents the “new fiction of sensibility” in which sensibility is “an active heroic virtue” 
(177).  Making a direct link between social activism and sensibility, Conger writes that 
“in Maria Wollstonecraft presents a society moving toward transition” and that 
sensibility “instigates and fosters those changes” (177).  Conger explains how 
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Wollstonecraft diminishes the potential for solipsism in the aesthetics of sensibility when 
Jemima and Maria are moved to remedy injustice not via rational analysis but by an 
emotional reaction.  She notes that “their response moves very swiftly from passive 
sympathy to empathy, and from there to hard-won mutual respect and mutual support in 
their campaign to eradicate injustice in their world, each for the other’s sake” (162).  Far 
from being aesthetic ideals, sensibility and the sublime in Maria (like in Williams’ 
Letters Written in France) are modes of social intercourse.  
Even before Maria details the abuse she suffered pursuant to marriage laws, 
Jemima’s tale draws an explicit connection between systemic gender and class injustice 
and alienation from human emotion.  Jemima eventually comes to embody a radical and 
empowered subjectivity that is defined by existence beyond enacted laws.  However, her 
isolation from human exchange at the hands of legal and societal tyranny initially leads 
her to act as an outlaw without any sense of human value or notion of viable self.  
Jemima is an “outlaw” in two senses of the word.  She is an “outlaw” in the more 
common usage of the term in that she breaks laws.  However, she is also an “outlaw” in 
that she is an “outlier”: she exists in the world in a distant, nonrelational fashion, in an 
isolated state that is not governed by any universal, communal, or other structural 
mandates.  Maria herself uses the term in the latter sense when she describes the 
“compassion I feel for many amiable women, the out-laws of the world” (116; emphasis 
in the original).  Indeed, Maria describes the state of women to be so severely cast out 
from the positive, binding, formal structures of a community that they are rendered 
countryless: “[H]e can rob her with impunity, even to waste publically on a courtezan; 
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and the laws of her country—if women have a country—afford her no protection or 
redress from the oppressor . . .” (118).  In a bitter paradox, these “outlaw” women are 
outside of the legal protections of the law despite being severely bounded by their 
restrictive authority. 
Jemima states that during this time of extreme oppression, she was “the refuse of 
society” (84) and “a ghost among the living” (87).  She begins her tale by explaining, in 
merely one sentence, the devastating toll gender and class inequality has on not just the 
financial security of women but also on their psychological and moral soundness:  “‘My 
father . . . seduced my mother, a pretty girl, with whom he lived fellow-servant; and she 
no sooner perceived the natural, the dreaded consequence, than the terrible conviction 
flashed on her – that she was ruined” (79-80).9  Jemima explains her mother, who was 
more afraid of being shamed than poor, tried to convince her lover to marry her but to no 
avail.  While Jemima’s father remained employed, her mother was forced out of her 
employment and died nine days after giving birth to Jemima.  A wet nurse was hired for 
Jemima, but because “[p]overty, and the habit of seeing children die off her hands” (80) 
had hardened her heart, she felt no sympathy toward the infant; thus, Jemima had never 
learned to feel sympathy.   
                                                
9 Adam Komisaruk has noted that the way Jemima describes her father parallels the 
metaphors “of bourgeois resistance to the ancien régime” (55).  Identifying the tyranny of 
an emotionally sealed person with the brutality of a political establishment is similar to 
Helen Maria Williams’s construction of the Baron du Fossé as an embodiment of the 
anti-egalitarian ideology of pre-Revolutionary France. 
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Jemima traces her unethical and illegal behavior and feelings of hate back to her 
initial isolation from sympathy and human exchange.  Using discourse that merges legal, 
phenomenological, and emotional categories, Jemima notes that her alienation from 
affection causes her to lie and steal, actions that, in turn, lead to more extreme abuse and 
her being “treated like a creature of another species.”  Jemima recounts: “To save myself 
from these unmerciful corrections [of physical beatings], I resorted to falsehood, and the 
untruths which I sturdily maintained, were brought in judgment against me, to support 
my tyrant’s inhuman charge of my natural propensity to vice” (81).  The emotional and 
physical brutality Jemima suffers does not deter her from deviating from the law as a 
means to secure minimal survival for herself even as it causes her to characterize herself 
in non-human, legal terms.  Jemima explains how she was dragged through “the very 
kennels of society; I was a slave, a bastard, a common property” (85).  Jemima’s identity 
is not founded on human emotion and interaction, on notions of relational relevance 
between her and a wider community; rather, she perceives herself to be formed by 
specific, closed laws delineating ownership and legal accountability.    
The affective response that Jemima’s narrative stimulates in Maria not only 
provides Jemima with emotional support, but also integrates her back into the human, 
communal realm and, eventually, into an “emancipatory fellowship” (Johnson, C. 205) 
with Maria.  When Maria reaches out to Jemima by taking her hand at the end of the tale, 
Jemima is “more overcome with kindness than she ever had been by cruelty” (91) and 
agrees to help Maria escape from her unjust—though perfectly legal—confinement in the 
asylum.  Conger explains that Jemima’s “metamorphosis from being a craven servant as 
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brutal as her many brutal masters to being Maria’s fiercely loyal and loving friend 
highlights Wollstonecraft’s trust that sensibility can be woman’s last, most saving, grace, 
a capacity that can not only solace her in, but also extricate her from, any psychological 
oppression perpetuated by misogyny” (166).  Once Jemima is no longer “shut out from 
all intercourse of humanity” (85), she comes to see herself not merely as human, but as a  
necessary member of the community that will resist injustice. 
In Maria, Wollstonecraft transforms sensibility by merging the rhetoric of this 
aesthetic category with that of natural rights jurisprudence.  Speaking of the relationship 
that is forged between Maria and Jemima, Syndy Conger has noted that by “changing the 
declamation of sentimental self-absorption into the rhetoric of radical social protest” 
(161), Wollstonecraft makes the ability to deliver justice reliant on the ability to engage 
in meaningful emotional exchange as well as rational judgments about when one should 
follow or deviate from the law.  Nancy Johnson has described the intersection of human 
exchange and aesthetics in the novel as “an ethic of care, an awareness of the importance 
of relationships . . . . The concern that each of the characters in the asylum expresses for 
each other becomes a critical form of agency that sustains and empowers them” 
(“Women, Agency, and the Law” 285).  Conger’s reading of female agency vis-à-vis the 
transpersonal, emotional exchange of sensibility in Maria goes further than Johnson’s 
reading, and characterizes the novel as “a narrative of emancipation,” in which Maria and 
Jemima “undergo a metamorphosis from victims to victors” who “transform . . . mutual 
sympathy into a redemptive sisterhood so committed that it occasionally leads to civil 
disobedience” (161).  Indeed, I argue that by folding sensibility into identity formation 
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itself, Wollstonecraft announces a new model for a subjectivity based on one’s access to 
emotion and the process of human exchange. 
Similarly, the sublime in Maria is directly related to the notion of social justice 
and cannot be experienced in isolation.  Daniella Mallinick asserts that in Maria, 
Wollstonecraft does not merely invoke the sublime for aesthetic purposes; rather, she 
progressively reconstitutes the requirements for—and reimagines the consequences of—
the sublime experience.  Mallinick argues that Wollstonecraft “strives to present a 
decidedly practical, historically constituted—and historically conscious—version of what 
is often viewed as an apolitical aesthetic idea” (2), and that Wollstonecraft’s use of the 
sublime is central to her efforts to produce a more inclusive sense of agency and social 
equality for women (1).  As R. S. White has noted, in Maria Wollstonecraft demonstrates 
an “adherence to the principles of classical natural law: a positive law which offends 
against conscience and shared moral obligations, is no law at all.  And the repeated 
denials of liberty and full human status are represented as breaches of specific natural 
rights that can reduce women to either ‘monsters’ or of less than human intellect” (115-
16).  Maria’s resolve to act with regard to a wider sense of justice that upholds the natural 
rights of all people, to act according to “a sentiment of justice” (Dubber 824), announces 
a new model of the connection between aesthetics, agency, and justice.   
Bolstering these connections, the material, aesthetic form of Maria underscores 
some of the thematic, egalitarian imperatives of the text.  Literally a communal structure, 
the novel comprises a number of discrete parts that come together as the larger narrative 
whole.  In the Author’s Preface, in which Wollstonecraft speaks directly to her readers to 
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announce her “main object” in writing the novel: “the desire of exhibiting the misery and 
oppression, peculiar to women, that arise out of the partial laws and customs of society” 
(59).  The published fiction itself contains an author’s Preface and is narrated by four 
speakers.  Although the third-person speaker begins and interjects numerous times 
throughout the story, the details of the novel are told by three first-person speakers: 
Darnford, a patient at the asylum and Maria’s eventual lover, who recalls his tale verbally 
to Maria; Jemima, who also depicts her account verbally to Maria and Darnford; and 
Maria, whose tale is written in the form of a letter to her young daughter.  Left unfinished 
at her death, Maria also contains a Preface written by Wollstonecraft’s husband, William 
Godwin, and a conclusion of “two detached sentences, and some scattered heads” pasted 
together by the Editor, also Godwin.  In addition to the way the form of the novel 
emphasizes how individual agency is both distinct from and intimately integrated into 
communal structure, the differences in class, gender, and race of the narrators similarly 
affirm the radical arguments of the text. 
Not only does Wollstonecraft complicate the traditionally strict dichotomy 
between reason and feeling to integrate natural rights and aesthetic categories, but in so 
doing her aesthetics necessarily blurs the distinction between private and public.  
Wollstonecraft employs juridical discourse and the rhetoric of sensibility and the sublime 
to merge traditionally private, aesthetic categories (sensibility and the sublime) and 
traditionally public, social categories (law and subject position).  Moira Ferguson and 
Janet Todd’s study of Wollstonecraft’s texts sees Wollstonecraft, most notably in Maria, 
dissolving the line separating “[t]he public and private, the worldly and domestic, 
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objective data and subjective response” (105).  Similarly, Conger explains that in writing 
Maria, Wollstonecraft “seems to believe that in the area of domestic reform, private 
actions may be as effective in bringing about change as shifts in public policy”; thus, 
Conger argues, Wollstonecraft maintained that women should not move away from 
employing aesthetic categories like sensibility, but rather reimagine them as “tools of 
social change” that have the ability to “emancipate women” (165). 
Sublime sensibility functions in Maria as a progressive, interactive mode through 
which individuals can begin to resist “the partial laws and customs of society.”  Thus, if 
one does not possess fine sensibility, he or she will not attain the sublime experience of 
recognizing violations of fundamental human rights and acknowledging his or her agency 
to resist such injustice.  Noting that her tyrannical husband wrongfully confined Maria to 
the “infernal solitude” of an asylum, the narrator explains the futile attempt Maria makes 
to articulate the horribly unjust nature of her capture: “To the master of this most horrid 
of prisons, she had, soon after her entrance, raved of injustice, in accents that would have 
justified his treatment, had not a malignant smile, when she appealed to his judgment, 
with a dreadful conviction stifled her remonstrating complaints” (62).  Maria’s husband, 
the reader soon learns, has used the partiality of the law to enact grave violence against 
his wife for the purpose of reaching her fortune, and the male warden acts in concert with 
the legal wishes of Maria’s husband.  That the warden will not be moved to sympathize 
with the legally marginalized—and thus financially vulnerable—Maria demonstrates 
what Adam Smith claims is the greatest cause of the corruption of one’s moral 
sentiments: “the disposition to admire, and almost to worship, the rich and the powerful, 
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and to despise, or, at least, to neglect persons of poor and mean condition” (72).  At birth, 
Maria’s sex determined her low and defenseless position (“Was not the world a vast 
prison, and women born slaves?” (64)), which was sustained through the inequality of the 
law.  As the novel opens, we see the material enactment of the existential juridical 
condition of women: Maria is imprisoned without cause but with complete legal 
impunity.  She is without a defense based in written law, and the warden’s corrupt moral 
sentiment leaves her without a defense based in the justice that stems from natural law. 
The eponymous character in Maria argues passionately for a legal system that is 
flexible enough to provide equitable relief when strict adherence to written laws conflicts 
with principles of natural law.  She characterizes the way in which the laws of coverture 
scandalize, infantilize, and enslave women by “fix[ing] the national belief, that the 
husband should always be wiser and more virtuous than his wife, in order to entitle him, 
with a show of justice, to keep this idiot, or perpetual minor, for ever in bondage” (118).  
Maria maintains that owing to the extreme inequality and injustice of marriage laws, 
people should look outside of the law to make determinations about justice.  Just as 
Smith’s impartial spectator operates as a third element, as a quasi-present locale for 
evaluating moral sentiment, between one’s self and another, Wollstonecraft establishes 
sublime sensibility as a third element, as a mode for recognizing a more radical agency 
that is based on juridical, humanitarian, and communal concerns.  In Maria, sensibility 
allows for a transformative moment of perception about the ways in which written laws 
conflict with natural law mandates.  In this sublime moment, one acts according to one’s 
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“own sense of justice” and constructs an empowered agency rooted in communal 
subjectivity. 
 
“My own sense of justice” 
 The first suggestion that Maria follow her own sense of morals and preserve her 
natural rights as a human (even in spite of being a wife) comes, perhaps paradoxically, 
from the male character Darnford.10  Darnford writes to Maria about 
 
‘the absurdity of the laws respecting matrimony, which, till divorces could be 
more easily obtained, was,’ he declared, ‘the most insufferable bondage.  Ties of 
this nature could not bind minds governed by superior principles; and such beings 
were privileged to act above the dictates of laws they had no voice in framing, if 
they had sufficient strength of mind to endure the natural consequence.  In her 
case, to talk of duty, was a farce, excepting what was due to herself.’  (137) 
 
                                                
10 Darnford is a complex character.  On one hand, he may be read as embodying the right 
balance of feeling and reason that Wollstonecraft advocates for in the novel, and he is 
certainly no friend of the contemporary binding marriage laws, restrictive social customs, 
and partial gender roles.  Indeed, he is reminiscent of Mary’s beloved yet infirm Henry, 
whose “rational religious sentiments received warmth from his sensibility” (24).  As G. J.  
Barker-Benfield has acknowledged, Wollstonecraft “attempted to maintain [a distinction] 
between sensibility combined with reason, and the entirely ungoverned and emotional 
kind characterizing the fashionable, conventional rearing of females” (281).  Yet in some 
of the fragments of notes for the continuation of the novel, Wollstonecraft characterizes 
Darnford as a reckless libertine who uses Maria for financial gain and sexual satisfaction.  
While an unfaithful Darnford abandons Maria and goes abroad, a pregnant and deserted 
Maria suffers a miscarriage and commits suicide. 
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The “superior principles” about which Darnford writes are principles according to natural 
rights.  Such rights are participatory rather than exclusionary: while most people had “no 
voice in framing” the marriage laws written by a select group of males, everyone can 
establish their own sense of justice according to laws of fundamental rights.  Of course, 
failure to comply with written mandates will come at a cost and bear “natural 
consequence[s].”  Darnford is quite explicitly advocating that Maria accept whatever 
legal sanctions or cultural repercussions may follow if she act in accordance with natural 
law. 
The clarity with which Maria does come to regard herself as free from the mental 
binds of marriage laws is sharply contrasted with her feelings at the opening of the novel.  
The laws have not been changed, and yet rather than regarding herself as a “slave” born 
into a “vast prison” because of her sex, she believes herself to be free once she learns that 
her husband intended to prostitute her to pay his debts.  “When the mind has, from 
reflection, a certain kind of elevation . . . we see what we wish, and make a world of our 
own” (138).  Maria’s ability to make a world of her own stems from sublime sensibility, 
and is grounded in her conviction that where the law clashes with equitable justice, one 
must be governed by one’s own mind and not by external law.  Maria explains her 
reasoning with words mirroring Darnford’s when she states: “I wish my country to 
approve of my conduct; but, if laws exist, made by the strong to oppress the weak, I 
appeal to my own sense of justice, and declare that I will not live with the individual, 
who has violated every moral obligation which binds man to man” (144).   
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 Maria’s “own sense of justice”—a sense that is reached through sublime 
sensibility—is at the heart of her literal and figurative emancipation from the detestable 
state of coverture.  The last finished chapter of the novel describes Maria’s voluntary 
participation in the case instituted against Darnford by Venables for adultery, or, as it was 
known at the time, “criminal conversation.”  Adam Komisaruk notes that a cause of 
action for criminal conversation was founded on what he characterizes as the dominant 
interest of the middle class: property (35).  Since a woman entered coverture and became 
the legal property of her husband when she entered a legal contract for marriage, if a man 
seduced another man’s wife the value of the husband’s property could be considered 
diminished; thus, the husband would have a cause of action to recover his monetary 
losses based on the diminution of value of his wife.  Traditionally, in criminal 
conversation cases neither the plaintiff (the husband) nor the defendant (the purported 
lover) would testify; rather, testimony would be given by witnesses for both sides, such 
as family members, friends, and servants who were privy to the intimate details of 
domestic life (Komisaruk 37).  The procedure for Darnford’s trial deviates sharply from 
the usual proceedings, most notably because Maria herself enters a long affidavit 
admitting her role in the affair, the reasons for it, and her revolutionary plea for jury 
nullification of the laws of criminal conversation based on higher principles of natural 
rights and human dignity.   
Maria’s insistence on entering her voice in the legal proceedings responds to 
Darnford’s critique of the injustice of a judicial system that requires women to abide by 
“the dictates of laws they had no voice in framing” (137).  Not only does Maria 
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acknowledge the truth of the affair, but she also refuses to characterize herself as having 
been passively seduced; rather, she cites her active participation and full consent 
regarding the relationship with Darnford.  In an act that embodies Maria’s new-found 
heroism to challenge “the partial laws and customs of society” that engender “the misery 
and oppression” of women, Maria claims to exceed the power of the court to define and 
enforce “the rigid laws which enslave women” and exclaims herself legal interpreter and 
judge of her conduct.  Maria does not have access to the benefits of the written law; 
however, in what is a revolutionary speech act, she uses her voice to self-annul the legal 
validity of her marriage to Venables.  Maria exclaims: “I consider all obligation as made 
void by his conduct; and hold, that schisms which proceeded from want of principles, can 
never be healed” (143).   
“Schisms which proceed from want of principles” are intimately tied to 
Wollstonecraft’s larger message about how sublime sensibility allows a person to 
recognize the communal nature of natural rights.  In Maria, it is the emotional but also 
the physical space of separation between two persons that perpetuates injustice.  The 
novel is a cautionary tale about what can happen when one lacks the sensibility to reach 
sublime moments of realization about, and resistance to, fundamental injustice, when one 
fails to enter into Wollstonecraft’s “aesthetics of solidarity” (Bahar 8).  G. J. Barker-
Benfield has stated that for Wollstonecraft, it was sensibility that “placed its possessor in 
touch with the sublime,” and that sensibility allowed for sympathetic communion with 
“the poor and oppressed among human kind . . .” (281).  Daniella Mallinick similarly 
locates a connection between Wollstonecraft’s sublime and higher notions of 
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fundamental justice.  Mallinick writes that “Maria proposes that women have been 
wronged by being unjustly sentenced to an intolerable existence.  And the experience of 
the sublime, by affirming women’s sense of humanity, reason, and godliness, reinforces 
this sense of injustice for them and for readers” (19).11  Indeed, while the cause of action 
at issue in the courtroom scene dictates that some kinds of human exchange are a 
violation of the partial, contemporary codified laws—it is “criminal” to “converse” with 
(read: “seduce”) a man’s wife—sublime sensibility dictates that it is a is a crime against 
impartial, atemporal natural law to remain unresponsive when there is a schism between 
what is legal and what is just.  Speaking of the need for active participation by all 
members of a community to lessen the gap between the rich and the poor, Darnford 
exclaims that  
 
’till the rich will give more than a part of their wealth, till they will give time and 
attention to the wants of the distressed, never let them boast of charity.  Let them 
open their hearts, and not their purses, and employ their minds in the service, if 
they are really actuated by humanity; or charitable institutions will always be the 
prey of the lowest order of knaves.  (91)12   
                                                
11 Discussing the “feminine community” of Maria, Jemima, and Maria’s young daughter 
that is established at the end of the novel, Mallinick states that “[t]he image of a separate 
community of women encourages female—and male—readers who grasp ‘the wrongs of 
woman’ to acknowledge that women deserve respect and to create a society whose laws 
and employment possibilities reflect the understanding that both men and women possess 
a God-given sense of purposiveness” (19). 
12 Darnford echoes the idea behind the early articulations of activist sensibility that 
Wollstonecraft set forth in Mary (“goodness went about doing good” (25)) and A 
Vindication of the Rights of Men (“charity is not a condescending distribution of alms, 
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Darnford, like Maria, argues for a sublime sensibility that incorporates both the heart and 
the mind to ameliorate communal injustice. 
Maria flatly refuses to adhere to the notion expressed by her landlady, whose 
husband’s physical and verbal violence had “grizzled her into patience,” that “when a 
women was once married, she must bear every thing” (126).  Maria voluntarily admits to 
the court that once she self-annulled her marriage contract to Venables, she did not feel 
morally constrained to live a celibate life.  She also explains that she did not feel 
compelled to cease a relationship with Darnford based on the punishment that could 
ensue from legal mandates written by humans.  Her affidavit states: 
 
I voluntarily gave myself [to Darnford], never considering myself as any more 
bound to transgress the laws of moral purity, because the will of my husband 
might be pleaded in my excuse, than to transgress those laws to which the policy 
of artificial society has annexed positive punishments.  — While no command of 
a husband can prevent a women from suffering for certain crimes, she must be 
allowed to consult her conscience, and regulate her conduct, in some degree, by 
her own sense of right.  The respect I owe to myself, demanded my strict 
adherence to my determination of never viewing Mr Venables in the light of a 
husband, nor could it forbid me from encouraging another.  (144; emphasis 
added) 
 
Maria argues with fortitude and certainty that she is owed respect as an individual human 
being in spite of the fact that she is a legally sanctioned wife, who, thus, exists under the 
legal condition of coverture.  Contesting the idea that, pursuant to coverture, her very 
existence—as well as her legal rights—are virtually annulled, Maria attempts to produce 
                                                
but an intercourse of good offices and mutual benefits, founded on respect for justice and 
humanity” (9)). 
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a fissure in the rigidity of the law to produce a more humane result that is based in 
notions of natural rights and communal justice.   
Some critics have read Maria’s favoring principles of natural rights over the 
written laws and cultural mandates of coverture as an example of the heroine operating 
outside of the law.  For example, Nancy Johnson describes Maria as being a self-imposed 
exile from the law, and argues that “Maria’s final appeal in her courtroom treatise is to 
step outside the law” (The English Jacobin Novel 149).  Similarly, Kathryn Temple 
writes that the effect of Maria’s actions is ultimately an expulsion from juridical culture 
(71).  However, I counter these readings and argue that the distinction between Maria 
acting outside of the law and acting within the law to challenge it and advocate for a 
further rupture of its legal validity is not merely a semantic distinction.  It is through the 
law and her impassioned speech for jury nullification to protect natural rights of all 
community members that she transitions from a state of coverture to recovering her 
identity in, if not by, a court of law.  While the “radically flawed legal system of the 
eighteenth century that [Wollstonecraft] conjures up cannot restore benefits hitherto 
denied Maria and Jemima” (Ferguson and Todd 116), the courtroom provides a forum in 
which Maria can articulate a more radical, communal agency. 
In asking the jury to ignore whether the facts of the case support the judgment at 
law for criminal conversation, Maria makes a clear distinction between what is legally 
correct and what is morally just.  The legal question can be determined based on applying 
the facts of each individual case; for the moral judgment, one must consider 
jurisprudential concerns about when the written law enacts an injustice that violates 
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commonly shared beliefs about natural law and equitable justice.  Arguing for jury 
nullification, Maria states:   
 
I claim then a divorce, and the liberty of enjoying, free from molestation, the 
fortune left to me by a relation, who was well aware of the character of the man 
with whom I had to contend.  –  I appeal to the justice and humanity of the jury – 
a body of men, whose private judgment must be allowed to modify laws, that 
must be unjust, because definite rules can never apply to indefinite circumstances 
– and I deprecate punishment upon the man of my choice, freeing him, as I 
solemnly do, from the charge of seduction.  (144) 
 
Maria’s appeal to “the justice and humanity of the jury” speaks to an identity theory that 
regards what is atemporal, fundamental, and communal in higher regard than what is 
historically sanctioned, prescribed, and individually penalizing.  Even though the jury is a 
“body of men,” Maria’s argument neutralizes this gender distinction and speaks to a 
notion of self made vital through human exchange and an awareness—felt in the heart 
and understood in the head—about inalienable, nongendered, human rights.  Gary Kelly 
reads this appeal as “a kind of radical individualism . . . against any collective or state 
pre-emption of individual freedom of justice” (Revolutionary Feminism 221).13  I refute 
                                                
13 In his subsequent work, Women, Writing, and Revolution, Kelly acknowledges that the 
ways in which eighteenth-century women writers represented the intersection of 
individualism, aesthetic categories, and communal emphases produced varying and 
competing models.  He writes that sensibility “guaranteed social relations, co-operation, 
and cohesion against excesses of individualism” (7-8).  Sensibility also “was associated 
with excessive or sublime selfhood of the imagination and ‘genius’ . . .” (8).  Finally, 
sensibility “could lead to social transgression, crime, or ‘madness’, as social categories 
designed for the willfully or unwillingly extra-social” (8).  In “Sublime Heroism and The 
Wrongs of Woman,” Daniella Mallinick counters that “Wollstonecraft’s sublime is not 
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Kelly’s stance and argue that while Maria’s appeal certainly asks for individual 
consideration, her appeal more critically asks for acknowledgement of and action 
regarding the fundamental liberties at the heart of human community.  Maria’s appeal 
rests upon the belief that the all-male jury should form a community of resistance to 
protest unjust laws by engaging in jury nullification, and that women should unite to 
engage in a kind of proto-civil disobedience if their male counterparts fail to uphold 
natural law mandates.  As we will see in the next chapter, Wollstonecraft’s husband, 
William Godwin, similarly locates a space for justice beyond the written law and within 
an outlaw community whose “comrades” abide by the clear distinction between justice 
and the law. 
 Maria was left unfinished at the time of Wollstonecraft’s death, and so we cannot 
know with certainty how the novel “ends.”  However, whether striking coincidence or 
planned strategy, the final paragraph of the last full chapter of the novel circles the reader 
back to one of the texts in which Wollstonecraft begins her critique of aesthetics, partial 
customs, and the oppressive rule of law, her Vindication of the Rights of Men.  The judge 
who presides over Venables’s case against Darnford sounds Burkean, and eschews the 
idea of “French principles in public or private life” (145).  The judge “had always 
determined to oppose all innovation, and the new-fangled notions which incroached on 
the good old rules of conduct” (145).  Ignoring the vital argument that Maria makes that 
                                                
solely individualistic; while individual strength of mind is valuable, collective, principled 
action is the only way to create a safe space in which human beings, regardless of gender 
or rank, can exercise their strengths of mind” (19).   
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the “sanctity of marriage” was not only a fiction but state-sanctioned violence against the 
female sex, the judge concludes his speech—and the novel—by stating that although 
legal restrictions on obtaining a divorce “might bear a little hard on a few, very few 
individuals, it was evidently for the good of the whole” (145).  Ironically, the statement 
that such restrictions are for the good of the whole cuts directly against what Maria 
comes to understand through sublime sensibility: that a violation of one person’s natural 
rights enacts inequitable injustice against the communal whole.
 
 
102 
 
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
“THE SUBLIME OF TRUE VIRTUE AND THE PATHOS OF TRUE SYMPATHY”: 
 
NARRATIVE (IN)JUSTICE IN WILLIAM GODWIN’S CALEB WILLIAMS 
 
 
If you must suffer, do not, I conjure you, suffer without making use of this 
opportunity of telling a tale upon which the happiness of nations depends. ... 
Never forget that juries are men, and that men are made of penetrable stuff. 
— William Godwin, Letter to Joseph Gerrald  
 
[I]t was proposed, in the invention of [Caleb Williams], to comprehend, as  
far as the progressive nature of a single story would allow, a general review  
of the modes of domestic and unrecorded despotism by which man becomes  
the destroyer of man. 
— William Godwin, Preface to Caleb Williams 
 
 
Beyond political justice  
What constitutes justice beyond the political, beyond parliamentary enactments 
and juridical pronouncements?  This question is at the center of William Godwin’s 
Things as They Are; or, The Adventures of Caleb Williams (1794).  In Godwin’s 
epistolary novel, Caleb Williams is legally confined and tormented under the written law 
for a crime he did not commit but for which he was erroneously found guilty.  Similar to 
Williams’s characterization of the law in Letters Written in France and Wollstonecraft’s 
depiction of the law in Maria, in Caleb Williams the law is presented as profoundly 
corrupt and deeply inhumane.  However, in Letters Written in France Williams focuses 
primarily on primogeniture and the violence of its attendant legal mandates; in Maria, 
Wollstonecraft also criticizes a specific area of juridical and social injustice, namely the 
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abject gender discrimination arising from the “partial laws and customs of society.”  
Godwin, on the other hand, makes an even more radical argument because of the breadth 
of its condemnation.  In Caleb Williams, Godwin suggests that the entire system of 
written law is inadequate and that justice can only be found beyond the law, beyond legal 
justice.  Although the implications of Godwin’s argument are farther reaching than those 
of Williams and Wollstonecraft, he similarly articulates his argument by rewriting the 
aesthetic categories of sensibility and the sublime.  As do the other writers in this 
dissertation, Godwin reconstructs sensibility and the sublime so that the aesthetic 
categories become gateways to understanding and urging egalitarian justice and to 
formulating notions of identity construction in which “individuals” are presented as 
multiple and communal. 
In Caleb Williams, the relation between communal subjectivity and justice is 
embodied most keenly in the character of Mr Raymond, who is the only one in the novel 
exemplifying justice beyond the law, what Godwin calls “the sublime of true virtue and 
the pathos of true sympathy” in Political Justice (395).  In my reading of Godwin’s use 
of sensibility and the sublime, “the pathos of true sympathy” is what one must possess to 
recognize the inhumane nature of the written law, and the most virtuous act, the “sublime 
of true virtue,” in the novel occurs when one acts based on the principles of hospitality to 
bring about communal, egalitarian justice.  Although Mr Raymond is an important 
character, his role in the novel has received almost no scholarly attention.  This chapter 
addresses this gap in scholarship and argues that Mr Raymond is central to the novel’s 
articulation of justice because he personifies a communal space of equality that is 
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achieved through “the sublime of true virtue and the pathos of true sympathy.”  
Extending the ethical theory of hospitality further than Helen Maria Williams does, 
Godwin describes Mr Raymond as enacting justice through the hospitality—that is, the 
justice outside of the law—he offers to the outlaw Caleb.  In addition, just as Mary 
Wollstonecraft will argue for the importance of jury nullification in Maria, in Caleb 
Williams Godwin both explicitly reveals the inequity in the application of written laws 
and implicitly uses the rhetoric of sensibility to argue that making rational decisions 
about justice starts with one’s heart and an acknowledgement of the fellow-feeling of 
communal ties that construct an individual. 
More than Williams and Wollstonecraft, Godwin suggests in Caleb Williams 
essential parallels between textual construction, justice, and subjectivity.  In Caleb 
Williams, the narrator is clear that both justice and injustice are achieved through 
narrative acts.  The narrator, Caleb, states at the outset of the novel that he has given up 
hope of finding current justice pursuant to the written law—the binary, juridically-
imposed narrative of legal “guilt” versus “innocence”—because the law has enacted such 
grave injustice.  Thus, Caleb endeavors to narrate his own justice in the form of his tale 
which may be believed by future generations.  Caleb’s hope for eventual justice is that in 
the future the communal opinion surrounding his “adventures” will find him innocent, 
that the comingled, master narrative will rewrite his name with justice based on “the 
sublime of true virtue and the pathos of true sympathy.”  In the novel, not only is justice 
found beyond the written law, but narrative acts are the means by which individuals write 
themselves into—and out of—existence.  To more sharply explicate my argument about 
 
 
105 
communal, narrative construction of an individual—and the (in)justice that this process 
involves—I will examine this strain of my argument vis-à-vis Louis Althusser’s theory of 
identity formation.  In addition to the tale—the “adventures” of Caleb Williams—driving 
the novel itself, the structure of the novel parallels the notion of an individual voice as 
multiple construction, with the novel an amalgam of several different voices that come 
together into Caleb’s single tale.  Arguing that the possibility of justice in Caleb Williams 
is grounded in narrative rather than political acts, I offer an alternative critical approach 
to the mainstream scholarship about this text.   
Despite the rich and complex arguments the novel makes in its own right about 
the possibility of justice, the majority of scholarship on Caleb Williams considers the 
novel vis-à-vis Godwinian political theory as espoused in Enquiry Concerning Political 
Justice and Its Influence on Modern Morals and Happiness (1793).1  In Political Justice, 
Godwin advocates for a code of law—or, a code of moral conduct—that is determined by 
an individual rather than by the parliamentary enactments of a political government.  This 
is not to say, however, that Godwin’s Political Justice makes individual interest the sole 
consideration of moral conduct; quite the opposite, it is an individual’s reason and 
empathetic virtue—his cognizance that he is a relational being, that he is always already a 
                                                
1 R. S. White notes that “[a]lmost all critics, in fact, read the novel as a fictional 
representation of some strand in Political Justice” (102), and argues that Caleb Williams 
exemplifies Godwin’s philosophy of governance according to natural rights as set forth in 
Political Justice.  Similarly, Mark Philp posits that Caleb Williams repeats the main ideas 
and mandates of Godwin’s treatise (109), and Marilyn Butler notes the “close correlation 
in Godwin’s mind between Political Justice and Caleb Williams” (253). 
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communal entity—that renders moral and just conduct.  In Political Justice, Godwin 
describes both an “individual” and justice as reciprocal: “Justice is a rule of conduct 
originating in the connection of one percipient being with another” (169), and as a 
communal entity “I am bound to employ my talents, my understanding, my strength and 
my time, for the production of the greatest quantity of general good.  Such are the 
declarations of justice, so great the extent of my duty” (175). 
Another popular critical line of thought examines the novel for its rich 
psychological readings.2  More recently, scholars have taken note of the role sensibility 
plays in the text, with most scholars arguing that Caleb Williams ultimately hands down 
an indictment of this aesthetic category.3  Despite this growing trend and, I argue, the 
                                                
2 Isabelle Bour argues that the psychological component of Caleb Williams is central to 
the novel and that in the novel “social history is seen as indivisible from psychological 
interaction between individuals” (814).  Folding the sublime into her reading of the 
psychological dimension of Caleb Williams, Emily R. Anderson states that the novel 
invokes the “psychological sublime” rather than the more-common “supernatural 
sublime” (104). 
3 Noting that Godwin depicts sympathy (and, specifically, the “‘magnetical sympathy’” 
Caleb feels for Falkland) in Caleb Williams as equally injurious to individuals as codes of 
aristocratic chivalry, John Bender concludes that “[a] more scathing depiction of the 
sympathetic construction of character would be hard to imagine” (121).  Similarly, 
Isabelle Bour states that Caleb and Falkland “exemplify the failure of sympathy” (823).  
Other scholars, however, have rejected sensibility’s importance in the novel and have 
argued that sensibility does not play a significant role in the novel.  See, for example, R. 
S. White’s unequivocal claim that “[n]othing could be further removed from the 
sentimental novel than William Godwin’s Caleb Williams” (101). 
 
 
107 
undeniably large space sensibility occupies in the novel, only Monika Fludernik has 
placed sensibility squarely at the center of her discussion to argue that the novel imagines 
the progressive, egalitarian aspects of sensibility.4  In “Spectacle, Theatre, and Sympathy 
in Caleb Williams,” Fludernik argues that Godwin enacts a transformation of Smith’s 
Theory of Moral Sentiments so that it is through “reciprocal sympathy” that one finds not 
only justice and equality but “the very essence of our humanity” (29).  Fludernik also 
deviates from the main critical path in her investigation of how the sublime operates in 
Caleb Williams.  In “William Godwin’s Caleb Williams: The Tarnishing of the Sublime,” 
she argues that Godwin’s novel demonstrates the possibility for “the sublime as an ideal 
of benevolence and unqualified affection for others” that “cancels out the aesthetics and 
politics of terror” (886).  Another more recent critical trend, and one that is also directly 
related to this chapter, considers the intersection of narrative form, constructions of 
ethical justice, and identity construction.  Tilottama Rajan finds affinities between 
Godwin’s novels and Derridean thought, noting that Godwin’s fiction underscores the 
gap between politics and justice,5 and Miriam Wallace and Nicholas Williams have both 
                                                
4 Fludernik also acknowledges the negative, contagious aspects of sympathy in the novel, 
commenting that sympathy “besides elevating humanity to a status of semi-divine 
fellowship, also carries with it the dangers of infection and corruption, of illegitimate 
attraction and fatal obsession” (“Spectacle, Theatre, and Sympathy in Caleb Williams” 2). 
5 While no critic, to my knowledge, has argued for the relevance of theories of justice set 
forth by Levinas and Derrida for reading Caleb Williams, Sue Chaplin has argued that in 
Political Justice, Godwin attempts “to place justice beyond the law and this does begin to 
resemble a poststructuralist, Derridean conceptualisation of justice” (119). 
 
 
108 
written about the ways in which the subjectivity in Caleb Williams hinges on the juridical 
and ideological implications of a “subject” in the novel. 
 
Communal construction: text, subject, community 
 Similar to the narrative structure of Wollstonecraft’s Maria, Caleb Williams is an 
amalgam of several different voices that come together into a single tale.  However, 
Maria always retains a single, omniscient narrator even when the narrating voice is that 
of Maria, Jemima, or Darnford because, at these moments, a character is “narrating” via a 
letter that is implicitly read by the narrator.  For example, in a scene in which Darnford 
begins to speak to Maria, the narrator states: 
 
‘I shall weary you,’ continued he, ‘by my egotism; and did not powerful emotions 
draw me to you,’ — his eyes glistened as he spoke, and a trembling seemed to run 
through his manly frame — ‘I would not waste these precious moments in talking 
of myself.’  (74) 
 
This passage epitomizes the way Wollstonecraft materially merges the identities of the 
original orator (i.e., Darnford) with that of the narrator.  Wollstonecraft’s technique 
allows the reader to consider how narrative form can mirror larger, theoretical questions 
about what an “individual” is, and yet the realization of a distanced, unitary narrator is 
always imposed into the communal narration.  In contrast, Godwin uses a technique of 
comingled voices in a much more radical way so that there is no intermediary, “single” 
narrator; indeed, not only in formal design but also in narrative content, Caleb Williams 
suggests that there are ultimately no unitary individuals.  In Wollstonecraft’s later Maria, 
the communal subject will serve as a positive structure embodying the possibility for 
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social justice; in Godwin’s Caleb Williams, however, the communal subject is more 
tenuous, sometimes revealing the darker side of communitarianism: tyrannical 
appropriation of the individual. 
 Caleb’s practice of comingling his narrating voice with the original utterances of 
other characters demonstrates the fine line between empowered communitarianism and 
unethical appropriation.  The narrative of Caleb Williams is constructed from opening 
(“My life has for several years been a theatre of calamity”) to closing (“I began these 
memoirs with the idea of vindicating my character”) pages with Caleb acting as the first-
person narrator.  Calling his tale a “memoir,” Caleb addresses the reader directly 
throughout the novel and states that he is compelled to write the text out of “a desire to 
divert my mind from the deplorableness of my situation, and a faint idea that posterity 
may by their means be induced to render me a justice which my contemporaries refuse” 
(5).  However, Caleb’s story is not his own, even if he takes ownership of it for the 
duration of the novel.  For example, Caleb explicitly exclaims that he will appropriate the 
narrative of his friend, Collins, regarding their “patron” Falkland and make it his own, 
thereby exercising tyrannical control over the narrative about Falkland’s tyranny over 
Caleb.  Caleb states:  “To avoid confusion in my narrative, I shall drop the person of 
Collins, and assume to be myself the historian of our patron.”  Caleb even goes so far as 
to quell the reader’s concern that he could not possibly give such a history because he did 
not bear witness to the events first hand by intimating that his psychological connection 
with Falkland is so extreme that Caleb’s physical body has been subsumed into that of 
Falkland: 
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To the reader it may appear at first sight as if this detail of the preceding life of 
Mr Falkland were foreign to my history.  Alas!  I know from bitter experience that 
it is otherwise.  My heart bleeds at the recollection of his misfortunes, as if they 
were my own.  How can it fail to do so?  To his story the whole fortune of my life 
was linked; because he was miserable, my happiness, my name, and my existence 
have been irretrievably blasted.  (12) 
 
In the preceding quotation, Caleb expresses a state of being in which he is oddly separate 
from yet deeply integrated with Falkland.  The harbingers of identity (“name,” 
“existence”) have been “blasted,” and in their stead is Falkland’s story, which Caleb 
appropriates both in practice (“I shall drop the person of Collins, and assume to be myself 
the historian of our patron”) and in content (“To his story the whole fortune of my life 
was linked”). 
My argument is not centered on the purely psychological doubling of the 
characters, but rather how the narrative structure itself articulates that an individual is 
always already a communal structure.  Godwin’s text rejects the possibility of reading 
characters as self-actuated, independent individuals; rather, Godwin “holds up for 
analysis the entire mechanism of subjectivity, if not, at this point, explicitly rejecting it” 
(Williams 489).  Not surprisingly given its topical context of prison, court systems, 
prosecution, persecution, defense, suspicion, and written and unwritten law, one may read 
the process of actualization in Caleb Williams as being inexorably tied to the judgment of 
others, and, namely, legally superior and supervisory others.  Indeed, Miriam L. Wallace 
has noted that “the individual subject is ideologically and juridically formed” in Caleb 
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Williams (45).6  Wallace reads Caleb as becoming subjectively merged with Falkland 
because of Caleb’s “interpellation of values learned from Falkland and from society’s 
admiration for Falkland” (49).  This merging is activated in the formal text as well, 
namely at the novel’s climax when Caleb writes no longer “with the idea of vindicating 
my character,” as he has “now no character that I wish to vindicate,” but to complete 
Falkland’s tale, so that “thy story may be fully understood” (337) (emphasis mine).  
Caleb’s tale begins as told directly to the reader and with the purpose of narrating his way 
to justice, seeking absolution from the reader for crimes he did not commit; it ends with 
an address only to Falkland for the purpose of liberating his master from the cold 
judgment of history. 
Caleb’s extreme desire to narrate justice is curious given that he personally knows 
he is guilty of no legal crime and given that, in the end, he is publicly vindicated by a 
legal tribunal.  And yet this desire is understandable if we read Caleb as a subject, and 
thus as subjugated, owing to his communal, subjective merging with Falkland, or, in 
Althusserian terms, his interpolated self.  Nicholas M. Williams explicitly argues for an 
Althusserian reading of subjectivity in Caleb Williams, noting that the novel critiques 
subjectivity in what would eventually become Althusserian terms (486).  For Althusser 
identity is inexorably tied to interpellation, which is the process through which an 
                                                
6 Similarly, Fludernik has found that “Godwin’s men and women are by their very nature 
actuated by a drive for reason and justice” (“Spectacle, Theatre, and Sympathy” 5).  Sue 
Chaplin comments that Godwin joins Paine in stressing “the contingency of juridical 
subjectivity,” in which subjectivity is formed based on whether one’s future self would 
feel bound by laws instituted in one’s present-self generation (120). 
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individual is recognized and hailed as a particular one, a specific someone; he or she 
recognizes being hailed as this specific someone and recognizes the connection between 
the one hailing and himself or herself, and answers the hailing, thereby becoming 
transformed from an individual into a subject.  Althusser suggests that  
 
ideology “acts” or “functions” in such a way that it “recruits” subjects among the 
individuals (it recruits them all), or “transforms” the individuals into subjects (it 
transforms them all) by that very precise operation which I have called 
interpellation or hailing, and which can be imagined along the lines of the most 
commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: “Hey, you there!”  (174) 
 
It is with the turning of the “you,” what Althusser calls the “mere one-hundred-and-
eighty-degree physical conversion” (174), that the “you” becomes a subject by the very 
action of recognizing that the hail was addressed to him or her and that it was really he or 
she who was hailed.  Indeed, Caleb Williams emphasizes the intersection of recognition 
and guilt (for example, Falkland cannot tolerate being recognized as the murderer of 
Tyrrel, or if a disguised Caleb is recognized he will be sent back to prison).  
In “‘Conscience Doth Make Subjects of Us All,’” Judith Butler comments on the 
criminalizing, or at least self-implicating, aspect of Althusser’s theory of interpellation.  
Butler explains that the hail always carries within it a charge, that the “Hey, you there!” is 
“a demand to align oneself with the law . . . and an entrance into the language of self-
ascription—‘Here I am’—through the appropriation of guilt” (6).  It is through 
ideological recognition, and its attendant material practices—shaking hands, inviting one 
in—that subjects are interpellated.  Butler goes on to ponder, “What is the significance in 
turning to face the voice of the law?  This turning toward the voice of the law is a sign of 
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a certain desire to be beheld by and perhaps also to behold the face of authority” (11).  
And yet this ideology does not disappear at the doorstep of private homes and thoughts, 
as ideology is always already inscribed into our experiential framework.  Althusser 
explains 
 
what . . . seems to take place outside ideology (to be precise, in the street), in 
reality takes place in ideology.  What really takes place in ideology seems 
therefore to take place outside it.  That is why those who are in ideology believe 
themselves outside ideology: one of the effects of ideology is the practical 
denegation of the ideological character of ideology: ideology never says, “I am 
ideological.”  (175) 
 
More than just an inscription in our class and gender membership, ideology is inscribed 
into one’s very identity as a subject because ideology interpolates individuals as subjects 
(170); ideology speaks to individuals and makes them subjects.  The narrative process 
may “make” individuals subjects, but there is no fixed time at which this process is either 
initiated or completed.  Althusser notes that the process of hailing-recognition-
subjectivization is actually atemporal.  He explains this apparent inconsistency by 
stressing that because ideology is eternal, interpellation has always already happened; 
individuals have always already been interpellated into subjects.7   
                                                
7 While Althusser is clear that interpellation is an atemporal process, it is interesting that 
one denotation of “interpolate” is to interrupt a person who is speaking or to break in or 
interrupt a process or action (Oxford English Dictionary Online).  Thus, despite the 
atemporal nature of the Althusserian interpolative process, we may linguistically, at least, 
pin the time and place in which one is “interpolated.” 
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This process-based, relational identity formation theory mirrors the narrative 
textual construction of Caleb Williams,8 both in how the individual narrative tales of 
injustice “make” the novel and in how these same tales unjustly “make” individuals.  
Characters in Caleb Williams are defined by their guilt or innocence, or by their power 
position in relation to the law: they either “make,” that is, write, the law, or the law 
“makes,” that is, imprisons or emancipates, them.  Perhaps the seeming inability of the 
characters to escape from the ideological dictates of the law—even if some can escape 
from the physical confines of the judicial system—is what leads Sue Chaplin to conclude 
that Godwin’s novel forms characters who are defined juridically: “the subject is always 
already under the law’s command, caught by the law’s generality” and, thus, a “juridical 
subject is a guilty subject” (123). Judith Butler’s explanation of how interpellation, 
including submission to the dominant ideology, makes suspects out of individuals notes: 
 
The “submission” to the rules of dominant ideology might . . . be understood as a 
submission to the necessity to prove innocence in the face of accusation, a 
submission to the demand for proof, an execution of that proof, and the 
acquisition of the status of the subject in and through a compliance with the terms 
of the interrogative law.  To become a “subject” is, thus, to have been presumed 
guilty, then tried and declared innocent.  (16) 
 
I argue that Caleb Williams rejects this outcome of innocence.  Indeed, in my reading of 
the novel, the question becomes not whether Caleb in reality broke a specific law 
pertaining to stealing from one’s master—he did not—but whether the narrative 
                                                
8 The notion of text-as-process and the attendant idea of the individual-as-communal 
process is more radically enacted in Blake’s texts, which I discuss in the next chapter. 
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surrounding this accusation becomes real enough to be true in terms of constructing his 
identity as a subversive thief. 
 
Narrative (in)justice and sublime truth? 
 From the opening page of Caleb Williams, the eponymous, first-person narrator of 
the novel makes no attempt to mask the fact that his purpose in memorializing his story is 
to narrate his way to a more palatable existence and an eventual legacy of justice: 
 
I have not deserved this treatment.  My own conscience witnesses in behalf of that 
innocence, my pretensions to which are regarded in the world as incredible.  
There is now, however, little hope that I shall escape from the toils that 
universally beset me.  I am incited to the penning of these memoirs only by a 
desire to divert my mind from the deplorableness of my situation, and a faint idea 
that posterity may by their means be induced to render me a justice which my 
contemporaries refuse.  (5) 
 
Caleb hopes that in future generations his narrative will serve to reanimate him back into 
a subject and eradicate the way in which he has been objectified as a subject of the law.  
As the reader learns, “the toils” that have beset Caleb refer to the way in which he has 
been physically hunted and psychologically persecuted for having discovered that his 
“master” Falkland murdered Falkland’s social equal, Squire Tyrrel, and allowed a farmer 
to be found guilty of the crime.  Certainly for Caleb, having access to this truth is not 
sublime.  Indeed, the way Caleb structures his narrative—both in plot and in material 
construction—suggests that the process of narrating the truth is a more potent, human(e), 
and ultimately sublime event than the revelation of the truth itself. 
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 In the limited critical conversation pertaining to the uses of the sublime in Caleb 
Williams, scholars have noted that the commitment to reveal the truth—and specifically 
the truth that rectifies injustice—constitutes the sublime.  Fludernik locates the source of 
the sublime in Caleb Williams in the “sublimity of virtue” as embodied in “the human 
sublime, that is, great men of exalted virtue” (861).  She explains that “virtue” in the 
novel is equated with “genuine sympathy and love that wins out over the tyrannical 
counterpart of sublimity (despotism, terror, vengeance)” (864), and that the “true 
sublime” exists only in a society imbued with justice and equality (888).  Although 
Fludernik considers Godwin to be conflating the aesthetic categories of sensibility and 
the sublime (describing Godwin’s use of “sympathetic sublimity” (889))9 as I do, my 
argument furthers this reading of Godwin’s aesthetics and regards the narrative and 
juridical-subjective processes as essential to his aesthetics. 
For example, in the novel’s published ending (which Godwin revised soon after 
completing the original manuscript ending), truth does prevail, and yet it is quite 
specifically the telling of the truth rather than the content of its message that is so 
revered.  Even after Falkland has died and Caleb has been legally vindicated, Caleb as 
                                                
9 Fludernik’s use of the term “sympathetic sublimity” is strikingly similar to 
Wollstonecraft’s own phrase “sublime sensibility,” a phrase which I discuss extensively 
in Chapter 2.  Curiously, Fludernik posits that Wollstonecraft “rejects[] the aesthetics of 
the sublime” (888).  While in Chapter 2 I demonstrate that Wollstonecraft radically 
reconstitutes the aesthetics of the sublime, I refute the claim that Wollstonecraft rejects 
these aesthetic categories all together.   
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narrator is compelled to continue the narrative process as the only way to reinstate 
Falkland’s character: 
 
I began these memoirs with the idea of vindicating my character.  I have now no 
character that I wish to vindicate: but I will finish them that thy story may be fully 
understood; and that, if those errors of thy life be known which thou so ardently 
desiredst to conceal, the world may at least not hear and repeat a half-told and 
mangled tale.  (337) 
 
On the first page of the novel, Caleb asserts his hope that his memoirs may “render me a 
justice which my contemporaries refuse”; at the close of the novel, however, even though 
he has been vindicated under the written law, Caleb insists that he has “now no character 
that I wish to vindicate.”  Given the fact that Caleb has never wavered in his innocence, 
why should his legal vindication at the end of the novel undermine rather than bolster his 
character?  Anderson reads this discrepancy as an indication that “the novel suggests that 
a good story is more powerful—and ultimately more dangerous—than a true story” 
(100).  Rajan frames the relationship in the novel between narrative and truth as 
privileging the notion of process: “truth cannot be something known in advance, but is 
the totality of a text’s effects and the attempt to understand them” (347).  I contend that 
the deconstruction of the narrator (i.e., Caleb) is directly tied to the fact that despite his 
best efforts at narrating his way to justice, truth according to the narratively inscribed law 
can never produce justice according to “the sublime of true virtue and the pathos of true 
sympathy.”   
Truth, just like identity, in Caleb Williams is a process that is not governed by 
strict adherence to juridical concerns.  Anderson argues that the emphasis on narrativity 
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in the novel in conjunction with the fact that the reader already knows that Falkland is 
guilty under the law for Tyrrel’s murder suggest that legal imperatives alone cannot 
render “true” verdicts about Caleb’s—or any character’s—ultimate guilt or innocence; 
rather, readers must look to ethical concerns to make these judgments (349).10  As further 
evidence for the necessity of ethics, Anderson posits that the revised ending of the text 
“presses beyond the formalities of the legal hearing to put Caleb and Falkland in a face-
to-face relationship, also removing the agents of ‘administrative justice’ present in the 
polemically angry first ending” (350).11  I agree that justice in Caleb Williams is not 
found pursuant to the written law.  I contend, however, that justice is not necessarily 
found in “truth” alone either; if this were the case, then the revelation about Caleb’s 
innocence at the end of the published novel would have produced an empowering rather 
than enervating effect on Caleb.  Further complicating the effect of truth on characters in 
                                                
10 Wallace reads Caleb Williams as demonstrating “the limited efficacy of rational 
discourse to uncover a universal ‘truth’ and to overcome the systemic problems of law, 
court system, primogeniture, family honor, and social prejudice” (60).  The novel instead 
prompts readers to respond “both emotionally to the scenes of suffering and to reasonable 
argument overheard among the characters” so that they may make judgments based in 
“philosophical choices and systems of familial relations” (60).  Similarly, Ward describes 
Godwin as fostering the belief that “a genuinely progressive and tolerant society cannot 
be understood in terms of its laws or institutions of government, but only as an expression 
human love and compassion” (23). 
11 The emphasis on justice according to a “face-to-face relationship” is at the heart of 
Levinasian subjectivity. 
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the novel is that the original manuscript ending, in which the truth about Caleb remains 
hidden, is both radically differently from and markedly similar to the published ending. 
In the manuscript ending of the novel, Caleb is banished from the magistrate’s 
quarters and berated for casting aspersions on Falkland’s innocent character after Caleb 
accuses Falkland of murdering Tyrrel.  The magistrate scolds:  “Be silent! . . . What is it 
you intend by thus continuing to intrude yourself?  Do you believe you can overbear and 
intimidate us?  We will hear none of your witnesses.  We have heard you too long.  Never 
was the dignity of administrative justice in any instance insulted with so bare faced and 
impudent a forgery!” (342).  Certainly, this ending differs sharply from the published 
ending, in which Caleb’s accusation against Falkland is believed.  Yet just as in the 
published ending, in this ending Caleb describes himself as a disintegrated trace, as an 
inscription on a grave stone, “an obelisk to tell you, here lies what was once a man!” 
(346).  Even more startling, Caleb exclaims that sensibility “is all folly,” and that “[t]rue 
happiness lies in being like a stone” (346).  Given that in both endings what remains is 
Caleb’s disembodied narrating voice, it seems that Godwin is suggesting that the real 
folly is in not using the power of narration to enact justice.  Indeed, in a “real-world” 
situation that has striking parallels to the world of Caleb Williams, Godwin urged his 
friend and writer Joseph Gerrald to rewrite legality based on Gerrald’s narrative prowess. 
 In January, 1794, Godwin delivered a letter to Gerrald, who was in a Scottish 
prison awaiting trial for sedition.  Gerrald, who was arrested while attending a meeting to 
promote annual parliaments and male voting rights, would be afforded the opportunity to 
speak before the jury; he, like Caleb, would have a chance to narrate his way to justice, 
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or, as Godwin expresses it, “telling a tale upon which the happiness of nations depend” 
(356).  Godwin writes that whether the jury finds the facts to support the charge of 
sedition true or false will depend not on the written law at hand, but on whether or not 
Gerrald’s tale “speak[s] to all the genuine feelings of the human heart” (356).  In other 
words, just as Wollstonecraft’s protagonist will do in the later Maria, Godwin urges 
Gerrald to make an argument for jury nullification. 
Godwin instructs Gerrald that in making his appeal to the hearts and “recesses of 
their souls” (356), the jurors must come to believe that sublime truth, not inflexible 
adherence to the law, must guide their judgments.  Godwin’s language is striking similar 
to that employed later by Wollstonecraft in Maria, when the protagonist of her novel 
exclaims: “I appeal to the justice and humanity of the jury – a body of men, whose 
private judgment must be allowed to modify laws, that must be unjust, because definite 
rules can never apply to indefinite circumstances” (144).  Godwin suggests that Gerrald 
should tell the jury that casting judgment in this case is not simply a referendum on one 
individual charge, but on whether humanity is able to recognize true justice.  He writes 
that Gerrald should argue the following: “I have been told that there are men upon whom 
truth, truth fully and adequately stated, will make no impression.  It is a vile and 
groundless calumny upon the character of the human mind.  This is my theory, and I now 
come before you for the practice” (356).  Just as Wollstonecraft’s jurisprudential theory 
places belief in the transformative nature of a “sublime sensibility” that spurs people to 
enact justice in the face of unjust written laws, Godwin believes that the jury will acquit 
Gerrald if he can show the jury members that Gerrald is “actuated by pure philanthropy 
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and benevolence, and [has] no selfish motives” (357).  The use of the word “actuated” 
here demonstrates the intimate connection between human subjectivity and human(e) 
justice.  In his letter to Gerrald, Godwin skillfully equates not being sensible to the 
sublime truth of a justice that is “paramount to the English constitution, to all written Law 
and parchment constitutions” (357) with not  being human, an equation he cultivates fully 
in Caleb Williams. 
 
Sensibility, justice, hospitality 
 The law in Caleb Williams is not only deeply unjust, but monstrously inhumane.  
Caleb unabashedly asserts that “the law has neither eyes, nor ears, nor bowels of 
humanity; and it turns into marble the hearts of all those that are nursed in its principles” 
(288).  In the novel, the inhumanity of the law is perpetuated through writing that is 
sanctioned by the system in the form of parliamentary enactments and precedent set by 
judicial opinions, and by socially enforced customs and codes of conduct.  Both modes of 
oppression are represented as unjust not necessarily because they are unreasonable, but 
because they intimate the deprivation of human sensibility that not only causes economic 
or representative injustice, but that creates a fracture among people that law alone cannot 
heal.  By using the rhetoric of sensibility to characterize the monstrosity of written laws 
and social customs in Caleb Williams, Godwin restructures this traditionally “private,” 
aesthetic category into one capable of critiquing one of the most “public,” human 
concerns: how justice operates in a community. 
 
 
122 
 Perhaps the starkest example of the severely inhuman(e), diseased system of 
justice in the novel is the impotence of the law to protect the lower classes of society. 
After Hawkins, Tyrrel’s tenant, refuses to admit his son into Tyrrel’s service (“‘I will lose 
all that I have, and go to day-labour, and my son too, if needs must; but I will not make a 
gentleman’s servant of him’” (74)), Tyrrel orders Hawkins to quit the farm to which 
Hawkins holds a lease.  Hawkins retorts that he will not give up the farm to which he has 
a legal and moral right, exclaiming to Tyrrel: “‘I hope there is some law for poor folk, as 
well as for rich’” (75).  In relating this story, Caleb laments that “Hawkins (to borrow the 
language of the world) was guilty in this affair of double imprudence” (75).  Not only did 
Hawkins “[talk] to his landlord in a more preemptory manner than the constitution and 
practices of this country allow a dependant to assume,” but he also “above all, having 
been thus hurried away by his resentment, . . . ought to have foreseen the consequences” 
(75). 
 The “language of the world” of Caleb Williams inscribes guilt and innocence 
according to social rank, not according to legal right.  Indeed, Hawkins is “guilty” of the 
crime of thinking he could bring an action under the written law when he was only a 
“fawn contending with a lion”:12 
 
Nothing could have been more easy to predict, than that it was of no avail for 
[Hawkins] to have right on his side when his adversary had influence and wealth, 
and therefore could so victoriously justify any extravagancies that he might think 
proper to commit.  This maxim was completely illustrated in the sequel.  Wealth 
and despotism easily know how to engage those laws as the coadjutors of their 
                                                
12 Godwin’s use of animal metaphor here is interesting given the way in which he 
describes the law as inhumane and un-human. 
 
 
123 
oppression, which were perhaps at first intended (witless and miserable 
precaution!) for the safeguards of the poor.  (75) 
 
While Godwin explicitly condemns the way “wealth and despotism” take mastery of the 
law, even when the victim of this injustice has “right on his side,” what is particularly 
effective is the way in which he equates the effects of this inhumane, legal inequity with 
the individual human heart and the prospects for communal justice.  Once Hawkins 
realizes that a legal remedy for him and his son has been paralyzed under “the tyranny of 
wealth” and the “advantages which our laws and customs give to the rich over the poor,” 
Hawkins’s “heart died within him” (78).  Godwin thus suggests that justice exists not in 
the realm of impersonal, inflexible written law but rather in the interpersonal, relational 
exchange of emotions at the heart of sensibility.   
Throughout the novel, the rhetoric of sensibility is repeatedly conflated with 
connotations of justice and egalitarian community.  Before Falkland’s “sensibility . . . 
shrunk up and [became] withered by events the most disgustful to his feelings” (11), he 
was characterized by “indefatigable humanity” and “justice in the form of man” (47).  
Falkland himself uses the rhetoric of sensibility to define what he regards as a communal 
duty to attempt to equalize the injustice inherent in the system of severely segregated 
classes.  Falkland exclaims that “[i]t makes one’s heart ache” (80) to think that birth 
alone will determine the entirety of a person’s life regardless of that person’s innate or 
developed skills and qualities.  He argues to Mr Tyrrel that the upper class  
 
must do every thing in our power to lighten the yoke of these unfortunate people.  
We must not use the advantage that accident has given us with an unmerciful 
hand.  Poor wretches!  They are pressed almost beyond bearing as it is; and, if we 
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unfeelingly give another turn to the machine, they will be crushed into atoms.  
(80) 
 
This exchange demonstrates one of the ways Godwin radicalizes the theory of sensibility.  
While traditional aesthetic paradigms of sensibility demand some form of spectacle13 to 
invoke a sympathetic response, Godwin’s characters (like Falkland in the quotation 
above) show that thinking about the realities of social injustice on a larger  scale are 
enough to prompt one to act to remedy this injustice.  For Godwin, true justice is not 
formed by written laws but rather by “a sentiment that binds our community” (Ward 27).  
Indeed, fractures within the community and downfalls of individuals in the novel are 
primarily brought on by the way in which the law is severed from human sensibility. 
 Monstrous acts and inhumane characters abound in Caleb Williams, although 
Tyrrel is cast as the most egregious actor who uses the law to justify his insensible 
malice.  Tyrrel’s tyrannical14 behavior is consistently described as “unfeeling,” just as 
                                                
13 In “Spectacle, Theatre, and Sympathy in Caleb Williams,” Fludernik notes that some 
critics fault Adam Smith’s theory as advocating a panoptic surveillance among 
community members.  Fludernik argues that unlike Bentham, Smith’s (and Godwin’s 
according to Fludernik) theory requires “sympathetic projection” that “relies on a 
projective exchange of glances” (7).  While my argument is in accord with Fludernik’s 
reading of Godwin’s notion of sensibility as “mutual sympathy between equals” (7, my 
emphasis), I do not regard Godwin’s theory as relying on a specular element.  Fludernik 
supports her argument by identifying the “theatrical quality” of the trial scenes in Caleb 
Williams as epitomizing the way sympathy works in the novel.   
14 No doubt the phonemic mirroring of “Tyrrel”/“tyrannical”/“tyrant” did not go 
unnoticed by Godwin. 
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feeling is written out of the law in the way some characters regard legal codes.  When 
Tyrrel summons his lawyer, Barnes, to initiate an arrest of Emily, Tyrrel’s orphaned 
niece, for debt, his lawyer exclaims, “‘Arrest her!  Why she does not owe you a brass 
farthing: she always lived upon your charity!’” (85).  Asserting that he “has no mercy for 
her” (86), Tyrrel balks at Barnes, who “had for several years been the instrument of Mr 
Tyrrel’s injustice,” and retorts:  “The law justifies it.  — What do you think laws were 
made for?” (85).  Notably, when the officers appear at Emily’s sick bed to take her to jail, 
her caretaker “expostulated with bitter invective against the hardheartedness of the bailiff, 
and exhorted him to mix some humanity and moderation with the discharge of his 
function; but he was impenetrable to all she could urge” (88).  When the caretaker tells 
the bailiffs that if they remove Emily from her bed it will kill her, they reply:  “‘The law 
says nothing about that.  We have orders to take her sick or well.  We will do her no 
harm; except so far as we must perform our office, be it how it will’” (88).   
That the law is insensible to matters of the heart15 in Caleb Williams runs counter 
to Godwin’s statement in his letter to Gerrald:  “Never forget that juries are men, and that 
men are made of penetrable stuff” (356).  The men in the novel who are agents of 
injustice, like Tyrrel, are markedly not made of penetrable stuff.  For example, Grimes, 
                                                
15 Ian Ward has noted that Godwin’s theory of justice is rooted in a deep love of 
humanity (41).  Ward traces Godwinian justice to Rousseau’s notion of justice, which 
Ward describes as: “if politics is about human relations, then politics is about compassion 
and love” (28). 
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whom Tyrrel employs to force Emily into marriage16 as retribution for the “tender 
sentiments” (50) she developed towards Tyrrel’s rival, Falkland, is characterized as 
inhuman in his physical appearance as well as inhumane in his sentiments.  “His 
complexion was scarcely human; his features were coarse, and strangely discordant and 
disjointed from each other,” and “he was a total stranger to tenderness; he could not feel 
for those refinements in others, of which he had no experience in himself” (50).  Given 
that even the characters who are described as at one time possessing acute sensibility and 
a focused notion of humane, communal justice (namely, Falkland and Caleb himself) 
become mentally and physically ruined, one could argue that the novel leaves no space 
for the ability to enact productive justice even beyond the law.  And yet it is precisely 
beyond the law—in a community of outlaws under the direction of “Captain” 
Raymond—that the novel locates egalitarian, humane justice borne from “the sublime of 
true virtue and the pathos of true sympathy.” 
 Given the fact that Raymond’s community operates outside the strictures of 
logocentrically sanctioned written laws and social customs, it is not surprising that Caleb 
never fixes a formal appellation on the community.  Indeed, almost no members of the 
                                                
16 The parallels between Emily and Grimes and Wollstonecraft’s Maria and Venables are 
striking.  Not only is Emily confined to an isolated, locked, towering, prison-like 
structure just as Maria is, but the impending marriage, which Emily has no meaningful 
way to reject, will strip Emily of her legal rights as an individual in the same way the law 
mutes the married Maria.  Indeed, the reader’s consternation about whether Emily will 
successfully escape before her marriage is directly tied to the fact that, after her marriage, 
Emily will have no way legally (and almost certainly no way practically) to flee from 
Grimes. 
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community are individuated through naming save for Captain Raymond17 and Gines.18  
Raymond refers to members as “comrades,” emphasizing the communal structure of this 
motley crew that puts into practice the egalitarian ideals of coexisting without regard to 
class.  Caleb remarks of the comrades: “Their appearance was different, some having the 
air of mere rustics, and others that of a tarnished sort of gentry” (223).  Even Raymond, 
the “Captain” of the society, explicitly rejects any authoritarian impulse or power.  When 
Raymond appeals to the community to vote to ban Gines from the group due to his 
repeatedly cruel and insensible behavior, he exclaims: “‘I do not pretend . . . to assume 
any authority among you; act as you think proper; but, so far as relates to myself, I vote 
that Gines be expelled from among us as a disgrace to our society’” (224). 
The specific “disgrace” to which Raymond refers is Gines’s extreme lack of 
sensibility, which causes him to privilege monetary concerns above acting justly towards 
                                                
17 The distinction of “Captain” is curious and leads to multiple and opposing 
connotations.  The militaristic association with “Captain” suggests a counter-reading of 
Raymond as an equal comrade.  However, a naval emphasis suggests that the group 
operates according to different rules and expectations from that of the rest of English 
society, for once a ship enters waters certain distances from the shoreline, admiralty law 
begins.  Admiralty laws are sharply independent from those governing land-bound 
society.  Still further, “Captains” of non-military vessels are the sole arbiters of the rules 
of their ships and decisions about their crew.  Such a reading of this word can connote 
imperialistic fervor, yet can just as easily connote the ability to construct laws that are 
beneficial to all members of a limited community.       
18 Just as “Tyrrel”/“tyrant”/“tyrannical” effects a phonemic mirroring, so too does 
“Gines”/“Grimes.”  Both Gines and Grimes are presented as insensible agents of 
injustice. 
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others.  In contrast, Caleb describes Raymond as possessing “fervent benevolence” (233), 
and the other members of the society characterized by “benevolence and kindness; they 
were strongly susceptible of emotions of generosity” (227).  When Raymond questions 
Gines what provoked Gines to inflict the “cruel treatment” of physically beating and then 
abandoning Caleb in the woods, Gines answers: “‘Provocation enough.  He had no 
money’” (224).  After Raymond voices his disgust with such behavior, Gines states: 
“‘You, with your compassion, and your fine feelings, will bring us all to the gallows’” 
(224).  In Raymond’s response to this charge, he elucidates the jurisprudential theory of 
the community.  Openly accepting that there is danger in the way in which the comrades 
break laws to enact justice, Raymond proudly explains that their “‘profession is the 
profession of justice,” and that “‘[w]e, who are thieves without a licence, are at open war 
with another set of men who are thieves according to law’” (224). 
For Raymond, “justice” is defined as acting beyond the artificial—and accidental 
by birth—barriers of class and legally sanctioned codes that are written for the wealthy 
and inscribe abuse on the poor.  According to Raymond, there is no justifiable middle 
ground for justice: a person can “‘[e]ither be the friend of the law, or its adversary’” 
(231).  Raymond’s view that the law is not only futile but oppressive and unjust for the 
majority of people is reminiscent of Caleb’s own realization about the absurd idea that 
“England has no Bastille” (188).  While the actual Bastille may be located in France, 
Caleb notes that the same “tyranny and wanton oppression” symbolized by the dreaded 
Bastille exist throughout England.  For this reason, Raymond argues, the “law is not the 
proper instrument for correcting the misdeeds of mankind” (231).  This is not to say, 
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however, that Raymond’s community does not have shared “laws,” perhaps the most 
important of which is the law of hospitality.  Despite Caleb Williams’s radical message 
that the laws of hospitality must supersede written laws and social customs, there has 
been almost no critical attention paid to this aspect of the novel.  While some scholars 
mention, seemingly in passing, how Raymond “preach[es] an anarchism that denies the 
authority of the law in order to preserve that of humanity and justice” (Ward 34) or that 
Raymond and the “outlaws” demonstrate how Godwin presents “the workings of 
morality as sympathetic affect” (Fludernik, “Spectacle, Theatre, and Sympathy” 27), 
these observations are brief and do not fold in a reading of hospitality into their 
discussion.   
Emphasizing justice as ethical encounter, seen in Helen Maria Williams’s “An 
American Tale” and later theorized by Derrida and Levinas, Godwin himself uses the 
term “laws of hospitality” to explain the responsibility that the community has to 
welcome and do justice to Caleb even in the face of grave danger for doing so.  When the 
society learns that there is a price on Caleb’s head, it considers turning him over to the 
law to collect the one hundred guineas.  Raymond incredulously questions whether his 
comrades would violate the laws of hospitality for a monetary reward, particularly when 
Caleb is not guilty of the charges at issue.  Raymond demands to know who of the society 
dares to believe that the law is equitable enough even to offer Caleb a fair trial: “‘Who 
ever thinks, when [Caleb] is apprehended for trial, of his innocence or guilt being at all 
material to the issue?’” (232).  Making an argument strikingly similar to the one 
Wollstonecraft will make in the courtroom scene in Maria, as well as to the one Godwin 
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himself makes to Gerrald, Raymond explicitly asks: “‘If no other person have the courage 
to set limits to the tyranny of courts of justice, shall not we? . . .  Shall we, against whom 
the whole species is in arms, refuse our protection to an individual more exposed to, but 
still less deserving of their persecution than ourselves?’” (233).  After considering 
Raymond’s plea, the comrades determine that they will “protect him at the hazard of our 
lives” (233).   
In Caleb Williams, Raymond and the “gang” of outlaws, whose actions are 
prescribed according to the laws of hospitality, are exceedingly more just than any of the 
“law-abiding” characters, whose actions are prescribed by written laws and codified 
social customs.  Despite the fact that many of the outlaws have a gruff exterior and all of 
the outlaws live as “rustics,” they possess finer sensibility than the most exalted Squire 
Falkland because they act according to the laws of hospitality.  These unwritten laws, 
which are based in relational, empathetic human exchange, require that one acknowledge 
the communal nature of “individual” existence and act in a way that privileges communal 
interests over those of one’s own self.  This is a heavy burden and significantly exceeds 
the requirements of acting merely with benevolence or philanthropy.   
This distinction between hospitality and philanthropy appears in Immanuel Kant’s 
Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (1795): “we are here concerned not with 
philanthropy, but with right.  In this context, hospitality means the right of a stranger not 
to be treated with hostility when he arrives on someone else’s territory” (105).  By 
placing hospitality within traditional juridical discourse (hospitality is a stranger’s right), 
Kant challenges our traditional notion of what it means to act lawfully.  Godwin enacts 
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the same rewriting and suggests that to act according to the laws of hospitality, to place 
the needs and demands of another, even those of a stranger, over one’s own interests is 
“the sublime of true virtue and the pathos of true sympathy.”  In Caleb Williams, 
hospitality is justice, and hospitality—and thus justice—is found beyond political 
institutions and legal mandates.  If “the sublime of true virtue and the pathos of true 
sympathy” are the harbingers of justice, then perhaps aesthetics as a mode of expressing 
human injustice does offer an opening for the possibility of justice.  After all, as we will 
see in the next chapter, according to William Blake, “The most sublime act is to set 
another before you.” 
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CHAPTER V 
 
“SWIFT WINGED WORDS”: LAWLESSNESS AND 
 
WILLIAM BLAKE’S ONTOLOGICAL AESTHETICS 
 
 
For Mercy has a human heart 
Pity, a human face: 
And Love, the human form divine, 
And Peace, the human dress. 
— William Blake, “The Divine Image”  
 
  
All Penal Laws court Transgression & therefore are cruelty & Murder 
— William Blake, Annotations to An Apology for the Bible 
 
 
Vision, the exemptive sublime, and the justice of regenerating meaning 
 Like the texts I have discussed thus far, William Blake’s work reconfigures the 
aesthetic categories of sensibility and the sublime.  However, while Williams, 
Wollstonecraft, and Godwin reorganize these traditional aesthetic categories in ways that 
challenge the legal and social status quo, privilege egalitarianism, and deconstruct the 
distance between the individual and the community, the categories remain largely intact 
and recognizable.  Blake goes dramatically further.  In this chapter, I argue that in The 
[First] Book of Urizen (1794), Blake transforms sensibility into what he calls Vision1 and 
the sublime into what I term the exemptive sublime.  Blake equates the Enlightenment’s 
                                                
1 I use the capital form of this word both as a way to honor Blake’s transcriptive choices 
as well as to emphasize to the reader the stark difference between Blake’s concept of 
“Vision” and “vision,” which I discuss at length below. 
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privileging of reason and empiricism with the unjust tyranny of limited vision, 
condemning vision as the “vegetative,” biological, mortal, and Enlightenment eye.  
Because single, empirical vision relies only on the ocular sense, Blake describes it as 
deadened and ineffective as “Newton’s sleep” (Letter to Thomas Butts, E722).  In 
contrast, Vision is “fourfold” and a “supreme delight” (Letter to Thomas Butts, E722) 
and requires multiple engagement with all senses.  In this chapter, I demonstrate how 
rejecting vision and electing to see with Vision provides access to the exemptive sublime, 
which I conceive as a space of justice that is exempt from interpretive mandates 
constrained by logocentricism, binary constructions, and hegemony.  In Blake’s 
rewriting, Vision and the exemptive sublime cease to be solely aesthetic categories and 
are instead modes by which people can liberate themselves from the tyranny of “mind-
forg’d manacles.”  Thus, there is a direct correlation between Vision, the exemptive 
sublime, and the justice of regenerating meaning according to one’s own interpretive 
constructions. 
Blake’s approach to justice and the law, like his approach to the aesthetic 
categories sensibility and the sublime, is also more radical than that of Williams, 
Wollstonecraft, and Godwin.  Although in Caleb Williams Godwin disputes the 
legitimacy of institutionally enacted laws in favor of a system of justice governed by “the 
sublime of true virtue and the pathos of true sympathy,” he addresses specific failures 
pertaining to the inequity of legal enfranchisement.  Similarly, in Letters Williams 
advocates for the abolition of primogeniture, and Wollstonecraft argues against the laws 
of coverture in Maria.  In contrast, Blake does not propose amending or abolishing 
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particular laws or even the legal system itself to bring about social equality.  Justice, for 
Blake, is grounded in a radical reconceptualization of meaning, namely, a revision of 
what it means to be free versus imprisoned, enlightened versus blinded, vital versus 
deadened.  Emphasizing the relationship between meaning and being, representation and 
ontology, at the center of Blake’s texts, Saree Makdisi has noted that Blake’s art 
“presupposes a new way of sharing, of loving, of living, of being, in common” 
(Impossible History 263; emphasis in the original). 
Just as the element of being “in common,” or what I have been describing as 
communal subjectivity, is essential to the rewritten sensibility and the sublime of 
Williams, Wollstonecraft, and Godwin, this element is similarly at the center of Blake’s 
Vision and the exemptive sublime.  Williams, Wollstonecraft, and Godwin reconstruct 
aesthetic categories to argue for an egalitarian social justice that acknowledges the 
intersubjectivity of all people.  Similarly, Blake’s Vision is grounded in the notion of 
multiplicity, of engagement with all senses without assimilation of one sense (namely, the 
ocular sense) over the others.  Further, the experience of the exemptive sublime arises as 
a reader squarely rejects the tyrannical and authoritarian idea that there is a single, lawful 
interpretation (namely, meaning derived from the Word).  Multiplicity in Blake’s texts, 
however, exists not just in textual (or aesthetic) representation, but in the very “being” (or 
ontology) of the texts themselves, in Blake’s ontological aesthetics.  
The material form of Blake’s texts contain an ontological vitality that is based in 
the idea of nonassimilated multiplicity.  W. J. T. Mitchell, in Blake’s Composite Art, 
explains the interactive relationship between Blake’s verbal and visual designs as if the 
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designs possess ontological vibrancy, noting that “their relationship is more like an 
energetic rivalry, a dialogue or dialectic between vigorously independent modes of 
expression” (4).  This “visual-verbal dialectics,” as Mitchell calls it, resists dominance by 
or assimilation of one design form over the other even though they “must be read as a 
unity”; thus, the verbal and visual designs contain both multiplicity and singularity (3-4).  
To ignore the dynamics of Blake’s “composite art” is to read with single vision, or, as 
Peter Otto argues, “to return such dualisms to a primordial unity [that] . . . for Blake is 
constitutive of the Fall” (43).  Building upon Makdisi’s concept of how Blake’s texts 
suggest a “new way of . . . being, in common,” in this chapter I argue that this new way of 
being in common extends to the way a Blakean reader with Vision can experience the 
space of multiplicity of meaning that is the exemptive sublime. 
My interpretation of Vision and the exemptive sublime have explicit implications 
for juridical and aesthetic paradigms.  For Blake, seeing with Vision is the ability to resist 
not only unjust political and social structures but also to reject conventional interpretive 
patterns that are grounded specifically in binary Enlightenment aesthetics, particularly in 
those tropes equating light and the ocular sense with insight, and darkness, void, and 
chaos with epistemological, ontological, and creative impotence.  Seeing with multiple, 
inspired, infinite Vision requires one to refute orthodox, culturally and legally sanctioned 
systems and modes of thinking; Vision opens for the reader a generative space of liberty 
that is the exemptive sublime.  Whereas Williams, Wollstonecraft, and Godwin rewrite 
sensibility and the sublime to represent the democratization of difference, the value of 
natural rights over those of written laws, and the communal component to “individual” 
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identity, these same elements are actually manifest in the material form of Blake’s 
“composite art.”  A way of reading that is anti-logocentric and, thus, anti-juridical is to 
deny the authority not only of a particular law but of the Law—the Word—of God.  This 
is the liberating denial that resides at the heart of Vision, the exemptive sublime, and 
Blake’s Urizen. 
Ostensibly about the Edenic creation of the human form, Urizen is far from 
paradisical.  A rewriting of the original creation story, it is a design of building up and 
tearing down, extreme shackling and enthusiastic freedom, lighted torments and the 
darkness of knowing.  Propelled by the open, porous, unstable, and dynamic relation of 
words and images that parallels the progressive energy created by contraries as conceived 
by Blake,2 the design itself enacts interpretive freedom.  Urizen is not only about 
regeneration; the design enacts regeneration because for Blake, art is “a creative and 
ontological activity, rather than simply a representational or epistemological one” 
(Makdisi, Impossible History 263; emphasis in the original).  By engaging the text with 
Vision, Urizen’s reader can deny the tyranny of single vision and single meaning that 
Blake equates with the Enlightenment; she can regenerate Enlightenment epistemological 
and ontological discourse so that places of void and darkness become places of 
                                                
2 In The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, Blake writes “Without Contraries is no 
progression” (3, E34).  Contraries, for Blake, enact progression and not nullification. 
Contraries do not cancel each other out; rather, contraries create a space of mutability and 
an energy of possibility and, I argue, can open the exemptive sublime.  I further discuss 
the relationship between the state of contraries and the exemptive sublime in this chapter 
below.  
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productive insight.  In this chapter I demonstrate how, with its emphasis on the 
importance of inspired Vision over empirical sight and absolute reliance on reason, 
Urizen opens the exemptive sublime, generating a space of liberty in which the anti-
juridical reader questions hegemonic doctrine.  Whereas Blake’s rejection of 
conventional Enlightenment aesthetics has been the subject of lively and productive 
scholarship in the field of Romantic-era studies, my argument considers Blake’s radical 
aesthetics not as an endpoint, but rather as a mode of inquiry to investigate and highlight 
the similarities between Blake’s unconventional figurations of tropes and the unorthodox 
interpretive field that is opened for the reader as a direct result of approaching a Blakean 
text with Vision.  In this chapter, I hope to regenerate the frequently flawed, critical 
discourse surrounding Urizen and counter the critical tendency to read the text via 
conservative paradigms of “blindness and insight or subversion and containment” 
(Cooper 191-92) that the text itself rejects. 
Prior to my discussion of Blake’s ontological aesthetics and the justice of 
regenerated meaning in Urizen, I explicate how rejecting the tyranny of single vision 
leads to egalitarian social justice by considering two texts among Blake’s most familiar 
works.  In “The Little Black Boy” (from Songs of Innocence, 1789) and The Marriage of 
Heaven and Hell (1790), Blake complicates notions of light, darkness, and void to 
suggest that Vision requires not just a new way of seeing, but also new ways of being and 
reading.  In “The Little Black Boy,” Blake’s design does not merely represent the theme 
of the sinfulness of slavery; the material composition itself challenges the reader to 
condemn not only the institution of slavery, but the way in which she makes meaning of 
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what is worthy of condemnation.  It is via Blake’s ontological aesthetics, rather than by 
thematic implication, that the design asks the reader to interrogate not just the juridical 
laws and social customs that enforce slavery, but the way she has been taught to see skin 
color with the single vision of the biological eye.  Similarly, in The Marriage of Heaven 
and Hell, the text complicates firmly entrenched associations about whether it is an angel 
of reason or a human being that possesses the most imaginative—and for Blake, ethical—
prowess.  By resituating the divine power to create meaning away from the angel and 
onto the human speaker, the plate encourages the reader to reject shackled, single, and 
mortal vision in favor of liberated, multiple, and infinite Vision, and to extend beyond the 
text the justice of regenerating meaning.  
 
Regenerating meaning 
Enlightenment epistemological discourse made a direct connection between 
empirical sight, ethical clarity, and progressive knowledge.3  In Downcast Eyes, Martin 
                                                
3 The privileging of light in the discourse of knowledge long precedes the prominent role 
it played in the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries.  Ancient Greek 
philosophers revered the sense of sight as the highest sense (Jonas 312).  Socrates likened 
the soul to an eye (Park 12), and Plato’s allegory of the cave attributed the ability to know 
reality with the ability to see, an attribution that positioned the sun in the exalted position 
as the vehicle through which one could make meaning and come as close to Truth and 
Good as this limited world would allow (Park 13).  However, perhaps nothing is stronger 
evidence of the centuries-long trust bestowed in seeing and light as conduits for 
perceiving reality and truth as the appellation given to the period of the Enlightenment, in 
which reason and experience as perceived by the five senses formed the basis for 
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Jay explains that the “ocularcentric bias” was so strong during the Enlightenment that 
Lockean and Cartesian thought characterized the mind as a camera obscura, and 
considered inexorable the tie between rationality and lucidity (85).  In the popular 
periodical The Spectator (1712), Joseph Addison proclaimed “Our sight is the most 
perfect and most delightful of all our senses” (368), and in An Inquiry into the Human 
Mind on the Principles of Common Sense (1764), Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid 
flatly stated that “Of all the faculties called the five senses, sight is without doubt the 
noblest” (77).  In direct contrast to this mainstream discourse, in some of his earliest 
works Blake is already complicating notions of light, darkness, and void and attempting 
to “renovate sight” (Frosch 127) by emphasizing the importance of inspired Vision over 
empirical sight as a way to regenerate meaning about a more equitable, just community.4   
                                                
knowledge and progress.  Even subject formation itself was held to be at the mercy of 
empirical reception, a point perhaps best exemplified by John Locke’s An Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding, in which Locke states: “The soul begins to have 
Ideas when it begins to perceive.  To ask at what time a man has first any ideas is to ask 
when he begins to perceive; having ideas and perception being the same thing” (93). 
4 See Goldberg, “Byron, Blake, and Heaven,” in which Goldberg asserts that Blake 
conceives of a state of heaven in which distinctions between labor and leisure and 
between physical and mental work are erased.  Applied to “The Little Black Boy,” this 
conception lifts Blake’s poem from the accusations of racism which some critics have 
assigned to it, for although work will continue in heaven for the little black boy, it will be 
the mental work of spiritually educating the uninitiated arrivals, such as the little white 
boy.  For more on Blake’s activist poetics, see Tim Fulford, “A Romantic Technologist 
and Britain’s Little Black Boys.”  Fulford’s article contrasts the efforts made by scientist 
Count Rumford and Blake to effect social reform, specifically as that reform related to 
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In “The Little Black Boy,” the word “black” carries both negative and positive 
connotations, suggesting to the reader that approaching the poem without Vision will 
produce a limited or even stymied interpretive experience.  Initially, the verbal design 
seems to conform to European ideas about black bodies being savage bodies and white 
souls being good souls, as well as to the Enlightenment trope of light and dark that 
equates blackness with deprivation and death. 
 
My mother bore me in the southern wild,  
And I am black, but O! my soul is white; 
White as an angel is the English child: 
But I am black as if bereav’d of light.  (9:1-4, E9).5   
 
However, such conformity is called into question as the poem progresses and we realize 
that it is the black child who is afforded more ontological potency and epistemological 
prowess: it is the black boy who is animated through his speaking voice, and it is he who 
will instruct the white boy about how to receive divine love.  The verbal design 
constructs an agency that is fluidly shared between the boys, that slips back and forth 
between the white and black faces.  Similarly, in the visual design, there are variations in 
                                                
the English “little black boys” who were employed as climbing boys (chimney sweeps) 
and the African boys who were owned as slaves.  Fulford argues that Rumford was 
merely a “Sunday School abolitionist,” that is, someone who offered pity and charity to 
the poor and to the Africans, but only as a means to maintain the dominant social order 
and status quo.  Blake, on the other hand, wrote socially progressive poetry which 
exposed the “psychology of sanctimony and its connections with Church and State” (42). 
5 All references to the verbal element of Blake’s works are from David V. Erdman’s The 
Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake (E). 
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the African boy’s skin color between different copies of the same design.  For example, 
in the Bentley Copy G of the visual design depicting the two boys standing before a 
Jesus-like figure, both the African and European boys have light skin. 
 
  Figure 1: Songs of Innocence, “The Little Black Boy,”  
Plate 30, Bentley Copy G (1789) (Yale Center for British Art) 
 
However, in the Bentley Copy L of this same design, the African boy is much darker than 
the European boy. 
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  Figure 2: Songs of Innocence and of Experience, “The  
Little Black Boy,” Plate 9, Bentley Copy L (1789-1794) (Yale Center for British Art) 
 
This color variation in the African boy’s skin tone suggests a shifting, communal agency 
that is shared between the African and European boys.  Commenting on how the notion 
of a disseminated (and disseminating) agency is not only found in the content of Blake’s 
designs but also in their form and materiality, Makdisi notes that in Blake’s designs “the 
supposed freedom of the sovereign individual is shown to be compromised by the extent 
to which selves and others exist in a dispersed and mutually dependent network that is 
not really compatible with a discourse of identity and difference” (Impossible History 6).  
The same network-reliant structure is found in the material form of the designs, “which 
share many verbal and visual elements, none of which can really be said to function in a 
genuinely sovereign sense, that is, as self-governing and independent from others” (7).   
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The same indeterminate identity and agency of the boys that exist in the verbal 
design and color variation of the visual design are also enacted in the pictorial image in 
the visual design, in which the black and white boys appear before a Jesus-like figure.  In 
the image, the black boy stands behind the white boy, who is leaning into the figure with 
hands clasped as if in prayer.  In one reading, the black boy is subservient to his white 
counterpart, as he is literally second in line to speak to Jesus.  His identity is also defined 
by utility, as he appears to be holding up the white boy.  Furthermore, the black boy 
appears to be an outsider standing in stark physical contrast to the white boy and Jesus, 
who share flowing, golden-colored hair and, in the Bentley Copy L plate, fair skin.  In an 
alternate reading, it is the black boy who has already received Jesus’ love.  Behind the 
black boy is a rock that may also be read as a set of wings springing from the boy’s back.  
Similarly, rather than serving a subordinate role to the white boy, the black boy could be 
introducing the white boy to Jesus, gently pushing him forward as the black boy teaches 
the white boy how to kneel and pray before Jesus. 
 Perhaps even more significant than what the black boy may be teaching the white 
boy, it is the black boy who instructs the reader about the vital difference between vision 
and Vision.  In “The Formal Challenges of Antislavery Poetry,” Jennifer Keith suggests 
that “Blake replaces European evaluations of black as demonic and white as angelic with 
[a] view of spirituality in relation to the sun” (112) in which, through Vision, we see that 
black bodies are darkened from God’s (the sun’s) excessive love.  Speaking of the roles 
the boys come to play in the poem, W. J. T. Mitchell notes that the visual design puts the 
white boy “in the position of the lost soul who has been rescued by his black ‘guardian 
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angel’” (13).  Significantly, the black boy states that his “sun-burnt face / Is but a cloud, 
and like a shady grove” (9:15-16, E9).  Once again, understanding and seeing in “The 
Little Black Boy” is “an act of divine imagination rather than empirical observation” 
(Keith 113), as the boy’s face is presented as ethereal as a cloud, and is also transformed 
through simile into a locus amoenus,6 a pastoral locale for creative inspiration and refuge. 
The ability to see the void as a locus amoenus if approached with Vision and 
Imagination—rather than reason alone—is dramatically enacted in another one of Blake’s 
early works, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell.  In the Memorable Fancy that begins on 
plate 17, an Enlightenment Angel of reason7 approaches the speaker to warn the latter, “O 
pitiable foolish young man! O horrible! O dreadful state! consider the hot burning 
dungeon thou art preparing for thyself to all eternity, to which thou art going in such 
career” (E41).  When the Angel takes the speaker to view the speaker’s “eternal lot,” they 
come to “a void boundless as a nether sky” (E41). Notably, the Angel is confined and 
terrified and joins his form to the bounded forms of earth by clinging to the roots of trees.  
Viewing the scene only with his vegetative eye of reason, the Angel, despite his divine 
appellation, possesses only single and limited empirical vision (Damon 134).  In contrast, 
the speaker suggests that void may actually house Edenic “providence” and a space of 
freedom.  Chastised by the Angel, the speaker, like the Angel, remains bounded to the 
tree until “By degrees we beheld the infinite Abyss, firey as the smoke of a burning city; 
                                                
6 I thank Jennifer Keith for suggesting this reading of the shady grove to me. 
7 For a discussion of the role angels of reason play in the history of Enlightenment 
thinking, see Stempel’s “Angels of Reason: Science and Myth in the Enlightenment,” and 
especially 72-74 for a treatment of the angel of the fourth Memorable Fancy. 
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beneath us at an immense distance was the sun, black but shining” (18, E41).  The images 
of blackness, fire, and darkness continue repeatedly and furiously, as the speaker also 
describes appearances such as black and white spiders, a scaly, monstrous serpent, and 
the head of Leviathan with bloodied gills.  
Once the Angel leaves, however, the speaker understands how single vision and 
tyrannical mandates about single, empiricist interpretation restrict his freedom.  Without 
the Angel, the scene of the abyss is drastically changed.  The speaker finds himself 
“sitting on a pleasant bank beside a river by moon light hearing a harper who sung to the 
harp. & his theme was, The man who never alters his opinion is like standing water, & 
breeds reptiles of the mind” (19, E42).  Explaining to the Angel “All that we saw was 
owing to your metaphysics” (19, E42), the speaker acutely understands how to engage his 
“fourfold Vision” and not be confined to the single vision of empiricist reason.  In The 
Illuminated Blake, Erdman poses whether this plate represents “the angel Reason, 
looking out upon nothing, contrasted to the red diabolic ‘young man’ who sees with 
imagination and senses” (114).8  Indeed, while traditional pastoral scenes take place in 
the light of day, the speaker’s pastoral is moon lit, indicating his unbounded freedom 
from the restraints of the sulphur sun of reason.  S. Foster Damon explains that for Blake, 
the sun is the symbol of the imagination; however, it is only the spiritual sun, not the 
“sulphur sun,” that represents imagination (390).  In contrast, the “sulphur sun,” which 
                                                
8 Erdman also notes that in Copy I of this plate there is a pool beside the tree, which 
Erdman suggests may be an oasis.  The presence of an oasis is particularly noteworthy 
within the context of my discussion of the void as a locus amoenus. 
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was rent from Mars during the spiritual warfare of the Eternals, is the sun of the material 
world, and is a symbol for reason (390).  Thus, the unified sun is imagination, while the 
rent, divided sun is the heat of the material world; and the heat of the material world 
emanates from flames of fire that give heat but, significantly, not insight (139).  This 
emphasis on the impotence of the sulphur sun of reason and the exaltation of the spiritual 
sun of imagination is an extreme rewriting of Enlightenment epistemological discourse, 
in which light and lucid reason are considered generative.  It is because the speaker 
engages his multiple Vision that he is afforded interpretive freedom, a space of 
lawlessness characterized by anti-logocentric, anti-juridical multiplicity of meaning.    
In the Memorable Fancy scene, the Angel sees the void and then the abyss as 
spaces of terror, while the speaker sees them as spaces of possibility for creation and 
imagination.9  The human speaker, who is bounded to the earth, is free because the 
speaker has Vision; in contrast, the free-floating Angel is shackled because the Angel has 
no ability to transcend Enlightenment mandates about how knowledge is gained and how 
reality is formed.  For Blake, repressing one’s own Vision is “even more oppressive than 
enforced obedience to a tyrannical government” (Makdisi, Impossible History 274).  As 
                                                
9 The speaker’s ability to use Vision in a productive way is reminiscent of Leibniz’s 
statement in On the Ultimate Origination of Things that “‘there always remain in the 
abyss of things slumbering parts which have yet to be awakened, to grow in size and 
worth, and in a word, to advance to a more perfect state.  And hence no end of progress is 
ever reached’” (quoted in Bronner 21).  See also Matthew J. A. Green’s fascinating 
comments on the possibility for progress in the Derridean aporia in Visionary 
Materialism in the Early Works of William Blake (50).  
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the Memorable Fancy scene describes, the “freedom to imagine is the power to create the 
world, and [for Blake] that power is human rather than divine” (Makdisi 267). 
 
Regenerating Urizen 
The [First] Book of Urizen is a rich design through which to consider how 
Blakean Vision and the exemptive sublime invoke the possibility of justice because at its 
very core, Urizen is about regenerating multiplicity of meaning in direct opposition to the 
Logos, or, in Urizenic terms, “One King, one God, one Law” (4:40, E72).  The narrative 
that unfolds in Urizen, the material text itself, and the approach to reading it are all 
characterized by lawlessness, and, specifically, the lawlessness of rejecting 
Enlightenment epistemological and ontological discourse that privilege empiricism, 
ocular sight, and binary structures.  Thematically, the design is a rewriting of the creation 
myth set forth in Genesis, and, thus, is insubordinate in its multiplicity according to the 
logocentric, tyrannical thinking that accompanies single vision.  It is a story about the 
Fall of Urizen, who is both slave to and author of written laws and single vision.  
Multiplicity of meaning also arises via the material text (via Blake’s ontological 
aesthetics), as inconsistencies between the verbal and visual designs prompt readers to 
employ Vision and experience the freedom of the exemptive sublime or be enslaved by 
single vision and orthodox interpretation. 
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In the verbal design of one of the last plates of Urizen, the speaker, who is 
unknown—and, perhaps with Blakean poetic justice, unknowable—tells the reader the 
fates of Urizen, Enitharmon, and Los.10  The speaker states: 
 
3.  Six days they shrunk up from existence 
And on the seventh day they rested 
And they bless’d the seventh day, in sick hope: 
And forgot their eternal life  
 
4.  And their thirty cities divided 
In form of a human heart  
No more could they rise at will 
In the infinite void, but bound down 
To earth by their narrowing perceptions  (25:39-47, E83) 
 
As he does throughout the poem, in these lines Blake regenerates Enlightenment 
epistemological and ontological discourse so that spaces of void are liberating and 
productive and matters of the heart are public and communal.  While terms such as 
“infinite void” often conjure sublime images of terror in eighteenth-century discourse, in 
this passage the phrase seems to indicate a desirable space of emancipation.  Further, 
throughout the poem, it is the Eternals who are juxtaposed against Urizen, Enitharmon, 
and Los and who are, given their appellation, assumed to have immortality, yet in the 
lines above it is implied that Urizen, Enitharmon, and Los at one time had eternal life.  
Also adding to the complication of these lines is that usually there is an associative 
disconnect between the notion of a heart—a solitary, internal, human organ—and the idea 
                                                
10 While I read the “they” in the lines below as these three characters, I do so cognizant of 
the fact that this conclusion is open for debate, and, once again, perhaps unknowable. 
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of a city—a multivocal, public, discursive space—yet in the lines above these two words 
seem inexorably entwined.   
There are multiple experiences of productive regeneration and illumination that 
occur in darkness and chaos in Urizen, and most strikingly in the work’s opening plates, 
in which the larger creative theory of the work is unfolded.  In the biblical Genesis, the 
ability to create ontological and creative presence resides solely vis-à-vis the Word 
animated at a precise moment by and as a radiant God; in Urizen, meaning is created 
beyond the limitations of logocentric and chronologic systems.  Urizen’s genesis mirrors 
Blake’s radically different understanding of creation (both physical and aesthetic) and 
demonstrates the way in which Blake’s aesthetics are grounded in an ontological process 
that privileges shifting relations and process rather than enclosure and fixidity.  Steven 
Vine describes Urizen’s genesis as having no identifiable beginning and Urizen himself 
as “a process and principle of repetition” (“Framing Los(s)” 120).  Hélène Ibata notes 
that for Blake “execution could not be divided from invention” (37), as the imaginative 
process and the physical representation of that process were one in the same.    
Although Blake found the system of language inadequate and oppressive—he 
analogized the English language to a “rough basement” (Jerusalem 36:58, E183) and 
declared the system of language to be a “stubborn structure” (Jerusalem 36:59, E183)—
he of course did not abandon the system.  Rather than attempting to transcend or escape 
from language, Blake rebuilds it and celebrates the possibilities that flow from its 
reconstituted structure.  Assigning ontological potency to “swift winged words” (Urizen, 
2:6, E70), Blake journeys deeper into language and “Striv[es] with Systems to deliver 
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Individuals from those Systems” (Jerusalem 11:5, E154).  Blake’s reader, in turn, is 
offered a space in which he or she can reconstruct his or her understanding at liberty in 
the exemptive sublime.   
One of the primary ways in which Blake accomplishes this reorganization of 
meaning in Urizen is to subvert traditional Enlightenment epistemological discourses of 
light, progression, and knowledge, thus requiring his readers to break open their “mind-
forg’d manacles” and assumptions to experience the freedom of nontyrranical Vision. 
Although Vision is a way of approaching the world and not an aesthetic category, Vision 
bears significant resonances with sensibility.  Blake co-opts some of the signposts of the 
literature of sensibility—such as enthusiasm,11 pity,12 and mercy—into his articulation of 
Vision.  Further, just as Williams, Wollstonecraft, and Godwin place intersubjective 
empathy and equitable communal justice at the heart of their radical sensibility, Blake is 
explicit in his belief that those who look at the world with a vegetative eye have no 
Vision and thus no empathy.  As Thomas R. Frosch explains, when seeing with Blakean 
Vision, “seeing becomes total knowledge, and there is no longer any disparity between 
the visible and the demands of feeling” (127). 
Similarly, the Blakean exemptive sublime shares some attributes with the 
predominant contemporary articulations of the aesthetic category of the sublime offered 
by Burke and Kant, but ultimately suggests an experience that is radically different.  Like 
                                                
11 For a discussion of the role of enthusiasm in eighteenth-century and Romantic-era 
literature, see Mee, Romanticism, Enthusiasm, and Regulation, especially part I. 
12 Barker-Benfield has noted that pity had a “shrine” in the literature of sensibility (265). 
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the theories of the sublime set forth by Burke and Kant, in the Blakean exemptive 
sublime there is a relational existence between the reader and exterior objects.  However, 
unlike the Burkean and Kantian articulations, for Blake there is no requirement in the 
exemptive sublime for defining elements such as terror, obscurity, nearness, distance, 
limitations, or the powerful intervention of reason.  The Burkean and Kantian sublimes 
are founded on the triumph of reason and present the human mind as a passive organ of 
colonizing, empirical stimuli.  Hélène Ibata explains how Blake found “imaginative 
failure” (34) and “intellectual torpor” (33), not inspiration, in a person’s sense of 
powerlessness and domination.13  Indeed, the Blakean exemptive sublime does not arise 
from the sense of an end, but from the sense of the space of interpretive process 
characterized by multiplicity and non-teleological orientation.  Because of its emphasis 
on interpretive freedom and multiplicity, the exemptive sublime is in direct opposition to 
prescriptive Enlightenment epistemological and ontological discourse that equates light 
with progress, virtue, and knowledge and darkness with stagnation, immorality, and 
ignorance, and that suggests that spaces of void are unproductive and infertile. 
Much like my articulation of the Blakean exemptive sublime, Mark L. Barr has 
described Blake’s reader as possessing “interpretive emancipation” and “interpretive 
freedom” (373).  Noting how Blake’s exceptionally difficult texts generate a positive 
space of exemption, Barr states that the  
                                                
13 Ibata also argues that Blake saw vastness and darkness as “evidence of mental 
dissolution and loss” (34).  As I discuss below, I firmly disagree with this specific 
reading, although I find Ibata’s larger theory of Blake’s theory of the sublime helpful. 
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gap between word and image, supported by the contradictory, fragmented and 
unconventional nature of Blake’s thought and representation, creates interpretive 
freedom that culminates in the removal of the author himself, a final catalyst that 
annihilates any fixed point of ideological reference—without Blake as author, the 
single voice becomes fragmented into a multitude of possibilities.  (373) 
 
Indeed, unlike Vincent De Luca’s assertion in Words of Eternity that it is the reader’s act 
of self-annihilation that must be accomplished for Blakean sublimity to occur (43), I 
argue that the Blakean exemptive sublime demands no prescriptive act just as it compels 
no interpretive mandate.14  This freedom is Blake’s Vision, which is at liberty from 
conventional figurations of binary Enlightenment tropes (such as darkness versus light, 
and spaces of void versus spaces of fertility).  The Blakean exemptive sublime does not 
enact the paradigmatic transport inherent in the notions of the sublime that begin with 
Longinus because the exemptive sublime does not convey the reader somewhere else; 
rather, in Blake’s ontological aesthetics, the exemptive sublime emphasizes the process 
of becoming.  By focusing on the process of interpretive multiplicity rather than on the 
product of a single message, Blake’s texts gesture toward a practice of reading that 
provides for ethical reflection about the validity of hegemonic demands.15  The necessity 
                                                
14 While I disagree with De Luca’s analysis of the Blakean reader’s self-annihilation, I 
find helpful his understanding of the Blakean text itself as sublime object (6), as well as 
his reading of the sublime as a field rather than as a “single conceptual entity capable of 
succinct definition” (4).   
15 Writing about The Book of Thel, W. J. T. Mitchell has suggested that the multiple and 
contradictory interpretations of the poem indicate that “[t]he effect of [Blake’s] strategy 
is to undercut any attempt by the reader to pass judgment on Thel from some fixed 
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for “seeing” with Blakean nontyrranical Vision confronts Urizen’s reader from the first 
plate of the design. 
Plate one, the visual design that opens The [First] Book of Urizen, immediately 
interrogates whether the reader has “Single vision” or manifold Vision, and may be seen 
as challenging the oppressive use of language by orthodox religious figures. 
 
  Figure 3: The First Book of Urizen,  
Plate 1, Bentley Copy C (1794) (Yale Center for British Art) 
 
                                                
perspective” (80), and that “Blake is trying to subvert this sort of univocal judgment, and 
to confront us with a human dilemma that eludes any fixed moral stance” (81). 
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That the elderly, Moses-like figure is writing on seemingly stone tablets with both hands 
and with eyes closed suggests that he is furiously inscribing restrictive laws in a blind 
manner, in an unenlightened way.  For Blake, this kind of passive reception and 
promulgation of unexamined commandments is the embodiment of “Newton’s sleep.”16  
Similarly, that this figure sits upon a large, imposing, and open book indicates that he is 
quite literally rooted in and tangled by the interpretive laws that he inscribes, an 
indication made more apparent by the actual roots growing from the book downwards 
into the ground.  Dark colors surround the man and the upright tablets, which also 
resemble tomb stones, while light colors and an open space high above the figure imply 
that the man is a prisoner of his own creation made in the darkness of incomprehension.  
However, other interpretations for this visual design prompt the reader to question 
whether it is darkness or light that is analogous to enlightenment.  For example, the gray, 
stone-like tablets also carry positive connotations.  These objects seem to emanate from 
the figure himself and form the pattern of wings, granting an angelic or divine quality to 
the figure.  These objects may also be understood as doorways, twin entries that intimate 
that the figure has some kind of choice in his destination and destiny.  Returning to the 
divine nature of the figure, the fact that his eyes are closed and his hands are outstretched 
to write may indicate that he is a material, human enactment of “swift winged words.”  
                                                
16 Gilpin has offered similar descriptions of this scene, commenting that Urizen is 
“blindly scribbling out laws,” and, in his “self-absorbed theorizing,” Urizen is so 
obsessed “with his own creations, he uses both hands to write” (40).  Gilpin also likens 
the stone tablets to tombstones, and notes that the tablets are reminiscent of the 
commandments God gave to Moses (40). 
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He may be read as a person who is creating his own emancipated reality by engaging all 
of his senses rather than condemning himself to “Single vision & Newton’s sleep.”  
David Erdman has commented on the way in which this plate may be read as a scene of 
potential liberation when, in Illuminated Blake, Erdman suggests that the patches of blue 
sky in the design invite the reader to question and test the absurdity of mechanically 
written laws and the existence of such tyrannical power (183). 
The reader’s ability to reimagine knowledge-making has significant political, 
juridical, and historical implications.  Cooper has commented that “by undermining 
readers’ conventional epic-realist expectations of a stable, self-reinforcing narrative of 
representations” in Urizen, Blake also “call[s] into question other, more oppressive 
discursive conventions associated with Urizen—most especially, the circular 
Blackstonian claim to speak ‘on behalf of’ the Law . . .” (194).  Explicating his juridical 
theory in Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765), William Blackstone holds that 
the law is permanent, uniform, and universal, and is founded upon an unwavering mode 
of legal textual construction that privileges entrenched social custom (or common law) 
and parliamentary enactments.17  The piety with which Blackstone regards written law 
                                                
17 Blackstone defines municipal law as “a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme 
power in a state, commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong” (44).  He 
claims that the determining properties of a law (or rule) are permanence, uniformity, and 
universality (44).  Distinguishing between law and advise or counsel, Blackstone explains 
that “our obedience to the law depends not upon our approbation, but upon the maker’s 
will.  Counsel is only matter of persuasion, law is matter of injunction; counsel acts only 
upon the willing, law upon the unwilling also” (44). 
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and social custom is antithetically opposed to Blake’s belief that “All Penal Laws court 
Transgression & therefore are cruelty & Murder” (E618).   
Blake’s statement that to curtail transgressive imaginative Vision is to end, or 
“murder,” ontological existence is not metaphorical.  Reminiscent of the way Williams, 
Wollstonecraft, and Godwin rewrite sensibility so that egalitarian justice is linked with 
empathy, for Blake there is a direct relationship between Vision, empathy, and freedom.  
Jon Mee has discussed Blake’s notion of liberation by using some of the language of 
sensibility, stating that “moral sentiments [could not] be abstracted from the excitability 
of the physiological being for Blake.  It was only by negotiating the minute particularities 
of the ‘passions & senses’ that the possibilities of human emancipation are to be written” 
(“Bloody Blake” 79-80).  In “The Divine Image” (Songs of Innocence, 1789), Blake 
locates “Mercy Pity Peace and Love” (1, E12) in the “human form divine” (11, E13), 
transferring the guiding principles underlying the literature of sensibility from a 
representational, aesthetic category and onto a communal, corporeal agent:  
 
And all must love the human form. 
In heathen, turk or jew. 
Where Mercy, Love & Pity dwell, 
There God is dwelling too.  (17-20, E13) 
 
This animated, human Vision relies on multiple senses that are driven by emotional 
response to reject singular meanings.  Differentiating Blake’s notion of emancipated and 
emancipating Vision, Makdisi notes that Blake placed the struggle for liberty in the 1790s 
“beyond the strictly political-representational issues raised in the writings of activists like 
Paine, to challenge not only the forms of identity taken for granted by Paine, but also the 
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radical faith in the law and competition” (8).18  Blakean enthusiastic Vision rejects the 
mandated logocentricism of Blackstonian19 and Enlightenment20 epistemological models.  
To approach a text with multiple Vision is to engage it with an enthusiastic openness to 
the multiplicity of reconstituted meaning, to approach the Blakean text in a way that 
mirrors the material, multiple form of the text itself.21 
In his short, two-stanza poem “How to know Love from Deceit,” Blake writes of 
the relationship between lawlessness, empathy, and liberation.  The poem speaks of 
                                                
18 Similarly, Jon Mee describes how radicals like John Thelwall held out the progressive 
movement as “above all else a product of Enlightenment rationality” (“Anxieties of 
Enthusiasm” 186). 
19 Barr characterizes Blake’s aesthetics as being focused on “the ways in which radical 
artistic expression resists judicial institutions” (371).  In “Practicing Resistance,” Barr 
argues that some of Blake’s designs, most notably Milton, evince a “poetic method attack 
against earthly institutions, a ‘mercy’ achieved through the ‘self annihilation’ of textual 
indeterminacy, seeks to revive the spirit of jury resistance to legal authority” (376).  
Barr’s observation is particularly illuminating in the context of my discussion above 
about how Wollstonecraft uses sensibility and the sublime to argue for jury nullification 
and a kind of proto civil disobedience.  
20 Denise Gigante notes that “Blake made it clear that to rely, like Enlightenment 
scientists, on the characteristics of visible structure is to fail to recognize the essential 
nature of living form” (465). 
21 Makdisi makes a direct connection between enthusiasm and multiplicity.  He explains 
that by the late 1800s, the term “enthusiasm” bore connotations that “threatened the 
sanctity, the stability, the sovereign imperviousness of the unitary subject, just as it 
threatened the sanctity of private property and the political norms and orders of the state” 
(Impossible History 296). 
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empathetic love and juridical and mental emancipation in ways that resonate with Blake’s 
notion of inspired Vision: 
 
Love to faults is always blind 
Always is to joy inclind 
Lawless wingd & unconfind 
And breaks all chains from every mind 
 
Deceit to secresy confind 
Lawful cautious & refind 
To every thing but interest blind 
And forges fetters for the mind  (E472) 
 
Blake locates the source of communal equitable justice as well as mental liberation not in 
legal mandates but in love that is “Lawless wingd & unconfind.”  Although Blake is 
explicit that this freedom has very real political implications, this freedom is intricately 
tied to his revolutionizing aesthetic categories, namely, to the way Blake creates a space 
for the reader in which meaning is a process of non-teleological, anti-hegemonic 
lawlessness.  In this space, contraries and multiplicity are (re)generative and not arresting 
or impotent, and the reader with Vision will welcome the space of undecidability.        
For example, the reader’s initial disorientation about whether the first plate of 
Urizen announces a hopeful space of emancipation or a foreboding tale of subjugation is 
exacerbated by the Preludium of plate two, which appears to embody a clash between 
pictorial design and written text.   
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  Figure 4: The First Book of Urizen,  
Plate 2, Bentley Copy C (1794) (Yale Center for British Art) 
 
The visual text boasts bright colors of pink and light green and depicts an angelic figure 
floating through the air contentedly and gently leading a small child above a flame-like 
pattern.  In Blake’s Composite Art, Mitchell explains the figure as a “guardian angel” 
who is a “humanized, moderated version of the more violent energy forms beneath her,” 
and associates the child as one of Blake’s cherub figures (144).  Emphasizing the 
connectedness and harmony between life forms, the Preludium contains the only pictorial 
design in Urizen in which humans make positive contact (111).  This contact may be read 
as a visual design of Blake’s concept of divine, human freedom, in which “form can 
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become liberating rather than confining” and “our ontological power can be freed, and 
directed by love rather than the law” (Makdisi, Impossible History 282).22  Just as Vision 
(or, “Mercy Pity Peace and Love”) is located in “the human form divine,” so too is the 
human (reading) body the source of sublimity for Blake.  Ibata notes that an individual 
“Selfhood” cannot experience the sublime in isolation; rather, “reunited with the 
imagination and expanded by Man’s creative energies, the body itself becomes the locus 
of visionary activity” (35). 
The reader’s “visionary activity” of reorganizing meaning continues as, contrary 
to the visual design, the verbal design explicitly speaks of a place that is isolated and 
suggests that a “dark vision of torment” will be revealed: 
 
Of the primeval Priests assum’d power, 
When Eternals spurn’d back his religion; 
And gave him a place in the north, 
Obscure, shadowy, void, solitary. 
 
Eternals I hear your call gladly, 
Dictate swift winged words, & fear not 
To unfold your dark visions of torment.  (2:1-7, E70) 
 
Despite ominous introductory promises, a close reading of the Preludium demonstrates 
that the reader may in fact locate within the written text of this plate something other than 
desolation and desperation.  This seeming incongruity epitomizes what Blake will say 
within the text of Urizen about a human’s ability not just to see, but to exercise Vision.  
                                                
22 Jeanne Moskal has noted that “Blake came to view forgiveness as a new dispensation, 
along the lines of an ethics of virtue, almost achieving an independent conceptual status, 
written successfully ‘without’ the dispensation of law” (12). 
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Indeed, the disorientation that results from challenging traditional modes of perception 
and understanding may be initially confusing, but certainly need not end with the reader 
having been led astray and lost; rather, it is the state of disorientation that eventually 
leads the reader to a place of possibility, a place in which strict adherence to interpretive 
dictates about how one sees is not necessary.  In addition to being a rejection of the 
Enlightenment’s privileging of illuminated reason as the most potent way to “see,” 
Blake’s reorganization of the discourse of dark and void spaces (in which for Blake one 
is able to see with Vision) is also a rewriting of the Burkean sublime. 
Highlighting the differences between Blake’s rewritten sublime and the 
prevailing, contemporary British theory of the sublime, the verbal design of Urizen’s 
plate two contains conventional vocabulary of the Burkean sublime; however, the 
associations that arise from this vocabulary are not necessarily negative ones in Blake’s 
text.  The second line states that the Eternals “spurn’d back his religion.”  While the “his” 
of this clause is not identified through the use of a proper noun, the reader assumes that 
the “his” refers to Urizen.  While “spurn’d” has a negative connotation, Blake counters 
this connotation with the idea of the creation of an open space, albeit one that is 
“Obscure, shadowy, void, and solitary.”  Traditionally, “obscure” connotes unformed, 
“shadowy” connotes immateriality of being, “void” connotes barrenness, and “solitary” 
connotes isolation.  However, the “I” of the Preludium hears the call of the Eternals 
“gladly,” and beckons them to deliver “swift winged words, & fear not / To unfold your 
dark visions of torment.”  Just as Blake recasts an immaterial, mental conception—
religion—as a noun possessing actual materiality capable of being pushed back and 
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moved, words are similarly given physicality and become “winged.”  The materiality of 
language embodied as winged beings is further underscored by Erdman’s notation in 
Illuminated Blake that a winged fly and a butterfly with spotted wings reside around 
some of the letters making up the word “Urizen” (184).   
The inversion of material and mental constructs mirrors Blake’s deconstruction of 
traditional conclusions about whether there can be ontological or epistemological 
progress in a space of void and darkness.  This inversion also exemplifies the way 
Blake’s readers can erect their own notions in the deconstructed—and liberated—space 
of the exemptive sublime.  By removing restrictive interpretive codes and mandates and 
opening the limits that traditionally demarcate meaning, Blake offers his readers the 
ability to challenge such codes, mandates, and limits by engaging in the imaginative 
process of creating their own meanings and, thus, their own reality.  Rather than forcing 
an end to the interpretive process, Blake’s aesthetics emphasize the process itself; while 
Enlightenment theorists of the sublime, such as Burke and Kant, articulate a sublime 
founded on limitation and overpowering interventions of cognitive functions, Blake’s 
sublimity is characterized by openings, by what Ibata describes as “a new kind of 
sublimity as process” (32).  Similarly, Vine characterizes the Blakean sublime as 
“enact[ing] an aesthetics of incompletion, process and becoming whose open-endedness . 
. . exceeds the formal closures of the illuminated book” (256). 
 If we consider the Blakean exemptive sublime as characterized by the liberty to 
reconstruct meaning in direct opposition to the Logos—or, in Urizenic terms, “One King, 
one God, one Law (4:40, E72)—and as constituted by the possibilities that arise from the 
 
 
163 
openness of becoming, it is not a far stretch to see how there is an ontological component 
to Blakean aesthetics: Vision and the imaginative power to create does not stop with an 
artistic endeavor for Blake; rather, Vision is “the power to create the world, and here that 
power is human rather than divine (or rather such divine power is here recognized as 
inherently human...)” (Makdisi, Impossible History 267).  Makdisi vehemently argues 
against the conclusion that this linking of imaginative power and materialist productive 
power is inherently idealist.  On the contrary, rather than lifting Blakean aesthetics out of 
considerations of materialist production, these aesthetics announce “a kind of ontological 
materialism” in which “the powers of conception and execution” are inseparable 
(Makdisi, Impossible History 268).  By subverting the power of Logos and offering the 
reader “interpretive emancipation” (Barr 373), the Blakean exemptive sublime offers a 
space of reconstituted meaning, materialist relevancy, and ontological potency.  To reach 
this space, however, the reader must use multiple Vision and not single vision. 
For example, in plate two of Urizen, the reader is confronted with the apparent 
paradox that shadows in the text exist in a space of void and darkness (Urizen is given “a 
place in the north, / Obscure, shadowy, void, solitary” (2:3-4, E70)).  If a reader were to 
approach this plate with deadened, single vision, these lines from the verbal design would 
yield an image of ungenerative, unproductive, desolate darkness.  This image, however,  
would be in sharp contrast to the brightly colored, sun-drenched visual design, which 
depicts a loving, intimate connection between two dynamic figures (as discussed above).  
Indeed, a reader with Vision understands that because shadows cannot exist without light, 
Urizen’s “place in the north” cannot be “void” and “solitary” as these words are literally 
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denoted, as the sun necessarily provides light and, thus, life, or at the very least the 
possibility for life.  As Christine Gallant notes in Blake and the Assimilation of Chaos, 
the state of void is inexorably tied not to nonbeing, but rather to existence.  Gallant 
explains that it is in the state of void from which the cosmos, and thus all life, is to be 
formed.  The Preludium’s urging to the Eternals that they “fear not / To unfold your dark 
visions of torment” (2:6-7, E70) is curious in that the unidentified speaker seems to 
understand that there is something redeeming or at least cathartic about releasing the 
“dark visions,” that there is an existing lifeforce, shadowy though it may be, in the 
darkness.  Gallant observes that “Blake does not mean to suggest that the ‘void’ is in 
itself fearsome and destructive, but only that it seems so to those who would change it” 
(18).  Those who would change Blake’s void are those readers who “see” only with 
single, uninspired vision, and, thus, are unable to recognize the space for productive and 
generative meaning in Blake’s void.    
It is not only some of Blake’s readers who lack Vision, though; indeed, most of 
the characters who populate Urizen are unable to experience the liberation of the Blakean 
sublime.  The destructive flaw for Urizen’s characters, Gallant explains, is that they 
attempt to transcend or escape chaos, and that this, Blake makes clear, is their fatal error 
(15).  Paul Mann makes a similar point when he notes that “[i]t was Urizen’s very desire 
to ‘transcend’ Eternity that generated the fallen world.  In Blake’s text in general, most 
attempts at transcendental projects are doomed to failure” (64).  Indeed, far before Urizen 
inscribes laws and attempts to forge “a solid without fluctuation” (4:11, E71), it is the 
Eternals who are repelled by spaces of void and darkness, and who attempt to separate 
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themselves from what they view as the chaotic nature of the void.  When Urizen is first 
named, in plate three, it is intimated that he is responsible for the “abominable void” that 
is so threatening to the Eternals: 
 
Lo, a shadow of horror is risen 
In Eternity!  Unknown, unprolific! 
Self-closd, all-repelling:  what Demon 
Hath form’d this abominable void 
This soul-shudd’ring vacuum?—Some said 
“It is Urizen”, But unknown, abstracted 
Brooding secret, the dark power hid.  (3:1-7, E70) 
 
Urizen is initially identified as a shadow that has penetrated the realm of Eternity and is 
folded in on itself.  What seems to be so “abominable” and “soul-shudd’ring” to the 
Eternals is the independence and singularity of the shadow.  However, the Urizenic 
shadow is also conflated with a space of “void” and a “vacuum”: did the Urizenic shadow 
form the “abominable void” and “soul-shudd’ring vacuum,” or are these spaces actually 
Urizen?  Either reading suggests that Urizen is, in fact, not “unprolific,” for whether he 
occupies the space of a shadow or a void, both spaces are productive and vital.  The 
Blakean shadow is in fact quite animated.  As Damon explains, for Blake the figure of the 
Shadow is “the residue of one’s suppressed desires” (368).  Indeed, the visual design of 
plate three depicts a body outstretched, running yet oddly static, engulfed in the heat of 
flames. 
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  Figure 5: The First Book of Urizen, Plate 3,  
Bentley Copy C (1794) (Yale Center for British Art) 
 
Notably, the body’s face is turned in a gesture of hiding, which may indicate the figure’s 
state of shame.23 
                                                
23 Mitchell offers interesting and various readings of this plate, such as seeing the running 
figure as a warning that we have been left to our own devices to navigate through the 
“‘flames of desire,’” or seeing the figure as an image of inspiration.  Mitchell also notes 
that the figure may represent one of the Eternals (145).   
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 Although some scholars have read connotations of the Urizenic shadow and 
places of void as negative throughout Urizen, I counter that these readings have fallen 
into what Andrew M. Cooper identifies as “the Urizenic trap.”  Noting that it is “striking” 
how Urizen’s critics continue to fall into this trap, he observes that critics 
 
tend to flatten that poem’s vertiginous Vortex of coming-to-know into a solid 
globe, as if they somehow knew Urizen a priori without needing to undergo the 
disturbing reversals enacted by Blake’s narrative.  All too compatibly with 
Urizen’s idea of himself, they portray him as a truly hegemonic power.  And yet, 
the poem demonstrates that this divorcing of knowledge from experience and 
agency is what generates the Urizenic illusion of becoming what you behold in 
the first place.  (191) 
 
For example, Tristanne J. Connolly states that while creation is supposed to connote 
coming into being, in Urizen creation is a step closer to nonexistence (80).  However, 
Connolly’s observation does not acknowledge that in Urizen, a state of void may be 
terrifying to the Eternals, but it is actually a place of gestation and not dissipation.  
Further, this reading suggests that Blake is operating within what the poet himself calls 
the “rough basement” and “stubborn structure” of English language, which, I argue, is a 
system that Blake challenges in Urizen.  Indeed, Erdman comments on the reproductive 
quality of the Urizenic abyss when he describes this space as “a womb for Urizen to grow 
in” (Illuminated Blake, 190).  While the “shadow of horror” may evoke revulsion on the 
part of the Eternals, in Urizen this figure does not signify absence, but rather a space of 
opportunity, albeit squandered, for the contraries of reason (Urizen) and imagination 
(Los).  Similarly, writing about spaces of void, Kathleen Lundeen describes the void as 
“lifeless” and “a kind of unproductive womb” (70).  As an example for this argument, 
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Lundeen notes that in the Preludium Urizen is exiled to a void.  However, this place of 
exile is in the North and is a place in which no religion is imposed.  In Blake’s language, 
the North represents the imagination (Damon 301); imagination, in turn, is represented by 
Blake as “the central faculty of both God and Man,” as the “‘Divine-Humanity,’” as 
existence, and as eternity (Damon 195).24  Further, in this place religion has been 
“spurn’d back,” providing an open place of possibility for imagination to flourish without 
being subject to and bound by the imposition of “One King, one God, one Law.” 
The interpretive open field continues on plate three when we consider how Urizen 
himself is a shifting space of associative, biographical, and even ontological 
indeterminacy.  Urizen is commonly understood as bearing a negative association, as his 
name—phonetically identical to the phrase “your reason”—indicates that he is the 
embodiment of Blakean debilitating reason.25  In addition, Urizen performs an 
ontological, materialist enactment of this aesthetic naming by laboring hard to limit, 
regulate, categorize, codify, define, and control what surrounds him.  One of the most 
striking confessions that epitomizes these labors is contained in the lines “I have sought 
for a joy without pain, / For a solid without fluctuation” (4:10-11, E71).  However, who is 
                                                
24 Vincent De Luca reads the Blakean North more ambiguously, stating that Blake’s 
representation of the North varies throughout his career, “sometimes appearing as the 
focal scene of whatever is barren and unregenerate, and sometimes as the preserve of 
original powers of culture and creativity” (192).  Applying this insight to Urizen, De 
Luca characterizes Urizen’s northern locale as a place of “dismal catastrophe” (194). 
25 S. Foster Damon notes that Urizen “symbolizes Reason” and the negative attributes 
Blake associates with this faculty, such as “the limiter of Energy, the lawmaker, and the 
avenging conscience” (419). 
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“I”?  Most readers take this to be Urizen himself, and such a reading certainly squares 
with the poem.  But the indeterminacy of the “I” should not be overlooked, particularly as 
there are moments in the poem when Los (or Imagination, and the associative contrary to 
Urizen),26 who is terrified at Urizen’s “formless unmeasurable death” (7:9, E74), “formed 
nets & gins / And threw the nets round about” (8:7-8, E74), and “bound every change [of 
Urizen] / With rivets of iron & brass” (8:10-11, E74).  
Writing of the way in which identities and associations shift in Urizen, Vine states 
that “Blake’s poetic naming of Urizen . . . can be seen as a staging of indeterminacy, for 
it sets up Urizen’s meaning as a question rather than as a knowable content,” and that 
Urizen “disallows any readerly attempt to regard Urizen as simply the allegorical 
representative of—in Blakean terms—a debased Enlightenment rationality (“Framing 
Los(s)” 119).27  Similarly, Jon Mee explains that he initially regarded Urizen “in terms of 
the kind of feudal-patriarchal blockage of circulation,” but that he realized he was “wrong 
to imagine that what is going on in The Book of Urizen could be reduced to an opposition 
of tyrannical blockage and radical circulation” (76).  Indeed, rather than embodying 
blockage, before he is bound into human form, “Urizen is a clod of clay” (6:10, E74).  
Although the Eternals read this state of existence as “Death,” the clod of clay may also be 
read as an open, unrestricted field of interpretive freedom that parallels the space of the 
exemptive sublime.  Further, given that Urizen is a recasting of the Book of Genesis, the 
                                                
26 Damon identifies Los as “Poetry, the expression in this world of the Creative 
Imagination” (246). 
27 Makdisi, writing about the abundance of confinement in Urizen, states that Urizen is 
“as much a victim as a villain” in “the organization of life” (Impossible History 269). 
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clay may also be read as the potential for Adam to reform not just his physical body but 
his ability to see through Vision.  
Interpretive freedom also stems from the fact that while we know the 
consequences of Urizen’s break from the realm of the Eternals, there remains significant 
indeterminacy concerning why, in the first instance, Urizen is divided.  While there is not 
a definitive answer within the timeline of the textual story itself, one possibility emerges 
not from Urizen’s actions once he is fallen, but from the reactions of the Eternals to their 
shadow self.  Although it is Urizen who is continually described as self-closed and 
unknown, it is the Eternals who desperately wish to remain self-closed and unknowing.  
In plate three, Urizen is described as 
 
Dark revolving in silent activity: 
Unseen in tormenting passions; 
An activity unknown and horrible; 
A self-contemplating shadow, 
In enormous labours occupied.  (3:18-22, E71)  
 
As noted above, “shadow” in the Blakean system represents delusion, but it also 
represents the residue of suppressed desires (Damon 368).  That Urizen was given a place 
in the North suggests that the Urizenic energy or desire, the “tormenting passions,” 
became too great to remain within the realm of the Eternals.  The visual design of plate 3 
(see above) similarly emphasizes burning desire as flames surround an outstretched 
figure.  Indeed, what is so threatening to the Eternals is not merely that the shadow of 
repressed desire has returned, but that it is “self-contemplating.”  The ability to know 
oneself is lacking in the Eternals, who react with trepidation and powerlessness when 
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called upon to integrate their shadow selves, that is, their desires.  Later in the poem, the 
Eternals actually flee from the more humanized, evolved vision of the first separated 
female form, Enitharmon, and order Enitharmon and Los to be hidden.  The Eternals 
command: “‘Spread a Tent, with strong curtains around them / ‘Let cords & stakes bind 
in the Void / That Eternals may no more behold them’” (19:2-4, E78). 
The Eternals’ refusal to understand their desire by covering their sight is 
strikingly enacted in the visual design of plate 17, in which a male form literally shields 
his view and is unable to see the female form before him.  
  Figure 6: The First Book of Urizen,  
Plate 17, Bentley Copy C (1794) (Yale Center for British Art) 
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That the forms have taken on an identifiably human appearance may indicate that the 
inability of the Eternals to practice Vision has been, tragically, reenacted by the humans, 
who will suffer the same fracture that led to Urizen’s separation from the Eternals.  
Similarly, the physical space separating the female (whom I read as Enitharmon) and 
male (whom I read as Los) forms demonstrates that humans have lost not just the ability 
to see with desire and Vision, but to engage in any kind of communal “self” structure.  
The “Mercy, Love & Pity” that is at the heart of communal identity, as well as at the 
center of the material form of Blake’s texts, has been lost on Urizen’s human forms.  The 
plate enacts how for Blake, aesthetics and ontology cannot be divided: Blake’s aesthetics 
and his Vision of humanity are based on ontological constitutive multiplicity. 
 In Urizen, Blake’s fallen forms (Urizen, Enitharmon, Los, and their progeny) are 
single forms who are not only ontologically divided from others in a physical sense—
indeed Urizen appears to have come into existence by being rent from Los—but also in 
their inability to use their imaginative power of Vision and sensual powers of desire to 
liberate themselves from their tortured, singular existences.  In William Blake and the 
Impossible History of the 1790s, Makdisi explains the relationship between being and 
desire in Blakean identity construction and aesthetics by noting that both in Blake’s 
conception of being and in his art “we are not fixed in definite (and intermeasurable) 
forms, as unitary, self-contained, and self-regulating individuals; indeed, we do not exist 
as definite forms at all, but rather as ever-changing bundles of relations articulated by our 
infinite desires” (Impossible History 7).  Makdisi notes Blake understood selfhood in a 
way that was opposed to the hegemonic narrative of negative freedom and individual 
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selfhood that epitomizes the liberal tradition and that was consolidated in the radical 
movement of the 1790s (2).  For Blake the sovereign individual “represented the worst 
form of confinement and restriction” (5).  He regarded selves and others as existing “in a 
dispersed and mutually dependent network that is not really compatible with a discourse 
of identity and difference” (6).  This idea of the individual as network and field is also 
enacted in Blakean texts, which may be characterized by “a series of links and synapses 
in which selves and others are shown to be made up of common and shared elements, and 
in which meanings are generated imminently rather than by reference to transcendent and 
transparent or “self-evident” truths” (6).  Blakean Vision imagines—and produces—an 
individual as unsealed and unbounded, and this “dispersed network” is also embodied in 
the content, form, and materiality of Blake’s texts (Makdisi 7). 
Just as Williams, Wollstonecraft, and Godwin rewrite sensibility and the sublime 
with an egalitarian ethos, there is a strong undercurrent of egalitarianism in Blakean 
Vision and the exemptive sublime.  Blake locates the ability to see with Vision, and, thus, 
to experience the exemptive sublime, in the “human form divine.”  This ability is 
available to all regardless of social class, gender, or race, although it is afforded only to 
those who engage all of their senses and disengage from the tyranny of single vision.  In 
Urizen, inspired Vision bears an ontological potency as it becomes not just favored, but 
necessary for existence.  Darkness and void become so deadly in Urizen because of the 
inability of the Urizenic forces to awaken to the “peculiar Light” of divine Vision; these 
forces remain unknown, unknowing, and petrified within the shadow of the possibility of 
coming into themselves.  Blake’s visual designs make it strikingly clear that “division” 
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does not mean “separation” if one is looking at an object—including a text—with Vision.  
We can better understand Blake’s conception of division by likening this term to his 
notion of the state that is created by contraries; this state is progressive and does not enact 
a nullification. Contraries do not cancel each other out; rather, contraries create a space of 
mutability and an energy of possibility and, ultimately, can open the exemptive 
sublime.28 
Blake’s visual designs emphasize the positive and energetic aspects of the 
division—of the contraries—of part and whole.  In “Visionary Syntax: Nontyrranical 
Coherence in Blake’s Visual Art,” Carr explains how in his pictorial representation of 
human and human-like forms, Blake employs a linear style to achieve the unification of 
part and whole without the former being subsumed by the latter and without forcing a 
“tyrannical organization” in his plates: 
 
Lines and outlines set boundaries and establish limits; but they also bound or leap, 
moving over the page in exuberant bursts of energy.  Blake’s “bounding line” 
defines a unified whole while it accommodates the “peculiar Light” of individual 
parts.  It binds minute details into a coherent form without grinding down their 
unique features as more mechanically regular styles do.  (227) 
 
For example, note how in figure six above, the bounding lines are so precise that large 
regions of the bodies are emphasized (for example, the female’s thigh) just as clearly as 
the “Minute Particulars” of thousands of black lines pushing through the copper color and 
                                                
28 Andrew M. Cooper has commented on the way in which Urizen asks readers to 
consider “a potentially liberating remarriage of the Contraries” (189).  
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creating a “peculiar Light” in front of the female figure.29  In the male figure, we see the 
detail of the latissimus dorsi muscle with the same ease with which we notice single 
strands of his hair.  We recognize the particulars of the gluteal muscles and the entire 
bottom region of the male almost simultaneously.  The bounding lines are stunning in 
their individual clarity, yet each is absolutely necessary to establish the unity of the whole 
image.  The visual design as an intact entity is established by the unification without 
assimilation of the bounding lines.  Blake’s bounding lines are at once supremely 
individual and necessarily communal; they produce the whole of the representation and 
yet they are liberated in their singularity and potentiality.   
Just as Blake’s bounding lines are a critical example of his ontological aesthetics, 
they also demonstrate how aesthetics can open the possibility of nontyrranical space.30 
Ibata offers an analysis of the Blake’s bounding line as embodying a gesture or process 
rather than a finite closure.  She explains that the line “may perhaps be best understood as 
an attempt to give form without actually binding, an expressive play rather than an 
authoritative delimitation, in which the dynamic and expressive gesture of the artist 
overrides the concern of adequacy between imagined form and represented outline” (45).  
                                                
29 Blake uses the terms “Minute Particulars” and “peculiar light” in Jerusalem, as I 
discuss below. 
30 Frosch has made a connection between Blake’s use of outline and his break with 
traditional eighteenth-century articulations of the sublime.  Frosch notes that Blake’s 
insistence on producing “sharply discriminated forms” in his visual designs is a rejection 
of “the spacious in the deliberately vague, the infinite in the boundless” underlying 
contemporary articulations of the sublime (128). 
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“To bound,” of course, carries associations of both restriction and emancipation, and 
whether one sees with multiple Vision or single vision will shape the interpretation of 
meaning in Blake’s texts.  In Jerusalem, Blake states, “so he who wishes to see a Vision; 
a perfect Whole / Must see it in its Minute Particulars” (91:20-21, E251), and that, “In 
Great Eternity, every particular Form gives forth or Emanates / Its own peculiar Light, & 
the Form is the Divine Vision / And the Light is his Garment” (54:1-3, E203).  It is by 
employing this nonempirical, reconstituted “peculiar Light” of Blakean Vision that the 
reader experiences the exemptive sublime. 
The freedom that resides at the center of Blakean aesthetics is a matter of the 
heart.  The Enlightenment angel of Reason cannot drive the interpretive process; rather, it 
is by using the manifold senses embodied in Vision that one can reconstitute meaning, 
and, thus, experience the emancipation rather than imprisonment of form.  Liberty for 
Blake is not grounded in codified laws or social customs; rather, it comes in the form of 
enthusiastic “Mercy Pity Peace” and, above all, “Love.”  Love is “Lawless wingd & 
unconfind / And breaks all chains from every mind,” including those from the mind of 
Blake’s reader with Vision who finds liberation in the exemptive sublime.  Just as 
Blake’s texts emphasize reading as a mode of process and becoming in which readers are 
offered an emancipated interpretive field, so too do they offer “a way of being with which 
an imposed logic of regulation would be incompatible, unnecessary, redundant: a form-
of-life which does not recognize the existence of the law” (Makdisi, Impossible History 
262).  In “Being-for-the-Other,” Emmanuel Levinas explains that a first principle based 
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on the “possibility of disinterestedness” is only irrational under our current philosophical 
and socio-political paradigms.  Levinas explains that 
 
[i]n this possibility of disinterestedness, in this goodness, the awakening to 
biblical humanity is produced: to respond to the other, to the priority of the other, 
the asymmetry between me and the other, him always before me, man as an 
irrational animal, or rational according to a new reason.  (120) 
 
Blake wholeheartedly rejects the Enlightenment valorization of reason.  Yet his insistence 
that Love will bring emancipation, that “The most sublime act is to set another before 
you” (The Marriage of Heaven and Hell 7:17, E36), is not irrational, even if it is “rational 
according to a new reason.”  And from the Blakean new reason, from the regeneration of 
Blakean ontological aesthetics, we move beyond the possibility of justice. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
CONCLUSION: EXTERIORITY AND 
 
THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 
 
 
The hostage is the one who is found responsible for what he has not done.  . . . I 
am in principle responsible, prior to the justice that makes distributions, before the 
measurements of justice.  
—Emmanuel Levinas, “The Proximity of the Other” 
 
 
“Now is the time! — save and protect me!  . . . Do not you desert me in the hour 
of trial!” 
—the Monster, Mary Shelley, Frankenstein 
 
 
Overture(s) redux 
This dissertation considers how some British literature of the 1790s proposes that 
open, nontyrranical, empathetic human exchange is not only at the center of sensibility 
and the sublime but also at the heart of subjectivity.  While for some scholars there is an 
urge to separate literature from “real world” affairs, throughout this dissertation I have 
been arguing that aesthetics is an overture for talking about and understanding the 
possibility of “real world” justice.  There is no dispute that governing bodies and courts 
can, and routinely do, enact justice.  The British Reform Bills of 1832 and 1867 
(redistributing parliamentary representation and extending voting rights) and, in the 
United States, the nineteenth amendment to the Constitution (in 1919 granting women the 
right to vote), the Brown v. Board of Education decision of 1954 (holding that 
segregation in public schools on the basis of race is unconstitutional), and the Civil 
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Rights Act of 1964 (outlawing many forms of racial and gender discrimination) are 
merely some of the numerous, groundbreaking laws that embody (to varying degrees) an 
egalitarian ethos.  And yet around the world, the state of equality between people in a 
geographical region as vast as a country or as small as a town is in dire straits.  Our 
reliance on juridical legality alone has failed, and, as this dissertation has been proposing, 
we must seek elsewhere to understand the possibility of justice. 
 In the previous chapters, I demonstrated how aesthetics can be a generative space 
for articulating the possibility of justice.  Namely, I argued that the radical rewriting of 
the aesthetic categories of sensibility and the sublime by Helen Maria Williams, Mary 
Wollstonecraft, William Godwin, and William Blake was also a radical rethinking about 
social justice and the essential relational, communal element that underlies subjectivity.  I 
also proved that for these writers, there is no definitive separation between sensibility, the 
sublime, and justice: without sensibility, one cannot experience the sublime, and the 
sublime for these writers is always tied to an understanding about justice as well as about 
the unseverable tie between self and other.  In this chapter, a conclusion in the rhetorical 
sense, but, I hope, not an end to the overtures we make concerning justice, I consider 
what these rewritten aesthetic categories and reconfigured ideas about social justice and 
communal subjectivity look like in a cornerstone text of the British late Romantic era, 
Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus (1818).1  Written by the 
                                                
1 I have elected to use the 1818 (rather than the significantly revised 1831) version of 
Frankenstein.  In addition to the fact that the 1818 version is closer in historical 
proximity to the literature of the 1790s I discuss in this dissertation, this version, as Anne 
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daughter of Godwin and Wollstonecraft, Frankenstein is a logical bookend to this 
dissertation both historically and biographically.  Still more compelling is the way 
Shelley’s novel extends rewritten sensibility2 and the sublime3 past aesthetic categories 
and into the realm of ethical hospitality.   
Ethical hospitality requires that we act to secure peace and protection not only for 
those whom we recognize as similar, that is, our friends and neighbors, but for those who 
are drastically different, that is, those to whom we might otherwise refer as our enemies.  
As I discussed in previous chapters, Williams’s “An American Tale” and Godwin’s 
Caleb Williams invoke elements of ethical hospitality; in Frankenstein, it is a driving 
concern of the text.  Frankenstein is a text about what happens when one does not look 
outside of the law to determine what responsibilities one has towards the other and 
instead endeavors to negate alterity and destroy the other.  The radical novelty of 
Frankenstein’s experiment and the monstrous “child” whom Frankenstein births 
                                                
K. Mellor explains, places a strong emphasis on Frankenstein’s personal responsibility 
and culpability for the monster, whereas the 1831 version suggests that fate has a large 
role to play in the events that unfold in the novel.  See Mellor, “Choosing a Text of 
Frankenstein to Teach.” 
2 For a treatment of sensibility in Frankenstein, see Bour, who concludes that attempts at 
empathetic benevolence are dreadful failures in the novel.  See also Hatch for a 
discussion of how the emotions of shame and disgust in the novel disrupt sympathetic 
connections. 
3 See Gigante, who distinguishes between the ugly and the sublime and finds, under 
Burke’s construction of the sublime, that Frankenstein does not portray sublime 
experiences of positive elevation. 
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emphasizes how human-made laws alone cannot sufficiently determine who acts justly 
and unjustly in the text.  Indeed, even though it is the monster who commits multiple and 
brutal murders, as readers we find ourselves placing culpability for these illegal crimes 
not on the monster but, at least in part, on Frankenstein.   
Some of this indeterminacy pertaining to culpability in the novel arises from the 
formal narrative structure of the text itself.  Comprised of three volumes, Frankenstein’s 
story occupies volumes one and three and the monster’s tale makes up the second 
volume.  However, although the volumes are told in first-person narration, Frankenstein 
and the monster are not the narrators.  The story is told by Walton as told to him by 
Frankenstein, and takes the form of letters sent from Walton’s arctic voyage to his sister 
in England.  Indeed, by his own admission Walton does not make a real-time, direct 
transcription of Frankenstein’s tale but rather “every night, when I am not engaged, [I] 
record, as nearly as possible in his own words, what he has related during the day.  If I 
should be engaged, I will at least make notes” (19).  Even the monster himself addresses 
the narrative injustice that has shaped Walton’s opinion of him: “You, who call 
Frankenstein your friend, seem to have a knowledge of my crimes and his misfortunes.  
But, in the detail which he gave you of them, he could not sum up the hours and months 
of misery which I endured, wasting in impotent passions” (184).  The monster’s 
perspective and even the “facts” of the story are filtered through Frankenstein and then 
through Walton.  Thus, the reader may feel uncomfortable placing guilt squarely on the 
monster, as the monster has never had an opportunity to plead his case in his own voice. 
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The indeterminacy with which we figure guilt and innocence in the novel stems 
more significantly from the fact that Frankenstein has committed a crime, even if he has 
broken no legal codes.  Frankenstein has neglected his responsibility to offer hospitality 
to the monster, and this neglect has caused not only an unjust act vis-à-vis an ethical 
trespass but also a crisis in Frankenstein’s own identity formation.  At the core of the 
ethical philosophy of hospitality are many of the elements that characterize the rewritten 
aesthetic categories of sensibility and the sublime: human exchange, empathetic love, a 
realization about social injustice, and an understanding about the communal nature of 
subjectivity.  Thus, by reading Frankenstein alongside the theory of hospitality, we also 
continue the inquiry into how the novel further rewrites sensibility and the sublime. 
 
Passing the aporia in Frankenstein 
Both Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida4 have written extensively about 
hospitality as both justice and subjectivity.  This justice, however, is not juridical justice 
in the sense of legally sanctioned and culturally codified designations about legal 
culpability or innocence.  Levinas explains that welcoming the other means being 
responsible for the other even without culpability: 
 
                                                
4 In “Monstrous Ingratitude: Hospitality in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein,” Peter Melville 
considers Frankenstein alongside Derrida’s theory of hospitality.  Quite surprisingly 
given the debt to Levinas that Derrida himself professes in relation to Derrida’s theory of 
hospitality, Melville excludes Levinas from his inquiry and limits his discussion to 
Derridean hospitality in the novel. 
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If the other does something, it is I who am responsible.  The hostage is the one 
who is found responsible for what he has not done.  The one is responsible for the 
sin of the other.  I am in principle responsible, prior to the justice that makes 
distributions, before the measurements of justice.  . . . The other engages you in a 
situation where you are obligated without culpability, but your obligation is not 
less for all that.  It is at the same time a charge.  It is heavy and, if you will, 
goodness is just that.  (“Proximity” 216) 
 
Obligation without culpability, what Levinas calls “being-for-the-other,” is what turns the 
hospitable host into a hostage.  Building upon Levinas’s theory of hospitality, in Adieu to 
Emmanuel Levinas Derrida emphasizes how the concept of host as hostage is 
encapsulated in the French word “hôte,” which means both host and guest (56).  This 
word also carries with it the negative aspect of being hostage, as “host” “allows itself to 
be parasitized by its opposite, ‘hostility,’ the undesirable guest which it harbors as the 
self-contradiction in its own body” (Derrida, “Hospitality” 3).  Thus, subjectivity operates 
within a paradigm in which the being-host and the being-hostage is the responsibility of 
the I (Derrida, Adieu 55). 
In Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, Levinas posits that subjectivity 
is built upon the edict that an individual has a responsibility to welcome and not do 
violence to the other.  For Derrida, hospitality requires one to bid enter with only a “oui,” 
a “yes.”  This affirmative declaration is a coming to pass without pas, without “no.”  The 
coming to pass of self and other, of “we”—of “oui”—without assimilation, is prior to 
constructions of humans and monsters, and creates a space for the kadosh, which Derrida 
explains is the holiness of the separated.  Indeed, were Frankenstein to engage in what 
Derrida terms in “Violence and Metaphysics” an “ethico-metaphysical moment” (92) of 
welcoming the other, of bidding the monster to enter, paradoxically he would have 
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created “a metaphysics of infinite separation” (92-93).  Significantly, the holiness of the 
separated comes in peace, not in war.  The violence of alterity in Frankenstein, the war 
that Frankenstein wages on the monster, and that the monster wages in return after 
“misery has made [him] a fiend,” destroys the identity, and eventually the existence, of 
both human and monster, for, as Levinas explains, “[w]ar does not manifest exteriority 
and the other as other; it destroys the identity of the same” (Totality 21). 
If, as Derrida states in Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas, hospitality is “the declaration 
of peace itself” (47), then the way in which Frankenstein faces the monster at their first 
meeting after Frankenstein’s initial rejection is the declaration of war itself.  Indeed, 
rather than acting as host, Frankenstein reflects the Hegelian notion that self-
consciousness and individuation is achieved by attempting to preserve the primacy of the 
self by doing violence to the other and positing the other as to-be-overcome (Russon 54-
55).  Frankenstein recounts: 
 
I perceived, as the shape came nearer, (sight tremendous and abhorred!) that it 
was the wretch whom I had created.  I trembled with rage and horror, resolving to 
wait his approach, and then close with him in mortal combat.  He approached; his 
countenance bespoke bitter anguish, combined with distain and malignity, while 
its unearthly ugliness rendered it almost too horrible for human eyes.  But I 
scarcely observed this; anger and hatred had at first deprived me of utterance, and 
I recovered only to overwhelm him with words expressive of furious detestation 
and contempt. 
 
“Devil!” I exclaimed, “do you dare approach me? and do you not fear the fierce 
vengeance of my arm wreaked on your miserable head?  Begone, vile insect! or 
rather stay, that I may trample you to dust!”  (76) 
 
At this meeting, Frankenstein reacts to the radical alterity of the monster with violence. 
He “scarcely observed” the countenance of the monster due to his visceral feeling of 
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wanting to demolish its very existence, and due to his hope of totalizing all difference and 
obtaining complete mastery and absolute ownership over the other (Botting 131).   
That one must depend on something outside of oneself to individuate and form 
self-consciousness is a cornerstone of Hegelian dialectics (Brivic 55), and, ultimately, 
vastly troubling to Hegel, just as it is to Frankenstein.  As opposed to Levinasian being-
for-the-other, in which individuation arises through sociability, in Phenomenology of 
Spirit Hegel articulates a theory of subjectivity that is being-for-itself, in which 
individuation arises through totalization.   
 
The conceptual necessity of the experience through which the consciousness 
discovers that the Thing is demolished by the very determinateness that 
constitutes its essence and its being-for-self, can be summarized as follows.  The 
Thing is posited as being for itself, or as the absolute negation of all otherness, 
therefore as purely self-related negation; but the negation that is self-related is the 
suspension of itself; in other words, the Thing has its essential being in another 
Thing.  (76) 
 
Hegel’s “solution” to the fact that consciousness formation is not a self-executing 
process—that consciousness always relies on a relationship with the exterior other and 
develops within a relational framework—is to negate, appropriate, and consume the other 
into I.  This solution involves Hegel’s notion of the necessity to overcome otherness, the 
notion that “conscience knows it must force its will upon others” (Russon 104).  For 
Hegel, consciousness is an act of violence.  The consciousness calls for a process of 
“nullifying the object as distinct [from it], appropriating it as its own, and proclaiming 
itself as this certainty of being all reality, of being both itself and its object” (144).  
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With its emphasis on power, totalization, distance, separation, and isolation, the 
Hegelian process of individuation is reminiscent of the Burkean sublime.  As I discuss in 
previous chapters, Williams, Wollstonecraft, Godwin, and Blake reject Burke’s notion of 
the sublime.  In Frankenstein, however, Shelley maintains the conservative elements of 
the Burkean sublime.  Almost all of the face-to-face interactions between Frankenstein 
and the monster take place in natural settings that are deeply reminiscent of the Burkean 
sublime.  For example, Frankenstein and the monster meet on a “sea of ice,” a glacier at 
the foot of Mont Blanc, which Frankenstein describes as an isolated space of extremely 
dangerous terrain that houses no signs of life: 
 
The surface is very uneven, rising like the waves of a troubled sea, descending 
low, and interspersed by rifts that sink deep.  The field of ice is almost a league in 
width, but I spent nearly two hours in crossing it.  The opposite mountain is a bare 
perpendicular rock.  From the side where I now stood Montanvert was exactly 
opposite, at the distance of a league; and above it rose Mont Blanc, in awful 
majesty.  I remained in a recess of the rock, gazing on this wonderful and 
stupendous scene.  (76) 
 
Frankenstein’s characterization of the “stupendous scene” focuses on grandeur and 
power, extreme isolation, physical danger, and passive human appropriation by energetic 
divine nature.  However, although Shelley invokes some of the aesthetic touchstones of 
the Burkean sublime, there is no sublime moment of understanding between Frankenstein 
and the monster in this face-to-face meeting on the sea of ice.  Rather, Frankenstein 
begins to have a sublime experience before the monster approaches (“My heart, which 
was before sorrowful, now swelled with something like joy” (76)), but this fortifying 
experience is immediately ended upon his seeing the monster.  In sharp contrast to 
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experiences of the sublime in Williams’s texts, for example, wherein sublime moments 
are triggered by an intersubjective, empathetic response in the face of difference, in 
Shelley’s text experiences of the sublime are shut down because of Frankenstein’s refusal 
to engage in the subjective process of individuation through relational sociability and his 
inability to see past the alterity of the monster’s face. 
  Relational sociability is the “alterity of the face, of the for-the-other which calls 
me to account” (Levinas, “Proximity” 215).  For Levinas, the face is not the physical 
features that distinguish one individual from another; rather, the face is the existence of  
the other as “the Stranger who disturbs the being at home with oneself” (Totality 39).  
The face is not an identifiable, nameable, biological structure, but rather the embodiment 
of our responsibility to the alterity of the other.  In Totality and Infinity, Levinas explains 
that the responsibility that arises from the “ethico-metaphysical encounter” between I and 
other “is an optics.  But it is a ‘vision’ without image, bereft of the synoptic and totalizing 
objectifying virtues of vision, a relation or an intentionality of a wholly different type” 
(23).  The subjugation of the biological face to the face as a peaceful welcoming of the 
radical other bears striking similarities to Blake’s extreme rewriting of sensibility as 
Vision.  Recall that Vision for Blake is not an empirical, singular sense that is conducted 
via the biological eye; rather, Vision is a practice rooted in the “Mercy Pity Peace and 
Love” of the “human form divine.”  Indeed, for Blake relying on vision—rather than 
Vision—is a violent practice that continues the cycle of repression of the human psyche 
and body by people such as orthodox religious leaders and government figures.   
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In another notable parallel between vision-the face and Vision-welcoming the alterity of 
the face, the monstrous, insensible violence of Blakean physical vision and the 
Levinasian physical face is dramatically played out in the deformed countenance of the 
monster in Frankenstein. 
Because the monster’s countenance is so repulsive to Frankenstein and propels 
Frankenstein to take up arms against him, the monster in one scene covers Frankenstein’s 
eyes with his hands and exclaims: “I take from thee a sight which you abhor.  Still thou 
canst listen to me, and grant me thy compassion” (78).  The monster’s act of taking away 
Frankenstein’s reliance on his eyes initially does begin to invoke a hospitable—or 
Visionary—response from Frankenstein.  As the monster begins to relate his story to 
Frankenstein, the scientist expresses that “for the first time . . . I felt what the duties of a 
creator towards his creature were, and that I ought to render him happy before I 
complained of his wickedness” (79).  As the monster and Frankenstein sit in the 
monster’s hut by the fire, the archetype of communal welcome, Frankenstein is able to 
listen to what the monster so desperately wants him to hear.  Unfortunately, at the close 
of the monster’s tale, the monster insists that Frankenstein “comply with my conditions” 
or the monster will destroy Frankenstein’s remaining friends (77).  Once again becoming 
embroiled in anger, Frankenstein meets this threat by returning to his former, violent 
stance that “there can be no community between you and me; we are enemies” (77). 
The fleeting compassion that Frankenstein feels for the monster is not to be 
confused with hospitality.  Frankenstein is obligated to serve as host—and hostage—to 
the monster due to the responsibility that arises from the command, the alterity, of the 
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other.  However, Frankenstein not only refuses this call to action to engage in an “ethico-
metaphysical moment,” but attempts to mute it entirely.  Indeed, I argue that the moments 
of compassion are in fact just as violent as the moments in which Frankenstein openly 
declares war on the monster, for Frankenstein’s compassion in these moments arises from 
his recognition of the monster as the same, not as other:  
 
I was moved. . . . I felt that there was some justice in his argument.  His tale, and 
the feelings he now expressed, proved him to be a creature of fine sensations; and 
did I not, as his maker, owe him all the portions of happiness that it was in my 
power to bestow?  (118)   
 
Frankenstein is moved by the monster’s superior ability to reason, put forth eloquent 
arguments about the nature of justice, and understand the subtleties of language and 
feeling; namely, Frankenstein is moved by what makes the monster human to 
Frankenstein.5   
The complex linguistic and psychological skills that the monster demonstrates are 
what makes Frankenstein proud of his creation, of his “son,” and makes him feel 
connected to the monster through what is the same between them, or even, what 
Frankenstein aspires to be.  But an encounter between the same is merely kinship, 
whereas hospitality arises out of an encounter between strangers (Levinas, “Proximity” 
                                                
5 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak has noted that Frankenstein attempts “to tame the monster, 
to humanize him by bringing him within the circuit of the Law” when Frankenstein 
appeals for help from a magistrate (258).  The Law, however, cannot regulate the 
monster’s behavior, because, as Spivak argues, “the absolutely Other cannot be selfed” 
and that “the monster has ‘properties’ which will not be contained by ‘proper’ measures” 
(258). 
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211).  Frankenstein himself acknowledges that while he feels compassion and 
responsibility for the monster when the monster arouses within him what is same, he is 
repulsed when what is different comes to the fore.  Frankenstein describes how the 
monster’s “words had a strange effect upon me.  I compassioned him, and sometimes felt 
a wish to console him; but when I looked upon him, when I saw the filthy mass that 
moved and talked, my heart sickened, and my feelings were altered to those of horror and 
hatred” (119).  Frankenstein’s extreme change of heart upon recognizing the alterity of 
the monster demonstrates how one is not at peace with the other by welcoming the other 
as same, for, as Derrida explains, “[s]o long as what is other as other will not have been 
in some way ‘welcomed’ in epiphany, in the withdrawal or visitation of its face, it would 
make no sense to speak of peace.  With the same, one is never at peace” (Adieu 85).  
 The peace, the welcoming, that comes from exteriority, from what is other, arises 
outside of, exterior to, the law.  Previous chapters have shown how it is frequently the 
outlaws, those who are exterior to the law or who are othered by the law, who possess 
extreme sensibility and experience sublime realizations about injustice and communal 
subjectivity.6  For example, Williams’s Mons. du Fossé, Wollstonecraft’s Maria, 
                                                
6 Perhaps with poetic justice given its argument about nonjuridical, aesthetic overtures for 
the possibility of justice, this dissertation is based upon writers who may also be regarded 
as outlaws.  Rewriting  sensibility and the sublime to argue for egalitarianism and 
recognition of the communal nature of the “individual” self, Williams, Wollstonecraft, 
Godwin, and Blake did so at tremendous personal risk and in spite of expanding 
restrictions on freedoms of expression.  With the suspension of habeas corpus in 1794 
and the Treasonable Practices Act and Seditious Meetings Act of 1795, the British 
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Godwin’s Raymond, and Blake’s Urizen all transgress written laws and social customs to 
find, as Maria calls it, their “own sense of justice,” a justice that is exterior to the law.  
Indeed, as I argue in chapter 3, Raymond is a paragon of justice in the hideously unjust 
world of juridical prosecution and persecution of Caleb Williams because he embodies 
nonjuridical justice in the form of hospitality.  In contrast, the characters who enact grave 
injustice (most notably Williams’s Baron du Fossé, Wollstonecraft’s Venables, and 
Godwin’s Tyrrel) work with the complicity of the law and act according to an 
insensibility that is nothing short of monstrous.  In Frankenstein, the outlaw De Lacey 
offers an opportunity to further examine how hospitality is an extension and later 
iteration of radical sensibility and the sublime. 
One of the most acute scenes of the injustice of failed hospitality in the novel 
takes place not between the monster and his creator, but between the monster and his 
fellow outlaw, De Lacey.  After months of watching—and coming to deeply care for—
the De Lacey family without their knowledge, the monster determines to present himself 
at the threshold of their home and seek hospitality from them.  Fearing that his grotesque 
appearance may prove an insurmountable obstacle upon first glance, and dreading what 
he calls the “barbarity of man,” the monster waits until all of the De Laceys are out 
except for the eldest of the family, who is blind.7  Just as when the monster covers 
Frankenstein’s eyes in an attempt to invoke a hospitable response arising from multiple 
                                                
government forcefully sought to curtail any voices of dissent and arrested some friends of 
these writers, such as John Thelwall, John Horne Tooke, and Thomas Hardy. 
7 For a study of Frankenstein’s critique of sighted culture and its privileging of words 
over visual evidence, see Joshua. 
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Vision—rather than a violent one arising from single vision—initial encounter intimates 
that the monster will finally receive the hospitality, the justice, that he desperately seeks.  
The monster recalls: 
 
I knocked.  “Who is there?” said the old man—“Come in.” 
 
I entered; “Pardon this intrusion,” said I, “I am a traveller in want of a little rest; 
you would greatly oblige me, if you would allow me to remain a few minutes 
before the fire.” 
 
“Enter,” said De Lacey; “and I will try in what manner I can to receive your 
wants; but, unfortunately, my children are from home, and, as I am blind, I am 
afraid I shall find it difficult to procure food for you.” 
 
“Do not trouble yourself, my kind host, I have food; it is warmth and rest only 
that I need.”  (107)  
 
As a “kind host,” De Lacey bids the monster to enter his home without awaiting an 
answer to his question “Who is there,” indicating that De Lacey does not fear intrusions 
by strangers, does not fear an interruption of his “being at home with oneself.”  Indeed, 
later in their encounter, De Lacey refers to the monster as “stranger,” and attaches no 
negative connotations to the appellation.   
Further, De Lacey is concerned not with his burden, with his being host(age), but 
merely concerned that he will not be able to provide food for the monster in a timely 
fashion.  The discourse between De Lacey and the monster continues in a manner that 
suggests that the monster will be recognized both as other and as honored guest.  
Speaking with the monster, De Lacey reveals his belief about the nature of humanity in a 
way that resonates strongly with Adam Smith’s articulation of how an “impartial 
spectator” guides one’s benevolent, fellow-feeling toward others, an articulation that is at 
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the center of sensibility.  De Lacy states that “the hearts of men, when unprejudiced by 
any obvious self-interest, are full of brotherly love and charity” (107).  He then proves his 
adherence to this sentiment when he tells the monster that he will do whatever he can to 
help the monster, exclaiming: “I am poor, and an exile; but it will afford me true pleasure 
to be in any way serviceable to a human creature” (108).   
De Lacey tells the monster “I feel for your misfortunes” (108), and, although he 
cannot offer food or luxuries to the monster, he bids the monster enter with only a oui.  
Unfortunately, this hospitality is short lived, and the encounter turns violent when the 
other De Lacey family members return.  Although the De Laceys are exiles who were 
wrongfully accused of a crime and forced out of their country, they continue to define 
justice in restrictive, juridical terms.  Even as the monster beseeches the eldest, blind De 
Lacey to shelter him against the cruelty of humanity, to answer his call as host, to “save 
and protect me,” crying out “Do not you desert me in the hour of trial” (108), the blind 
De Lacey is silent and the sighted De Laceys wage war on the monster, physically 
beating him and driving him from their home.  The De Laceys, like the monster, are 
borderless hostages without a homeland, and yet even they cannot access enough 
sensibility to experience a sublime moment about the necessity of extending justice to the 
other.  They cannot engage in what Blake refers to as “the most sublime act” of setting 
another, setting an other, setting the monster, before them because they see only the 
radical alterity of his physical countenance with their biological eyes.  To see with 
Blakean Vision is to “identify another as distinct, but beloved in its distinction” (Frosch 
127).  The sighted De Laceys are as equally blind as their elderly father; because the 
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family has no sensibility/Vision, they can offer no hospitality, and thus no justice, in the 
face of difference. 
It is critical to once again reflect upon the fact that hospitality is grounded on 
exteriority, but not on proximity (Levinas, Totality 38).  The Stranger forces a being to 
posit himself or herself as a relational being, but the relation is not one of geographic 
distance; it is not a relation reducible to the “I am here” and “the other is there.”  Justice 
as hospitality and subjectivity requires one to acknowledge that I “house” an other in I.  
That the other disturbs this “being at home with oneself,” and that the non-biological 
countenance of the other is a call for responsibility on the part of the host, on the part of 
the I, is what the characters in Frankenstein cannot face.  The alterity of the countenance 
of the monster is inescapable, and the characters in Frankenstein attempt to deface and 
assimilate the exteriority of the other through totalization.  Because no one in 
Frankenstein is able to see with Vision past the monster’s face to welcome the other 
through relational sociability, there is no justice, no coming to pass, for anyone.  Indeed, 
while some characters, such as Walton, may act at times with benevolent kindness, 
hospitality, and thus justice, arises only in the face of difference. 
As an explorer searching for an arctic passage, Walton exists in a space of 
possibility.  Frequently perilously trapped in a broken sea of ice, Walton’s boat is neither 
freely at sea nor firmly on land.  His crew lives on the brink of death due to the extreme, 
natural hazards inherent in their arctic location, and he is consumed with nursing 
Frankenstein back from death as the scientist slips in and out of consciousness.  As 
captain, Walton’s identity is grounded in authority, custom, and codes of conduct, yet as 
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head of a ship breaking unchartered territory he also embodies lawlessness.  Upon saving 
Frankenstein from the sea of ice, Walton gladly shelters his dying guest.  Walton offers 
Frankenstein nourishing food and even his captain’s cabin.  Although Walton frequently 
refers to Frankenstein as his “guest” and “the stranger,” there is nothing strange about 
Frankenstein in the eyes of Walton.  Indeed, the two characters are so similar that at times 
Walton seems to be Frankenstein’s doppelgänger.  Thus, the help Walton offers to 
Frankenstein may be kind, but ethical hospitality arises only in the face of that which is 
radically different. 
Speaking of the aporia that exists between host and guest—between self and 
other—in hospitality, Derrida characterizes the space of passing, entering, and crossing 
that must come to pass between self and other using Levinas’s notion of exteriority but 
not proximity: 
 
The “I enter,” crossing the threshold, this “I pass” . . . puts us on the path, if I may 
say, of the aporos or of the aporia: the difficulty of the impracticable, here the 
impossible, passage, the refused, denied, or prohibited passage, indeed the 
nonpassage, which can in fact be something else, the event of a coming or of a 
future advent, which no longer has the form of the movement that consists in 
passing, traversing, or transiting.  It would be the “coming to pass” of an event 
that would no longer have the form or the appearance of a pas: in sum, a coming 
without pas.  (8) 
 
This space, this coming to pass, is much like the sublime and the Blakean exemptive 
sublime I describe in the previous chapters: it is a space of justice, liberation, and 
realization about the communal nature of self and other, and a space is reached through 
human(e) sensibility.  It is a space of possibility, not demarcated geography.  This space 
is also reminiscent of the alternative space, the “progression,” that arises from the 
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dynamism of Blakean contraries.  As Blake states in The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, 
“Without Contraries is no progression.”  Blakean contraries enact mutability and 
progress, not cancellation and totalization. 
If we approach the aporia between self and other, between enacting justice and 
injustice, as an approach into juridical exteriority, into, for example, aesthetics and 
hospitality, we find that the aporia is, after all, not impassable.  Justice is individuation 
based on the radical—though peaceful—alterity of the encounter, the call that commands 
one to respond, to become, to come to pass as hostage and as host, as hôte.  Recognizing 
and answering the call of responsibility for the other creates an eternal separation, an 
absolute distance, but not an impassable aporia.  Note again that the kadosh, the holiness 
of the separated, comes in peace, not in war.  The distance that comes in war will never 
hold, and it is time that we come to pass.
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